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Moral cognition has a prominent social nature. We routinely discuss moral issues in our 
social groups, deliberate together on moral grounds, and collectively make moral decisions 
and judgments. This thesis investigates moral decisions and judgments in collective contexts 
in and for human groups.  
In chapter 1, I review the relation between collective cognition and moral cognition. 
Defining the scope of this work to carve out its territory, I show how this thesis connects 
the early studies in collective moral psychology to the recent findings in the field of 
collective moral cognition. In particular, I investigate collective moral cognition (chapter 
2), collective moral judgments (chapter 3), and collective moral actions (chapter 4) in three 
separate manuscripts.  
In chapter 2 (manuscript one), I argue how collective moral cognition (e.g., moral 
judgments and decisions) differ from individual moral cognition. Furthermore, I discuss 
how collective moral decisions and judgments differ from non-moral decisions and 
judgments made by collectives.  
After theoretical examination of these two questions in the literature, the thesis proceeds 
with the description of the empirical evidence conducted in two lines of work. In one line 
(chapter 3, manuscript two), I examine how collectives (i.e., groups of interacting 
individuals) arrive at consensus judgments for moral dilemmas. In particular, based on the 
theoretical models developed in chapter 2, I discuss how group-based emotions, social 
deliberation, and social motivations can shape collective moral judgments in small groups. 
Comparing collective judgments to those made by independent individuals, I examine three 
hypotheses showing how collective moral judgments can differ from the statistical 
 
 
aggregate of individual judgments. Consistent with one hypothesis, the findings of my study 
show that collectives are more utilitarian than individuals. The underlying mechanisms of 
this collective utilitarian boost are discussed.  
In the other line (chapter 4 - manuscript three), I examine the mechanisms through which 
people seek to punish individuals in collective moral transgressions differently than solo 
violations. I compare the punishment judgments in collective vs. individual moral 
transgressions by assessing how individuals seek to punish moral violations done jointly 
with others vs. alone. My findings show that individuals within a group receive less 
punishment for collective harmful actions compared to when they do them alone. Moreover, 
across several experiments, the role of intention, outcome, and moral domain (harm vs. 
purity) in the diffusion of punishment is explained. Exploiting discounting accounts in 
causal attribution, I discuss the mechanisms underlying the diffusion of punishment in 
collective actions. 
 In chapter 5, I explain how the collective dimension can be central to moral cognition. 
Concluding the findings of each chapter, the implications for cognitive science, moral 
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While I was doing my Ph.D., an incident greatly influenced me, my family, my friends, 
and my country. On the 8th of January 2020, as widely reported by the international media, 
a passenger plane was shot down by two missiles in Iran, with the loss of all 176 travelers 
and crew. In the aftermath of the tragedy, the Iranian government incorrectly reported that 
a technical malfunction caused the plane crash. Following a litany of claims and denials, the 
government finally admitted that its own army shot down the aircraft due to days of 
heightened military and political tension between Iran and the U.S.  
My 30-year-old friend was on that plane. He is dead now. We lost him twice: the first 
time when the plane crashed and the second time when we finally realized that the 
government had lied. To me, the government's strategic decision to hide the truth is a case 
of a collective moral violation based on a collective decision, which affected many people's 
lives and welfare. 
History can attest to the claim that collective decisions and actions have played critical 
roles in atrocities around the world: from Rwanda mass killings to more recent crimes done 
by terrorist groups such as Al-Qaeda, Taliban, and ISIS, none was conceivable by single 
individuals in isolation, but many were involved.  
I believe that understanding the mechanisms of collective moral decision-making and 
collective actions can help us understand the machinery that can lead to such violations. To 
provide preventive solutions for collective norm violations, we need a deep understanding 
of such mechanisms in groups. 
Think of the global and existential challenges we face today, such as ecological and 
energy issues, global warming, weapons of mass destruction, nuclear agreements, etc. They 
all harbor vital moral concerns that can only be addressed at the collective level. If we ignore 
the collective aspects of morality, we may not reach a collective solution to solve those 
problems.  
Being a woman born and raised in a totalitarian regime, surrounded by fundamentalist 
terror from neighbors to the east and west, I wrote this thesis in the hope of a dream: a better 








A family may discuss ending the life support for a comatose parent. An ethics 
committee may decide to approve a research proposal that involves animal pain. A 
group of strangers may argue whether abortion should be legalized on social media. 
Similar to these examples, moral decisions and judgments have a prominent social 
nature. But how do we assimilate morally relevant information in groups, discuss 
and deliberate together on moral grounds, and reach collective moral decisions and 
judgments? On a more general level, does collective moral cognition possess 
features that make it different from individual moral cognition? Similarly, do 
people judge collective immoral decisions or actions differently from individual 
ones? 
 Aiming to answer these questions posed above, in this thesis, I investigate moral 
cognition in collective contexts. In particular, I examine moral decisions and 
judgments in (and for) human groups. Thus, in this thesis, morality does not refer 
to certain attitudes (e.g., politeness, kindness, etc.) but the content of moral 
cognition and the process through which people integrate morally relevant 
information, emotions, biases, and intuitions in order to make moral decisions and 
judgments in (and for) groups. In addition, this thesis explores collective moral 
cognition at a descriptive level. It concerns what individuals find morally 
acceptable (or unacceptable) rather than what is or ought to be ethically, practically, 
or rationally right. Here, establishing the scope of the thesis, I argue how the 
collective dimension is central to moral decisions, judgments, and actions in the 
literature. 
1.1 Collective moral decisions and judgments 
Previous literature shows that there are fundamental differences between the 
decisions made by individuals vs. groups. In particular, a recent family of views 
underscores the central role of the interaction in human cognition. In the first part, 
reviewing the literature, I discuss the proposal of these recent views (1.1.1). In the 
second part, to evaluate the past in light of the present, I adopt a historical narrative 
to discuss the collective dimension in the moral realm. Rather than being 
exhaustive, my intention is to show how collective and moral cognition were 
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originally entangled in early works of moral psychology but examined 
independently in later years (1.1.2).  
In the third part, highlighting the role of groups in moral cognition, I show how 
the theoretical concepts of collective cognition were recently imported into the 
moral realm. The main focus of this part is on contemporary works that stress the 
differences between I vs. We as the agent of moral decisions and judgments (1.1.3). 
Finally, putting together these three parts, I show how this thesis is the continuation 
of an emerging approach that connects collective cognition to moral cognition 
(1.1.4). 
1.1.1 ‘We’ vs. ‘I’: non-moral domain 
We humans are not single minds encapsulated within isolated craniums, but we 
experience the world through our bodies while interacting with others in dynamic 
environments. Acknowledging this fact, a new turn in cognitive science has 
emerged, which examine human cognition not as abstract information-processing 
units in isolated minds (individualism), but rather as the extensions of bodies 
(embodied cognition, see Varela et al., 1991), with certain affective states (e.g., 
Izard, 1992; Zajonc, 1980), interacting with other minds and other bodies 
(interactionism, e.g., De Jaegher & Di Paolo, 2007). These accounts suggest that 
human information processing is a function of physical, affective, and situational 
signals (Roth & Jornet, 2013) in dynamic environments, coming from interaction 
with others (Gallotti & Frith, 2013). 
A recent trend pushes this movement forward, highlighting the fundamental 
differences between mental processes in isolated individuals vs. interactive groups. 
According to this recent family of views, the cognitive mechanisms of collective 
actions cannot be understood merely by examining the individuals involved in them 
(e.g., Michael, 2011; Sebanz et al., 2006). In fact, when people interact, certain 
group dynamics may arise that make collective actions fundamentally different 
from the sum of the individuals’ actions in groups (Gallotti & Frith, 2013). 
 During the interaction, people may align their minds (and bodies) and share 
their resources to bring about a change in the world together (Sebanz et al., 2006). 
In such cases, they may no longer process the information from a first-person 
perspective (as single observers), but they adopt a shared perspective to act and 
think collectively (Tuomela, 2007). It is argued that the shared perspective in 
collective actions can also modulate abstract thinking, decisions, and judgments 
(Herschbach, 2012; Thompson & Stapleton, 2009). Thus, when people are in 
groups, and they jointly make collective decisions, they may exhibit certain features 
that they may not show should they act as individuals without such shared 
perspective (Tuomela, 2007). Moreover, during interactions, people may have 
access to the information differently than what they would have as mere observers. 
Interactions, therefore, can lead to group-level information processing, which may 
be different from the statistical aggregate of individual mental processes (Higgins, 
2020).  
1.1 Collective moral decisions and judgments 
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Scholars have referred to this approach by various terms such as ‘we-
perspective’ ‘we mode’, ‘we-ness’ (see Tuomela, 2007), ‘shared intentionality,’ 
‘co-cognition ‘, ‘interactionism’ (Gallotti & Frith, 2013), ‘2nd person cognitive 
science’ (Schilbach et al., 2013) ‘interactive turn’, ‘participatory sense-making (see 
De Jaegher & Di Paolo, 2007), and ‘collective psychology’ (see Wilson, 2004). All 
of these terms revolve around one single idea: when a group thinks, decides, or acts 
as one single agent, it cannot be reduced to its individual parts (Bratman, 2014; 
Michael, 2011; Salmela, 2012; Sebanz et al., 2006; Tuomela, 2007; Wilson, 2004). 
The common denominator of these recent collective-interactive accounts is the 
emphasis on certain interactions that lead to fundamental differences between the 
two modes of cognition, i.e., ‘I’ vs. ‘We’ mode: in the latter, the agent of the action 
or the decision is more than one person; thus, different mechanisms may emerge 
during the interaction, making the latter dissimilar to the former. Acknowledging 
this fact, the disagreement between different accounts within this family of views 
is mostly on the conditions (and the extent to which) this emergence may occur.  
Not all cognitive mechanisms modulated by groups have such collective nature. 
For instance, basic forms of interaction may not require ‘we’ perspective. Such 
interactions introduce a novel social context that can affect individual behaviors. 
Examples of such effects are emotional contagion, facial imitation, or motor 
mimicry, which happen merely in the presence of others, or simply by observing 
the expressions of emotions or certain body states in them (see Hutto, 2004). What 
collective accounts suggest, however, is beyond these basic forms of interactions. 
The collectivist accounts propose that interactions are indeed critical settings that 
create a common ground, a shared sphere for collective cognition (Higgins, 2020). 
This shared sphere is primarily related to higher-level interactions (not merely due 
to observations or the presence of others), which may involve joint actions, 
coordination, communication, or shared intention (but see Gallotti et al., 2017).  
Note that the emphasis here is not on the fact that mental processes are affected 
by high-level interactions. In other words, the mental states may be simply affected 
by other minds (or bodies), even in higher-level interactions, without the need for a 
shared perspective. For instance, when people collaborate, they may keep track of 
what others think, believe, intend, desire, etc. Therefore, they may attribute mental 
states to others, trying to infer the contents of these mental states to adjust their 
actions accordingly. Although these processes are the result of high-level 
interactions, they still happen at the individual level.  
The argument of the ‘collective’ accounts, however, is that social dynamics in 
group interaction can create novel features that are different from what happens in 
single minds (Wilson, 2004). In such cases, the interactions seem to create distinct 
access to information (Tuomela, 2007) while it enriches cognition (Gallotti & Frith, 
2013). Therefore, ascribed mental states that may prevent or encourage people to 
behave in certain ways in groups can occur at the individual level. But when people 
act as groups, such collective individual mental representations may create a shared 
perspective resulting from the interaction itself. Thus, due to the emergent 
properties arising at the collective level, group information processing cannot be 
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attributed to individuals. Put differently, when the perspective is shared, certain 
dynamics might emerge, which make individual experiences qualitatively and 
conceptually different from what every single individual can do or experience alone 
(Tuomela, 2007). Note that this view does not suggest a collective mind beyond the 
individual minds or brains (for the difference, see Wilson, 2004) but rather stresses 
the difference between individual vs. collective information processing.  
Recently, across different domains, the collective dimension is shown to be of 
paramount significance in cognition. For instance, research in joint perceptual 
decisions in psychophysics (e.g., Bahrami et al., 2010), joint factual decisions (e.g., 
Mannes et al., 2014), collective dimension of information acquisition in social 
epistemology (Schmitt, 2017), and collaborative tasks in cognitive neuroscience 
(e.g., Sievers et al., 2020) show how interaction can shape collective decisions and 
judgments differently from individual decisions and judgments. 
To sum up, according to a recent family of views, interactions in groups can 
create emergent phenomena, changing the content and the process of cognition at 
the collective level. When making collective decisions or acting as a group, people 
may adopt a shared perspective. This shared perspective is argued to change the 
process or the content of individual decisions in collective settings, which, in turn, 
lead to collective decisions that are different from the aggerate of the individual 
decisions. Several studies confirm that collective decisions and actions are 
qualitatively different from individual ones.  
1.1.2 ‘We’ vs. ‘I’: a historical review of the moral domain  
In the previous section, I reviewed an emerging trend in cognitive science, 
stressing the role of interactions in human cognition. Yet, the collective dimension 
is not new to the moral realm. In fact, the works of pioneers in psychology of 
morality show that the collective dimension was inextricably intertwined with 
studies of moral decisions, judgments and actions.  
For instance, the founder of experimental psychology, Wundt, was preoccupied 
with the role of collectives in morality to the extent that he initiated a branch in 
psychology (parallel to his experimental psychology project) to address this issue. 
Between 1900 and 1920, he published ten volumes of Völkerpsychologie, the 
psychology of a community of individuals (literally ‘the psychology of peoples’) to 
address the role of interaction in morality and other domains (see Hogg & Williams, 
2000). 
To Wundt, thinking in isolation was different from sharing thoughts with others 
in verbal communication. For instance, he observed that people would sometimes 
revise their sentences when speaking about what they thought because their words 
could not properly communicate the content of their thought. Moreover, people 
could capture disagreement with others, sometimes very quickly, even before being 
able to think why they disagreed in the first place. These observations, to Wundt, 
were pieces of evidence showing that thoughts, as expressed to others with words, 
1.1 Collective moral decisions and judgments 
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could be qualitatively different from thoughts when experienced in silent thinking 
(Fancher & Rutherford, 2012).  
Wundt also believed that moral principles, coming from religions, myths, and 
customs, have the same characteristic, as they could be hugely dependent on others 
external to us. In fact, morality to him was nothing but a reciprocal collective 
enterprise (Fancher & Rutherford, 2012). As a result, he objected to the 
individualist accounts in morality in his paper ‘study of the facts and laws of moral 
life’ while emphasizing the role of interaction and groups in the moral realm (see 
Klautke, 2013).  
Wundt hugely influenced later thinkers, such as Émile Durkheim, a French 
social scientist, who also examined the collective representations of groups in the 
moral realm. Durkheim proposed that the unit of analysis in the studies of morality 
should be collectives rather than single individuals. However, unlike Wundt, he 
thought that the collective aspect of morality could be studied empirically as a 
natural phenomenon (Bellah, 1974; Klautke, 2013). He used the term "collective 
psychology" for this line of research as he believed that moral codes could be shaped 
via interactions with others (Hogg & Williams, 2000).  
Gustave Le Bon was another French thinker influenced by Wundt’s folk 
psychology (Hogg & Williams, 2000). Similar to Wundt, Le Bon believed that 
collectives could act differently than individuals in the moral realm. In fact, 
according to his observations, collectives were ‘too impulsive and too mobile to be 
moral’ (Le Bon, 1960, p 67) and often unable to reason properly. However, 
somewhat self-contradictory, he did not ascribe only negative moral characteristics 
to groups but also positive moral virtues such as altruism.  
Perhaps even more pessimistic than Le Bon, Niebuhr, yet another influential 
scholar, argued the same. In 1932, Niebuhr published ‘moral man and immoral 
society’, in which he highlighted the differences between group and individual 
moral actions. Evident from the title of his book, he found collectives morally 
inferior to individuals, as groups could not acquire certain cognitive or affective 
capacities, such as empathic concern (Niebuhr, 1932).  
McDougal, another early 20th-century psychologist, also had a significant 
impact on collective psychology (Farr, 1986; Hogg & Williams, 2000). To him, the 
cognitive, affective, and conative components of the mental characteristics could 
be regulated differently via interaction with others. He published Group Mind as 
the second volume of his influential book ‘Introduction to social psychology’, a 
burgeoning field of research at that time. In this book, he argued that, due to the 
interaction, the mental characteristics of groups are different from individuals. Yet, 
McDougall’s ideas were sometimes misunderstood as ascribing a ‘mind’ to groups, 
perhaps due to the misleading title of his book (Hogg & Williams, 2000) or his 
eccentric personality (Fancher & Rutherford, 2012; Farr, 1986). He did not assign 
any (moral) agency to groups but to the individuals comprising the groups (Farr, 
1986; Hogg & Williams, 2000; but see Wilson, 2004).  
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By and large, McDougal remains one of the pioneers who highlighted the 
difference between collective and individual psychology (Farr, 1986; Moscovici, 
1986) and moral psychology specifically. For instance, he reacted against the 
individualistic assumptions underlying classic moral theories such as utilitarianism 
(Farr, 1986). 
McDougall was criticized by many, including Alport (and many other scholars 
in the American camp), who were then greatly influenced by behaviorism (Farr, 
1986) - a discipline focusing on behavioral changes as a function of reward and 
punishment in individuals. To behaviorists, the collective psychology was the 
psychology of individuals; thus, ‘we’ was simply an arithmetic aggregation of ‘I’s 
to them (Hogg & Williams, 2000). 
As collectives and groups were not central to behaviorism at that time, Alport 
(and other behaviorists) succeeded in shifting the views towards individual 
behaviors, downplaying the influence of McDougall's works, as well as other 
collective approaches in understanding the human mind. Hence, the American 
camp (and the dominance of behaviorists at that time) were effective in diminishing 
collective morality as a research project which was initially started in Europe. 
‘By the late 1920s, the collectivist perspective of early social psychology—the view that 
interaction produced emergent properties of collectives that could not be understood in terms of or 
reduced to individual psychology—had all but disappeared from mainstream social psychology that 
focused on individual behavior. The disappearance was, of course, most troublesome for the social 
psychology of groups.’ (from Hogg & Williams, 2000, p.82, italics mine).  
In the European camp, however, the collective dimension was hugely under the 
influence of WW II. On the one hand, European psychology (as other domains of 
science) was economically and politically dependent on the US between 1940 and 
1960 (Hogg & Williams, 2000) – hence under the influence of behaviorists. On the 
other hand, in the aftermath of the war, European thinkers were motivated to 
understand the collective mentality and mechanisms which led to the immoral 
actions leading to (and happening during) the war (Parkin-Gounelas, 2014). 
Therefore, when Europe finally gained its confidence as it was more economically 
and politically independent from the US, it revived the collective dimension in 
moral psychology. European social psychologists, then, highlighted the role of 
collective and group dynamics in understanding the mind and the behavior, once 
again (see Hogg & Williams, 2000). This influence passed over the Atlantic Ocean 
(Hogg & Williams, 2000) and was imported into the US social psychology (e.g., 
Milgram et al., 1969).  
The experimental approaches to psychology eventually acknowledged the role 
of groups as the agents of decisions and focused on the interactions as crucial in 
shaping actions. The collective dimension finally got a chance to be studied 
experimentally in small groups and face-to-face interactions. Using empirical 
methods in controlled experiments, the collective dimension was studied 
rigorously, establishing the fundamental differences between decisions and actions 
in individuals vs. in groups. 
1.1 Collective moral decisions and judgments 
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Note that the difference between small ad-hoc groups vs. ‘collectives’ or 
‘crowds’ is non-trivial. The scale of the collective moral decisions that Wundt, 
Durkheim, Le Bon, and other pioneers had in mind was much larger than that of 
small interactive groups in social psychological labs. For instance, when Niebuhr 
discussed group morality, he referred to formal groups rather than ad-hoc groups. 
Understanding morality in crowds, formal groups, and organizations is beyond the 
scope of this thesis, as I only investigate ad-hoc groups experimentally. The 
difference is, however, important since distinct mechanisms distinguish the social 
(formal) and ad-hoc (non-formal) groups (e.g., see Tang et al., 2020). Yet, in light 
of this caveat, it is even more noteworthy that emergent factors of group dynamics 
in collective settings were measured in small groups as an independent research line 
at that time. 
As it was free from the authority of behaviorists, collective or group decision-
making was finally rigorously studied across different labs. In fact, collective 
decision making, as an independent research project, was well received and studied 
as a separate research line in non-moral domains (e.g., in perceptual or factual joint 
decision making; c.f. chapter 2). 1 
As the experimental methods allowed researchers at social-psychological labs to 
address group decisions, scholars started to investigate moral decisions in groups 
as well. For instance, in a seminal work, Bandura et al. (1975) showed that people 
in a group are more prone to harm others via electric shocks than when they act as 
individuals. This effect was attributed to the diffusion of responsibility in groups 
(Bandura et al., 1975). 2  
However, this collective approach in the moral domain did not last long. 
Although non-moral psychologists were successful in importing the collective 
dimensions into their studies, the moral domain had a very different destiny. Studies 
of moral decisions and judgments, unlike other aspects of psychology, were soon 
dominated by another approach, whose views and methods were, once again, vastly 
individualistic. This new account, coming from developmental psychology, 
influenced later studies of morality while missing out the role of interactions and 
groups in the moral realm (see Leach et al., 2015). 
Preoccupied with the investigations of rational moral judgments in children as a 
function of their developmental stages, pioneers like Piaget (1993) or Kohlberg 
(Kohlberg & Hersh, 1977) originated ‘moral psychology’ as an independent 
discipline that concerned individuals rather than groups. For Kohlbergian moral 
psychologists, the interactive social aspects were critical, but only as the origins of 
 
1 In chapter 2, I will return to collective decisions in non-moral realm and argue how they are 
different from moral realm. 
2 Diffusion of responsibility is a recurring motif in this thesis, and I will return to it in chapters 2 
and 3. It refers to the effect that even the mere presence of others can make individuals feel less 
responsible. This was originally observed in relation to the well-known bystander effect: when 
several observers witness a norm violation, each observer is less likely to intervene compared to 
what they would have done had they been alone (Darley & Latane, 1968). 
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moral judgments. Social dynamics or group agents were not the focus of 
developmental moral psychology. This will be established in detail in chapter 2. 
Reviewing the literature of moral psychology and the neuroscience of moral 
decisions, I will return to the fact that experimental moral psychology began as an 
individualistic research project, originally concerned with individuals' moral 
reasoning. 
Yet, it should be noted that at this time, taking the same developmental approach, 
a few attempts were made to understand the role of groups and interactions in moral 
judgments. Research showed, for instance, that interaction could change moral 
judgments in adult groups. Using the ‘+1 manipulation’ technique in dyadic 
discussions, a person whose moral stage was 1 stage above the target of 
manipulation (within the range of 1 to 6 moral stages) was matched with the target. 
This method was proposed as the optimum way to change the target's moral 
judgment after short discussions about moral issues (Berkowitz et al., 1980; 
Berkowitz & Gibbs, 1983). People were shown to change their moral judgments 
based on small differences (weak disagreement) they had with others during 
discussions. This change of mind led to a more advanced moral judgment in the 
Kohlbergian sense (see Keasey, 1973). Similarly, groups were shown to be more 
advanced than individuals in their moral reasoning (Damon & Killen, 1982; 
Maitland & Goldman, 1974), especially when they socially deliberated on moral 
dilemmas - e.g., stealing a drug in order to save the life of one’s wife (Nichols & 
Day, 1982).  
Although informative, these few attempts were sporadic. Developmental moral 
psychology was generally preoccupied with the process of deliberative reasoning 
within individuals, not between them (see Leach et al., 2015). 
One should not forget that morality is a multidisciplinary field, and each field 
treats it differently. Another dominant approach here that fueled the later 
individualist trend and maintained it for some years was experimental moral 
philosophy (and philosophically inspired psychology). This influence was partly 
due to the nature of classic normative moral theories. In fact, despite their 
differences, classic moral theories had at least one thing in common: they all treated 
individuals and collective decisions in the same way (c.f. 2.2.1). For instance, being 
oversimplistic, for a Kantian, as long as the decision was committed to the 
categorical imperative, for a utilitarian, as long as it brought about the total good, 
and for a virtue ethicist, as long as it was faithful to certain virtues, there was no 
distinction, in principle, between ‘I’ or ‘we’ as the agent of the moral decision. 
Thus, as long as a decision fulfilled the required moral criteria, it was then regarded 
as morally right, no matter how the decision was made, either by one or many. 
 As moral psychology has a bidirectional relation with moral philosophy, moral 
psychologists seem to import this individualistic approach later from moral 
philosophy into the empirical studies of moral cognition in their research (c.f. 2.2.1, 
see also Leach et al., 2015).  
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To sum up, collectives were central to moral psychology in the early works, but 
the focus of moral psychology shifted on individuals in later years. On the one hand, 
the dominant developmental approaches in moral psychology concerned 
individuals rather than groups. On the other hand, moral theories did not distinguish 
collective decisions from individual decisions. Thus, a good deal of moral 
psychology over-relied on the individualized conceptualization of moral decisions 
and judgments. The dominance of these two approaches fueled individualistic 
trends in moral psychology in later years, which persisted until recently.  
1.1.3 ‘We’ vs. ‘I’: moral domain – current state 
In section 1.1.1, I argued that the collective approach is not alien to 
contemporary cognitive science. I reviewed a family of recent views suggesting that 
collective actions and decisions cannot be understood by merely investigating 
individual actions and decisions. In section 1.1.2, I explained that the collective 
dimension was once critical to social and behavioral sciences in early works, 
especially in moral domains, but it received comparably little attention in the moral 
psychology of later years. 
 However, after decades of dominance of rationality, deliberation, and abstract 
thinking in individual moral reasoning, recently, this narrative gives way to theories 
that highlighted the role of emotions, quick automatic intuitions, and social 
interactions in moral reasoning. Similar to other domains of cognition, 
revolutionary turning points in moral cognition have helped scientists to move from 
traditional accounts (which study abstract isolated moral minds) towards social, 
affective and, interactive accounts (Colombetti & Torrance, 2009; Haidt, 2001; 
Métais & Villalobos, 2021; Prinz, 2010; Urban, 2014; Varela, 1999). Thus, a new 
trend in moral cognition seems to be emerging, bridging the gap between moral 
psychology and collective cognition.  
For instance, many scholars have stressed the significance of emotions and 
intuitions in human moral decisions, judgments, and actions (Haidt, 2001; Prinz, 
2010). One radical account - the social intuitionist model – pushes this notion 
forward, to the extent that it assumes human morality is primarily the outcome of 
automatic and emotional rapid intuitions rather than slow, deliberative reasoning 
(Haidt, 2007). Inspiring later researchers, this account argues that there is little room 
for deliberation in human moral judgments. When deliberation comes into play, it 
is relatively late, only after the moral judgments are already made. One important 
assumption in the social-intuitions model is that the rapid emotional intuitions have 
a social and interactive nature, acquired during social interactions (Haidt & 
Kesebir, 2010), suggesting that interactions are of paramount significance in 
making moral judgments.  
The central role of emotion-laden interactions is now widely accepted in 
morality and has shifted scholars’ attention from individual heads to real-life social 
interactive contexts in the moral realm (Colombetti & Torrance, 2009; Métais & 
Villalobos, 2021; Urban, 2014). Moral theorists do not see humans as rational moral 
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decision-makers in isolation anymore, but as minds with extended bodies with 
affective states (Prinz, 2006) in social contexts. Moreover, morality is argued to be 
integrated with our actions and not merely expressed as abstract thinking. Similar 
to other skills, moral reasoning can be learned via interactions with the environment 
(Varela, 1999) and other people (Colombetti & Torrance, 2009). Moral judgments 
are proposed as intuitive ‘social doing’ to build our reputation in social interactions 
(Haidt, 2007) or as ‘social influence’ in argumentation to convince others to accept 
our moral views (Mercier, 2011). 
Focusing on the affective characteristics of interaction, new accounts show how 
interaction can be of paramount significance in moral decisions due to its social-
affective aspects. The character of our social encounters is argued to be essentially 
moral, considering the important role of emotions in participatory sense-making in 
moral contexts (Colombetti & Torrance, 2009). Similarly, in the developmental 
psychology camp, moral cognition is examined as a function of communication and 
interaction during the first years of life (Dahl et al., 2013; Zahn-Waxler et al., 1992). 
Moreover, in the social-psychological camp, scholars endorse the interactions and 
group contexts as independent variables affecting moral decisions and actions in 
individuals. This approach shows, for instance, how people shape their identity 
according to the groups they belong to (see Leach et al., 2015) or how groups are 
perceived differently than individuals for their immoral actions (Brambilla et al., 
2012; Sharvit et al., 2015). Even random assignments to groups are shown to lead 
to particular moral decisions (Goette et al., 2006). Moreover, groups can shape 
moral emotions and behaviors in individuals (Cikara et al., 2011; Cikara & Fiske, 
2012), while the neural mechanisms of these moral decisions may depend on in-
group vs. out-group division (Cikara et al., 2014). 
To sum up, the revolutionary socio-emotional trends in cognitive science 
influenced moral psychology, shifting the attention from rational individual heads 
towards interactive, emotional, and embodied moral agents. A recent group-based 
approach appeared which examines moral decisions in relation to groups. These 
ground-breaking social-emotional interactive accounts look at moral cognition as a 
social enterprise. 
1.1.4 ‘We’ vs. ‘I’: current thesis 
In the previous sections, I argued how the collective dimension was once central 
to the moral domain, overlooked for some years, but it became critical in recent 
years once again (see 1.1.3). Consequently, the effect of groups and collectives on 
individual moral decisions and judgments has become crucial in studies of moral 
cognition in recent years.  
However, the recent group-based approach concerns the effect of groups on 
individual moral reasoning rather than exploring groups as a whole (c.f. 1.1.1). In 
this sense, a good deal of group-based moral psychology still misses out the 
collective aspect of morality. Put differently, previous research mainly investigated 
groups as the context (Us) or the target (Them) rather than the agent (We) of moral 
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decisions or judgments. By contrast, the mechanisms underlying social 
deliberation, moral argumentation, social influence, or persuasion in collective 
moral reasoning received relatively less attention. In particular, whether collective 
moral decisions and judgments are different from the aggregate of individual 
decisions and judgments is less clear. 
Very recently, studying groups as the agent of moral decisions has become 
attractive to researchers (e.g., Navajas et al., 2019). A few studies have shown that 
group moral decisions can be different than what individuals decide in isolation. 
For instance, people find it more acceptable to sacrifice one person in order to save 
many when they are in groups vs. alone (Curşeu et al., 2020). The more people feel 
socially connected to their partners in such decisions, the more they find such 
utilitarian decisions morally acceptable (Lucas & Livingston, 2014).  In resource 
allocation moral dilemmas, collectives distribute resources differently than 
individuals (Ueshima et al., 2021). Moreover, Individual and collective moral 
decisions seem to be different in certain age groups (Takezawa et al., 2006).  
Following the same line of research, one objective of this thesis is to address the 
differences between groups and individuals in their moral judgments when the 
group is the agent of moral reasoning. The central question that will be repeatedly 
brought up is whether (and how) collective and individual moral decisions and 
judgments are different from each other. Combining insights from experimental 
social psychology, collective cognition, and moral philosophy, chapter 2 and 
chapter 3 aim at answering this question (c.f. chapters 2 and 3). 
It should be noted that, with respect to collectivism in morality, my position is 
rather conservative. Therefore, in this thesis, I do not argue that collectives are 
irreducible to individual mental processes in the moral realm. Any argument about 
irreducibility is beyond the scope of this work. Yet, my position is not neutral either. 
I argue that when people come together in the social sphere to discuss moral issues 
or decide on moral grounds, specific emotional, cognitive, and social mechanisms 
may arise that do not come up when people reflect on the same issues alone. The 
simultaneous interplay between emotion and deliberation can contribute to 
collective moral decisions different than individual decisions, as I will discuss in 
chapter 2. 
Drawing on recent literature in moral psychology, in chapter 2, I will explain the 
cognitive mechanisms that can act differently in a collective moral context, leading 
to an alteration of moral decisions and judgments in groups. Depending on the 
affective, deliberative, and social mechanisms at play - which emerge at the 
collective level - the content and process of collective moral decisions may vary. In 
chapter 2, the mechanisms such as virtue signaling (how we wish to be seen by 
others), diffusion of responsibility (how we join groups to reduce our 
responsibility), social deliberation (discussing moral issues together in order to 
solve them) will be discussed in more depth. These mechanisms can modulate 
moral decisions in groups, leading to substantial differences between individual and 
collective moral decisions and judgments.  
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After showing the difference between collective and individual moral cognition 
theoretically in chapter 2, the next logical step is to set up a study to examine them 
experimentally. Therefore, in chapter 3, I will answer three empirical questions: 
How are collective moral judgments different from individual ones? How are 
individual moral judgments different before and after social deliberation? And what 
is the underlying mechanisms at work in collective moral judgment which explain 
these differences?  
To answer these questions, in a study of collective moral judgments (chapter 3), 
I use the models proposed in chapter 2 to build three hypotheses, each coming from 
one of the previously proposed mechanisms (emotional/reasoning/social). Testing 
these hypotheses, each predicting a different pattern of behavior in individuals vs. 
groups, this chapter will answer the three questions posed above. Therefore, 
consistent with the previous literature (chapter 2) and the empirical data (chapter 
3), I show that the process and the content of collective decisions and judgments 
differ from individual decisions and judgments. In this sense, collective moral 
reasoning cannot be simply regarded as equal to the individual moral opinions in 
isolation, aggregated statistically.  
I will explain the experiment in more depth in chapter 3, but a clarification seems 
necessary here. The collective decisions presented in chapter 3are particular types 
of decisions called ‘moral judgments. As I shall define it, a moral judgment is the 
moral evaluation of a third person’s action (or inaction) after the action (or inaction) 
occurred. For instance, one might judge a friend’s cheating on her/his exclusive 
partner by answering whether (and to what extent) that action was morally 
unacceptable. Similarly, in the experiment presented in chapter 3, I asked people to 
judge the moral acceptability of actions (or inactions) of hypothetical characters in 
short moral dilemmas. 
 Moral dilemmas are difficult situations with no apparent morally permissible 
answer. Some examples can be illuminative: think of the student, described by 
Sartre, torn between staying with his frail mother and fighting the Germans to 
avenge his only brother and defend France during WW II (Bastable, 1957); or the 
dramatic decision Sophie has to make in the book, later turned into a movie, 
Sophie’s Choice. A lonely mother in distress, Sophie, is asked to choose which of 
her two children must be sent to death (Styron, 1979). The latter case belongs to a 
particular category of moral dilemmas called sacrificial dilemmas. Initially built by 
philosophers, sacrificial dilemmas show a conflict between sacrificing someone in 
order to save others. One of the most well-known sacrificial dilemmas imported 
from philosophy into psychology (apart from Sophie’s Choice) is the trolley 
problem - a hypothetical situation in which an isolated bystander can kill one person 
to save five railway workers in different contexts (Foot, 1967; Thomson, 1976). 
Following their original appearance, the trolley problem, Sophie's Choice, and other 
sacrificial dilemmas were turned into experimental stimuli by cognitive 
(neuro)scientists. They were used to investigate the cognitive (Petrinovich & 
O’Neill, 1996) and neural basis (Greene et al., 2001) of people's moral inclination 
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and have since been predominantly used in moral psychology and neuroscience (for 
a review, see Christensen & Gomila, 2012). 
In addition to sacrificial dilemmas (i.e., killing one to save many) - which are 
odd situations that are used uncritically in studies of moral judgments - the 
dilemmas presented in chapter 3 are more relevant to real-life daily moral 
challenges (to see the moral dilemmas, see chapter 3). They include short scenarios 
that, probably for the first time, involved omissions or inactions that led to certain 
utilitarian outcomes. These utilitarian outcomes shared a special feature: they were 
based on violating a norm to bring about the greatest total good; for instance, 
keeping a friend’s cheating secret in order to help them save their marriage.  
These scenarios were designed to test participants’ utilitarian intuitions since a 
utilitarian approach would prioritize the consequences of the relevant action (e.g., 
preventing a divorce) over their abiding by moral duties (e.g., always telling the 
truth to a friend). As detailed in chapter 3, by asking people to evaluate these types 
of utilitarian actions (or inactions) first in private, then in groups (after short 
discussions), and later, in private again, I show how collective judgments are 
different from individual ones. I will explain how the observations in chapter 3 
suggest certain mechanisms at play, driving collective judgments towards the 
utilitarian direction.  
1.2 Collective moral vs. non-moral decisions and judgments 
Another question I seek to address in this thesis is whether there are any 
differences between how people perceive moral vs. non-moral decisions and 
judgments, especially in collective contexts. This is important for two reasons: 
 1) If there is no difference between how we construe moral vs. non-moral 
domains, we can simply extend findings from studies of collective non-moral 
decision-making (a very well-explored research project) to the moral realm (a 
hugely underexplored research line). By contrast, in chapter 2, I argue that moral 
matters can be construed differently from non-moral matters. This difference can 
be especially significant in collective settings. The upshot is that we cannot simply 
outspread the non-moral realm into the collective moral realm by applying the 
findings in those domains directly to collective moral reasoning due to the 
difference between metaethical commitments in moral vs. non-moral domains. 
2) Understanding whether, how, when, and why people interpret the moral 
domain differently from the non-moral domain can have practical implications. 
Clearly, if people think of their moral views as solid facts, it seems less likely that 
they change their opinions or compromise in group decisions and discussions (c.f. 
2.4). Thus, getting along with others in moral discussions may depend on how we 
construe moral issues. Whether ‘morally wrong or right’ is metaethically subjective 
or objective to us can be of paramount significance in how we engage in collective 
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moral discussions (e.g., compare collective moral discussion to collective problem-
solving in tasks with an objective solution or a well-defined expected utility).  These 
metaethical perceptions, as I discuss in chapter 2, can affect moral disagreement 
and negotiations in morally relevant contexts differently than in other contexts. As 
I argue, moral opinions can be perceived on a continuum from matters of opinion 
to matters of fact. Then understanding what can shift this perception on this 
continuum towards one or the other end may help resolve moral disagreements and 
conflicts.  
Based on these two reasons and building upon recent findings in moral 
psychology of metaethical commitments, in chapter 2, I will argue that certain 
vulnerabilities in the moral realm can penetrate collective moral reasoning. Such 
vulnerabilities are related to the peculiar nature of metaethical commitments in 
collective settings. As I argue in chapter 2, collective moral problem-solving can 
have properties of collective judgmental tasks (e.g., deciding together which piece 
of art is more beautiful) and intellective tasks (e.g., solving a mathematical equation 
in groups). Thus, collective moral decisions and judgments need to be examined as 
an independent group task. 
To sum up, in chapter 2, I argue why collective moral decisions and judgments 
are peculiar based on i) how people construe moral and non-moral domains 
differently when it comes to collective contexts and ii) how collective and 
individual moral cognition can be conceptually different from each other. The 
upshot is that we cannot simply import the findings of other fields into collective 
moral decision-making precisely due to these significant differences. Group moral 
decisions and judgments, therefore, cannot be studied simply as an extension of 
existing research by, e.g., deploying existing resources and models in joint decision 
making. For instance, applying aggregation rules on decisions and judgments to 
statistically estimate the opinions of the group may be inapplicable in the moral 
realm. These substantial differences between individual and group moral decision-
making give collective moral decisions a special nature that requires independent 
examinations. 
1.3 Collective moral transgressions 
One crucial finding of the collective experiment in chapter 3 is that people 
violate moral norms in groups more than in isolation. 3 Moral violations are not 
uncommon in collectives: groups are shown to be less obedient to norms 
(Fochmann et al., 2021), they develop more antisocial behaviors (Behnk et al., 
2017), tend to be less generous (Bornstein and Yaniv, 1998), and lie more than 
individuals (Conrads et al., 2013, 2016; Kocher et al., 2018). Moreover, 
 
3 However, norm violations tested in chapter 3 are special cases since they maximize the total good. 
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collaboration increases corruption (Weisel & Shalvi, 2015), and similarity in groups 
increases collective cheating (Irlenbusch et al., 2020).  
But why are groups more prone to moral violations? One reason, recently 
proposed, could be that by joining groups, people try to minimize the negative 
consequences of their decisions (El Zein et al., 2020), using groups as shields to 
protect themselves from the potential costs of their actions (El Zein et al., 2019). A 
critical cost for group moral violations is the punishment each member receives in 
moral violations. Therefore, seeking ‘safety in numbers’ by joining groups, each 
group member may expect to bear a lower cost than acting alone. Chapter 4 aims at 
addressing this hypothesis more directly: do individuals receive less punishment if 
they violate a norm together?  
The findings of the prior research on punishment reduction in groups have been 
inconsistent. One major shortcoming of previous studies, which fuels the 
inconsistencies, is that they merely studied financial cost in intentional violations 
as the only form of immoral action. For instance, they studied collective robberies 
(Feldman & Rosen, 1978; Vainapel et al., 2019) or collective donations (El Zein et 
al., 2020). By contrast, in chapter 4, different cases of collective moral violations 
are used across three experiments. These violations are solid cases of moral 
transgressions, such as collective murders or group cannibalism. 
Moreover, previous research showed that three factors could strongly affect 
moral judgments: I. Intention: was the action intentional or accidental? II. Outcome: 
what was the consequence? (see Cushman, 2008), and III. Moral domain: was the 
action immoral and harmful (e.g., murder), or immoral but harmless (e.g., 
cannibalism) (Dungan et al., 2017). Accordingly, to understand the processes 
underlying the reduction of punishment in groups, it would be crucial to investigate 
its sensitivity to these dimensions.  
Thus, across three experiments, chapter 4 will address three factors (intention, 
outcome, domain) in both solo and collective actions from an impartial observer’s 
perspective. I explain how these factors modulate the reduction of punishment in 
collective moral transgressions.  
To understand the mechanisms of reduction of punishment in groups, across two 
experiments, participants seek to punish hypothetical characters who are involved 
in moral violations. These violations occur either individually or jointly with two 
other characters. I examine how different intentions (malign vs. innocent) and 
consequences (harmless vs. harmful) through intentional, attempted, and accidental 
cases of killings in these stories (experiment 1) can contribute to the reduction of 
punishment in group actions. Whether harmless (yet immoral) actions, such as 
eating human flesh in groups (in experiment 2), can modulate this effect is also 
explored. I will show how the result of these experiments can shed light on the 
mechanisms of punishment attribution in collective moral violations. Insights from 
causal theories of responsibility attribution will be used to explain the underlying 
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Abstract: Moral issues are often the topics of extensive and lively 
interactions in social life. To date, however, research on moral decision and 
judgment has predominantly focused on individuals contemplating moral matters 
privately. We review the motivations underlying this approach and discuss why it 
is problematic: collective moral decisions and judgments (1) are characterized by 
specific dynamics that make them significantly different from individual decisions 
and judgments; and (2) are also different from collective non-moral decisions and 
judgments as they share properties with both intellective (matters of truth) and 
judgmental (matters of facts) tasks. We conclude that a thorough examination of 
the collective dimension is needed to promote a more inclusive understanding of 
the mechanisms underlying moral cognition.  
 
2.1 Introduction 
 A good deal of our moral cognition is collective. Consider moral concerns 
intersecting with debated social matters: an ethics committee approving a research 
project involving animal pain; a family arguing over terminating life support for 
their comatose child; a panel of politicians discussing the ethics of drone warfare; 
a group of social media users debating online on the tradeoff between losing jobs 
and closing a polluting power plant. In these and many other cases, we make moral 
decisions with others, carry the weight of their consequences together, or judge 
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ethical issues within our social groups. Indeed, violations of moral norms 
encourage gossip, public shaming and sometimes lead to social or legal changes.  
 Given the ubiquity and impact of collective moral decisions and judgment, 
understanding their mechanisms is critical. But, in cognitive science, moral 
cognition has so far been very much treated as a private matter (Bloom, 2010; 
Ellemers, 2017; Ellemers et al., 2013, 2019; Fedyk, 2017; Haidt, 2007; Mercier, 
2011). This paper focuses exactly on the question of how groups make moral 
decisions (what we ought to do) and judgments (what ought to be done) together, 
e.g., by processing (morally relevant) information in groups, persuading each other, 
signaling inclinations, casting votes, compromising, and/or reaching a consensus. 
With this, we aim to invite researchers in cognitive science to more actively focus 
on the collective dimension of moral cognition and hint at specific directions for 
future research. 
To prove the importance of the collective dimension, we offer two main 
arguments. First, we argue that collective moral decisions and judgments are 
conceptually and cognitively distinct from the aggregate of the individual ones 
(taken in isolation). To this end, we draw on evidence in cognitive science stressing 
the role of emergent factors specifically arising in collective contexts, notably 
emotion-based and reason-based dynamics, virtue signaling, and diffusion of 
responsibility. We discuss how the process and content of the related decisions and 
judgments are affected by the interplay of these factors. 
Second, we argue that collective moral decisions and judgments are also distinct 
from the collective non-moral ones. Most collective tasks can be neatly categorized 
as matters of objective truth (e.g., solving a mathematical equation) or of subjective 
opinion (e.g., casting votes in a beauty contest). By contrast, moral tasks do not 
have this clear-cut nature and cannot be straightforwardly ascribed to any of such 
categories. We then review existing evidence in moral psychology showing that 
people are neither fully objectivists nor fully subjectivists about the validity of their 
morals (as we later explain, they can be best qualified as metaethical pluralists). 
We discuss how this metaethical outlook bears relevance in collective discussions, 
especially when group members embrace divergent views or have to rely on (the 
expertise of) others. 
Our paper concerns moral cognition at a descriptive level by examining what 
people find morally ‘good’ or ‘bad’ together. It does not concern what is practically 
or rationally ‘right’ or ‘wrong.’ Moreover, in this paper, morality does not refer to 
people’s character (e.g., politeness, kindness, etc.) but to the content of people’s 
moral cognition and to the process through which they integrate morally relevant 
information, emotions, biases, intuitions, etc., in order to make moral decisions and 
judgments in groups. Throughout our analysis, we assume that, overall, it makes 
sense to treat collective moral decisions and judgments as having some key 
commonalities. Focusing on those, an oversimplification is in order: we gloss over 
the differences concerning the nature (e.g., formal or informal, hierarchical or flat) 
and size (e.g., small or large) of the group; the discussion topic (e.g., bioethics, 
social justice, purity violations) and format (online, face-to-face); and the 
consequences of the decision or judgment (i.e., whether any relevant consequence 
stems from them). 
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The paper is structured as follows. In § 2, we review some motives why most 
models of moral cognition are centered on individuals (rather than groups) and 
discuss a more recent collective-oriented trend. In § 3, we explore the emergent 
features of collective moral decisions and judgments as compared to the aggregate 
of the individual ones taken in isolation. In § 4, we focus on collective moral 
decisions and judgments as compared to the non-moral ones. In § 5, we conclude 
that neglecting the collective dimension prevents us from having a comprehensive 
understanding of moral cognition. In this spirit, we invite cognitive scientists to 
further pursue this line of enquiry. 
 
2.2 Why the cognitive science of morality has mainly focused on 
individuals  
“How people make moral decisions and judgments together” is an empirical 
question that has previously received relatively little attention in the cognitive 
science of morality. This section identifies some potential motives underlying this 
neglect across three approaches to moral cognition: experimental moral philosophy, 
moral psychology, and the cognitive neuroscience of morality. We also discuss an 
emerging, more collective-oriented trend in the study of moral cognition.  
 
2.2.1 Philosophical conceptualizations 
 Moral psychologists often glean ideas, predictions, and even methods from 
moral philosophy. And throughout its history moral philosophy has been interested 
in normative questions about how individuals ought to live. In this sense, 
deontological ethics, utilitarianism, and virtue ethics are the three dominant 
normative moral theories.  
 Centered on moral norms, deontology is paradigmatically associated with 
Kant’s categorical imperative (Kant, 1785/1993). The categorical imperative is 
meant to be intrinsically obligating and universally valid: every rational person 
ought to act in accordance with the moral law, independently of contingent motives 
or cultural differences. Then, to the extent that the moral norm is applied, it can be 
relatively unimportant whether this ideal and abstract reasoner is an individual or a 
group. In turn, utilitarianism suggests that the moral rightness of an act (Mill, 
1861/1998) or of a rule (Berkely, 1712/1972) consists in its promoting the 
maximum good: deciding what one ought to do consists in solving cost-benefit 
calculations between different options from an impartial observer’s view. What 
counts is that the outcome impartially subserves the utilitarian interest. Thus, once 
again, whether the decision-maker is an individual or a collective might be of little 
relevance. Finally, Aristotelian virtue ethics pays attention to what virtues (i.e., 
character traits, dispositions) individuals must develop to live good lives or nourish 
their moral character (Anscombe, 1963).  
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While the individual or collective identity of the ideal reasoner is of little 
importance to decide what ought to be done, the individualistic point of view is 
rather crucial for other aspects of normative theories. For example, according to 
classic theories of moral responsibility, we must be able to blame single individuals 
who commit moral wrongs without allowing them to shake off their responsibilities 
by blending into the group, and humans must be able to develop their moral selves 
as individuals (Bonicalzi, 2019; Fischer and Ravizza, 1998). Furthermore, moral 
philosophers have also been interested in what motivates individuals to behave 
morally: different philosophical traditions see reasons (e.g., Kantian ethical 
rationalism) or rather feelings and emotions (e.g., Humean ethical sentimentalism) 
as intrinsic moral drives (Dancy, 2003).  
 What is problematic is that the individualistic trend, which waters down the 
distinction between the I and the We, often percolates tacitly into empirical moral 
psychology. Indeed, inspired by these various philosophical theories, empirical 
moral psychologists have been keen to understand how these philosophical notions 
(e.g., deontology, utilitarianism, rationalism, sentimentalism) fit actual moral 
intuitions (Białek et al., 2019; Greene et al., 2001, 2008; Kvaran et al., 2013; 
Strohminger et al., 2011; Valdesolo & Desteno, 2006). However, transitioning from 
this ideal and abstract reasoner (in philosophy) to concrete individuals (in 
psychology), researchers seem often to put aside an important fact: while the ‘I vs. 
We’ distinction may be of little relevance to standard normative theories, it 
suddenly becomes central to understand how people concretely gauge their morals 
in real life. As Bernard Williams (2011) puts it, if taken too literally, systematic 
moral theories will fail to capture the nuances of our everyday moral life. One of 
such nuances is indeed the collective dimension in which much moral cognition 
takes place.  
The influence of individualistic moral philosophy on psychology is reflected 
vividly in how the latter has used classic philosophical dilemmas to test moral 
decisions and judgments taken by individuals in isolation. Philosophers originally 
devised moral dilemmas as thought experiments to assess the normative plausibility 
of deontological or utilitarian ethics (Foot, 1967; Thomson, 1976). So-called 
sacrificial dilemmas, such as the Trolley problem, describe hypothetical situations 
in which isolated bystanders must decide whether to sacrifice one to save many. 
These dilemmas were initially built to show, for example, whether utilitarianism is 
sufficiently respectful of justice and rights, and not to measure laypeople’s 
intuitions. Moral dilemmas were then imported into empirical moral psychology to 
test whether subjects sitting for psychological experiments tend to be more 
utilitarian or deontological under various experimental manipulations (e.g., high vs. 
low attentional load (Tinghög et al., 2016)) or whether individuals are motivated 
by rational calculations or emotions (e.g. Greene et al., 2001; see Christensen & 
Gomila, 2012 for a review).4 Although this research endeavor per se is intrinsically 
 
4 Previous researchers have raised critical concerns about the generalizability of such uncommon 
situations (Everett & Kahane, 2020; Kahane et al., 2015) or their proving that individuals are driven 
by authentically utilitarian or deontological intuitions (Bostyn et al., 2018; Kahane, 2015). 
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relevant, psychologists have mostly detracted from raising the question “how do we 
decide together?” in such situations. 
 Overall, the collective dimension is not alien to philosophical theories of 
practical reasoning and normativity. Discussions about how collectives act together 
are central to various philosophical fields or sub-fields, such as social epistemology 
(Fricker et al., 2021), collective intentionality (Sellars, 1974) and responsibility 
(Pettit, 2007),5 group agency (List & Pettit, 2011), team reasoning (Gold & Sudgen, 
2007), social choice theory (List, 2012) and joint commitment (Gilbert, 2014). For 
instance, the collective dimension of moral, and also political, decision-making is 
particularly central to the social contract tradition (including Hobbes, Locke, 
Rousseau, Kant, Rawls, and Scanlon) wherein moral and/or political obligations 
emerge from hypothetical agreements between idealized society members.  
 In particular, in his A Theory of Justice (Rawls, 1971/2017), Rawls devised an 
ideal scenario (the original position) from which people jointly decide about basic 
principles of justice regulating a fair society: the reasoners are asked to think of 
themselves as free and equal, endowed with fundamental interests, the general 
capacity to rationally form and commit to life plans, some competence about 
economics and the sciences, and some general psychological or biological features. 
Crucially, they should imagine themselves as ignorant about their own historical 
circumstances, personal interests, social roles, race, or gender (they make decisions 
under a veil of ignorance). By abstracting away from such personal details, the veil 
of ignorance promotes choices made from a neutral point of view, in accordance 
with the philosophical tradition of the moral reasoner as a judicious and impartial 
spectator discussed by Hume, Smith, or Sidgwick. Experimental attempts at 
modelling decisions under the Rawlsian veil of ignorance indicated that individuals 
are actually able to make impartial decisions (although in a utilitarian fashion) 
(Huang et al., 2019). However, when it comes to real life, such assumptions are 
more difficult to apply. In collective moral cognition, we deal with humans 
negotiating their preferences and making efforts to agree on shared options, without 
possibly ignoring their own preferences and histories. 
We do not enter the debate concerning the extent to which the individualistic, 
idealized, ahistorical point of view must be taken as central to normativity.6 Our 
point is rather that this perspective is not fully informative and can be potentially 
misleading when it is taken as a blueprint for a research program in moral cognition. 
 
5 Collective responsibility has also been at the heart of influential works in post-war 20th-century 
philosophy (e.g., Arendt, 1987), hugely inspiring the early days of social psychology (Festinger & 
Carlsmith, 1959; Milgram, 1963; Myers & Bishop, 1970; Myers & Kaplan, 1976; Myers & Lamm, 
1976; Wallach et al., 1964; Wallach & Kogan, 1965). However, while philosophical models focus 
on whether attributing responsibility to collectives is plausible (for collectivism, see e.g., Gilbert, 
2014; for individualism, see e.g., Narveson, 2002), little attention has been paid to how people 
collectively make the decisions for which they can then be held responsible. 
6 Against the oversimplification brought about by too idealized settings, some philosophers – 
notably Habermas (1995) with his discourse ethics – have highlighted the intrinsically dialogical 
dimension from which shared everyday moral practices arise. Well-known criticisms of impartialist, 
abstract and atomistic moralities have been raised also in the context of feminist (e.g., Benhabib, 
1992) and communitarian (e.g., MacIntyre 1988) critiques, stressing the role that social groups have 
in nourishing our moral and political judgment. 
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When we examine how real people – with their gender, personal interests, and 
social roles – participate in moral discussions in real life, such idealized 
assumptions fall apart.  
In sum, the close relationship between moral philosophy and empirical moral 
psychology may have some cost (see also Blasi, 1990). One of such costs, we 
argued, is that a good deal of philosophical moral theories is individualistic, and 
this individualistic approach has been often imported uncritically into empirical 
moral psychology. 
 
2.2.2 Psychological conceptualizations 
Psychological conceptualizations of moral cognition, with respect to how they 
conceive the collective dimension, can be roughly divided into two camps. We call 
them standard (§ 2.2.1) and contemporary views (§ 2.2.2). We first discuss how 
the former is partially responsible for the dominant individualistic narrative. Next, 
we discuss the latter and how the role of groups is progressively emerging in it. 
 
2.2.2.1 The standard views 
Standard views in moral psychology mainly consist of three major trends, each 
emerging from a different research area: developmental, affective and personality 
psychology.  
The first trend is associated with the work of leading developmental 
psychologists. Preoccupied with the investigation of rational moral judgments in 
children as a function of their developmental stages, pioneers like Piaget (1993) or 
Kohlberg (Kohlberg & Hersh, 1977) established moral psychology as an 
independent discipline focusing on individuals rather than groups (see also Leach 
et al., 2015). For Kohlbergian moral psychologists (e.g., Damon & Killen, 1982; 
Maitland & Goldman, 1974; Nichols & Day, 1982), the interactive social aspects 
were critical, but only as the context explaining how individuals form specific 
moral judgments rather than as the agent collectively making such judgments. 
An initial interest for the collective and interactive dimension of moral 
cognition started to rise within this development approach, but was unfortunately 
abandoned in later years. Following the methods developed by the Kohlbergian 
school, a few studies showed that groups are more advanced (in the Kohlbergian 
sense) than individuals in their moral reasoning: following discussion, groups of 
students gave proof of higher developmental stages compared to individuals, 
especially when they socially deliberated on moral dilemmas, e.g., stealing a drug 
in order to save someone’s life (Damon & Killen, 1982; Maitland & Goldman, 
1974; Nichols & Day, 1982). Using the ‘+1 manipulation’ technique in dyadic 
discussions (with participants’ being exposed to partners in the stage directly above 
theirs), some studies demonstrated that moral judgments in adults could change, 
leading individuals to more advanced views. In particular, people were shown to 
change their views based on small differences (weak disagreement) at the 
interpersonal level (see Keasey, 1973). As a result, this method was proposed as 
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the optimum way to change the target’s moral views (Berkowitz et al., 1980; 
Berkowitz & Gibbs, 1983). Although informative, these attempts were sporadic: 
developmental moral psychology remained more interested in deliberative 
reasoning within individuals, not between them (see Leach et al., 2014). 
As the years progressed, the rationalist view gave way to a different Zeitgeist, 
centered on emotions and automatic processes (Zajonc, 1980) as key drivers in 
moral cognition (Blasi, 1980). This emotional/affective approach, the second major 
trend in moral psychology, suggested that moral deliberation is primarily based on 
quick moral intuitions we might be unaware of, rather than on effortful reasoning 
(Haidt, 2001; 2007). Several related accounts underscored the role of fast intuitions, 
emotions, and automaticity as central to moral cognition (Prinz, 2010; but see 
Huebner et al., 2009; Pölzler, 2015). This trend started acknowledging the social 
function of moral decisions and judgments. In particular, Haidt assumed that these 
quick intuitions were not merely the outcome of our private thinking but developed 
primarily in the interpersonal context (Haidt 2001). Yet, the focus remained on the 
intuitive/affective aspects of individual moral cognition while the collective aspect 
remained underexplored (Haidt 2007). 
The last trend, rooted in personality psychology, is the tendency to explore moral 
decisions and judgments as the outcome of stable idiosyncratic features – 
interindividual differences and personality traits – in individuals (Lifton, 1985), 
e.g., age and education (Rest et al., 1978), gender (Atari et al., 2020), political 
orientation (Graham et al., 2009), religiosity (Piazza & Sousa, 2014), genetics 
(Campbell et al., 2009) and personality (Leslau, 1994). These stable features 
contribute to forming the individual’s moral character (Blasi, 2005), remaining 
steady across different situations (Vranas, 2004). Moreover, moral reasoning was 
argued to be affected by personality disorders such as psychopathy, narcissism, 
neuroticism, and sadism – as people with such disorders show more eccentric moral 
behaviors (see Arvan, 2013; Bartels & Pizarro, 2011; Djeriouat & Trémolière, 
2014; Koenigs et al., 2012; Pailing et al., 2014; Pletti et al., 2017). While these 
features have an impact on moral cognition, it remains nonetheless unclear how 
they affect moral decisions and judgments in groups.  
 
2.2.2.2 The contemporary views 
 Recent, but already established, trends in moral cognition have turned more 
decisively to social, affective and interactive approaches (Colombetti & Torrance, 
2009; Métais & Villalobos, 2021; Urban, 2014; inspired by Varela, 1999). Notably, 
emotions-laden interactions are more and more accepted as key components of our 
moral life: as humans, we are not isolated atoms, but interacting minds with 
extended bodies and affective states, navigating the social contexts and learning 
from others (Colombetti & Torrance, 2009). Within such interactive social 
contexts, moral judgments become forms of ‘social doing’ to build one’s own 
reputation (Haidt, 2007) or persuade others (Mercier, 2011). Correspondingly, even 
in the developmental psychology camp, moral cognition is more consistently 
examined as a function of communication and interaction during the first years of 
life (Dahl et al., 2013). 
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 However, with some exceptions (see, e.g., Gallotti & Frith, 2013; Schilbach et 
al. 2012), even collective-oriented social psychologists have mostly looked at the 
group dimension as an independent variable affecting moral behaviors in single 
individuals. We know, for instance, that social norms and group values inform 
individual moral reasoning (Ellemers, 2017; Ellemers et al., 2013), moral identity 
(Leach et al., 2015) and the behavior of group members (Brambilla et al., 2012). 
Individual values are highly related to those of the social group (Sharvit et al., 
2015), are susceptible to whether one is judging outgroups or ingroups (Cohen et 
al., 2006; Goldring & Heiphetz, 2020; Leidner et al., 2010; Van Laar et al., 2014), 
undergo the influence of creative members of society (Pizarro et al., 2006), and can 
in turn shape moral emotions towards ingroups and outgroups (Cikara et al., 2011; 
Cikara & Fiske, 2012). Even random assignment to arbitrary groups has been 
shown to drive specific moral actions (Goette et al., 2006).  
In sum, these accounts look at moral cognition as a more social enterprise. 
However, one important limitation is that collective moral decisions and judgments 
per se (i.e., when the group is the agent and not a context) received relatively little 
attention. Other recent analytical reviews highlight this gap. For instance, Ellemers 
et al. (2019) provided a systematic review of the papers published in moral 
psychology journals in the period 1960-2017. Based on the review, only one 
percent of the reported studies concern some aspects of group-based morality, let 
alone collective decisions and judgments. Consequently, some scholars have 
warned us about how little we know about its underlying mechanisms by implying 
that “something is missing” in the current empirical research. This missing element 
is framed either as moral persuasion (Bloom, 2010), social argumentation (Mercier, 
2011) or change in moral intuitions in interpersonal contexts (Haidt, 2007). 
However, even such critical approaches often do not stress the relevance of moral 
decisions and judgments as collective endeavors. Indeed, none of the reviewed four 
central ways in which groups affect morality (including the social nature of moral 
conventions), in Leach et al. 2015, concerns the dynamics of collective and 
interactive decisions and judgments. 
Recently, empirical attempts have been made to fill the gap between collective 
and individual moral decisions and judgments. For instance, some studies showed 
that, when decisions are made collectively, people more easily accept breaches that 
increase the benefit of many (Curşeu et al., 2020; Keshmirian et al., 2021). One 
study identified group rationality as the mechanism shifting people’s views towards 
accepting moral breaches (Curşeu et al., 2020). By contrast, another study proposed 
reduction of stress and negative emotions as the potentially underlying mechanism 
(Keshmirian et al., 2021). While both of them showed that collectives tend to be 
more utilitarian in moral dilemmas, another study yielded the opposite effect in 
resource allocation dilemmas: following a short discussion, the joint allocation of 
limited resources led to less utilitarian and less egalitarian distributions while 
benefitting the least well-off (Ueshima et al., 2021). Another study showed that, 
when social connections between group members are induced via experimental 
manipulations, dyads are more likely to jointly agree about sacrificing one to save 
many (Lucas & Livingston, 2014). Yet another study showed that differences 
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between individual and collective moral decisions can be limited to certain age 
groups (Takezawa et al., 2006).  
 
2.2.3 Neuroscientific conceptualizations  
Standard psychological models see moral reasoning as the outcome of individual 
heads. This is the case, and quite obviously so, also for the cognitive neuroscience 
of morality, which focuses on its brain basis (Ashcroft, 2005; Churchland, 2008; 
Decety & Wheatley, 2015; Greene, 2015; Moll et al., 2005. But see Schilbach et al. 
2012). 
Analogously to psychology, and perhaps due to its historical methodological 
limitations (e.g., lack of technologies that allow simultaneous brain imaging during 
interaction), this field treats moral decisions and judgments vastly as individual 
matters grounded in biological differences. Individual features such as the cortical 
thickness of specific brain areas (Patil et al., 2020), genetic specificities in the 
endogenous serotonin level (Marsh et al., 2011) or in the expression of oxytocin 
receptors (Bernhard et al., 2016), the activity of brain areas involved in individual 
decisions (Wiech et al., 2013), brain damages (Ciaramelli et al., 2007; Koenigs et 
al., 2007), the activity of the vagus nerve (Park et al., 2016) can affect moral 
decisions and judgments. The association between moral attitudes and brain 
disorders – e.g., breakdown of brain networks in psychopathy (Pujol et al., 2012), 
neural signatures of psychopathy (Glenn et al., 2009), and neuroticism (Harenski et 
al., 2009) – also contribute to the claim that morality is an individual matter. 
Opposing the idea that moral cognition is exclusively rooted in biological 
differences at the individual level, a few steps have been made to understand its 
neural basis in relation to social settings. These studies, however, mostly focused 
on the social origins of moral and immoral behaviors in individuals, e.g., the impact 
of social norms and social feedback. For instance, prior understanding of the co-
participant’s moral character is shown to affect our reliance on feedback 
mechanisms in brain (see Ellemers & Van Nunspeet, 2020 for a review). By 
contrast, we know little about the brain basis of moral cognition in interacting 
individuals. 
This deficiency can be now (partially) overcome given the availability of new 
techniques such as using hyper-scanning to test how two or more brains interact 
(Czeszumski et al., 2020; Dikker et al., 2017; Dumas et al., 2011; Hasson et al., 
2012; Hu et al., 2018; Konvalinka & Roepstorff, 2012; Montague et al., 2002; see 
Wheatley et al., 2019 for a review). Using these methods, we can acquire evidence 
on how inter-brain neural activity can predict collective performance in groups 
(Reinero et al., 2021), how consensus in value-based decisions leads to the 
alignment in brain signals (Sievers et al., 2020), or how brainwave synchronization 
predicts finding solutions in collaborative problem solving (Balconi & Vanutelli, 
2017; Hirata et al., 2014; Hu et al., 2018; Liu et al., 2016; Toppi et al., 2016).  
More specifically, hyper-scanning has already proven to be helpful in the study 
of moral cognition, for instance in investigating punishing tendencies in collective 
settings (Ciaramidaro et al., 2018). However, finding a reliable signature of neural 
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synchronicity in collective moral cognition and defining how it contributes to actual 
moral decisions and judgments remain open challenges. For instance, whether the 
strength of the coupling/connectivity can predict consensus, whether and how it 
occurs when people converge on similar views, whether its pattern may differ from 
non-moral joint cognition or vary across moral domains (i.e., harmful actions vs. 
purity violations (Graham et al., 2013)) are questions that can potentially be 
addressed using these new methods. 
 
To sum up, we proposed several reasons why moral cognition in individuals has 
been a most preferred research target across different domains, i.e., experimental 
moral philosophy, empirical moral psychology and the cognitive neuroscience of 
morality. We also observed some promising surging interest in the collective 
dimension of moral cognition. However, further studies are needed to investigate 
the process and content of collective moral cognition. In particular, more insight 
must be gained into how moral persuasion, negotiation, co-argumentation, and co-
deliberation may work when groups act as the agents of moral decisions or 
judgments. Perhaps we are ready for a new turning point in moral cognition, shifting 
the research community’s attention to the collective and interactive dimension of 
decisions and judgments.  
 
2.3 Collective vs. individual moral cognition  
 As discussed in § 2, moral psychology and neuroscience have only recently 
developed an interest in the collective dimension of moral cognition. In this section, 
we move the discussion forwards: we rely on existing evidence about mechanisms 
that may help disentangling individual and group moral decisions and judgments. 
On this ground, the goal is to make more specific predictions about how their 
processes and outputs may turn out to be interestingly different. We argue that 
collective moral decisions and judgments, when agents act as a group, cannot be 
fully explained in terms of the mere aggregate of the attitudes of single group 
members taken in isolation: when collectives decide or judge together, arising 
affective, deliberative and social dynamics may shape the related processes and 
outputs.7 This suffices to make collective moral cognition qualitatively different 
 
7 The thesis that collective mental processes are irreducible to the summation or aggregate of 
individual mental processes and can be attributed to groups in a collective way is central to theories 
of collective intentionality (Gallotti & Frith, 2013; Searle, 1995; Sellars, 1974; Tuomela, 2007; 
Higgins, 2020; Wilson, 2004). Here, we do not commit to a specific theory of collective 
intentionality, nor we argue in favor of the intrinsic irreducibility of collective mental processes. 
What we offer is rather a sketch of some distinctive features emerging in collective moral decisions 
and judgments. We argue that, when people come together to make moral decisions and judgments, 
specific emotional, deliberative, and social mechanisms may arise, i.e., where “specific” means that 
they tend not to come up when people debate on the same issues alone.  
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from individual moral cognition. Rather than striving for exhaustiveness, we aim to 
identify some key factors explaining such specificities. To review the mechanisms 
responsible for them, we deploy the resources of two different lines of research.  
The first comes from a couple of often paired distinctions in psychology: 
affect/reason and intuition/deliberation. When people decide socially on moral 
issues, the interplay of these contrastive mechanisms may steer the underlying 
processes and outputs towards different directions: 1. The affective and intuitive 
mechanisms may take over, pushing the group towards acting more intuitively 
and/or emotionally; 2. Reason-based and effortful mechanisms may take over, 
shifting the group towards more argumentative and deliberative moral reasoning. 
We call this approach collective dual system and explain it in § 3.1. 
The second comes from a line of research showing that people join moral 
discussions in view of forms of “social doing” (Haidt, 2007), i.e., to fulfill social 
motives. Among such motives, one can include influencing others, curating one’s 
public image, reducing blame and guilt, or establishing a social status. In particular, 
in § 3.2, we consider two of such crucial social motives, i.e., virtue signaling (how 
virtuous we wish to be seen by others) and diffusion of responsibility (joining 
groups to reduce our responsibility). 
 
2.3.1 Collective Dual System 
There are two basic models in cognitive science accounting for the mechanisms 
underlying individual decision-making. The first one (affect/reason) suggests that 
individual decisions are alternatively driven by an emotion-based and a reason-
based system. While the former is responsible for processing emotions and affects, 
the latter is responsible for abstract representations, logical thinking, and reasoning 
(Abelson & Carroll, 1965).  
The second model (intuition/deliberation) highlights the role of two (other) 
interacting – if not competing – cognitive systems: one is automatic, involved in 
fast, intuitive, and effortless processes, and the other is deliberative, slower, and 
more effortful (Evans, 2003; Evans & Stanovich, 2013; Sloman, 1996).  
Although these models have been developed independently (Darlow & Sloman, 
2010), they are often used interchangeably (Haidt & Kesebir, 2010) and exhibit 
some conceptual and functional overlaps (Lodge & Taber, 2005) – i.e., the emotion-
based system with the intuition-based one, often indicated as system 1; the reason-
based system with the deliberation-based one, often indicated as system 2. As a 
result, their respective features are merged within dual system accounts. In our 
analysis, we will follow the same convention and discuss the potential impact of 
system 1 and system 2 at a collective scale.  
Both systems are thought to shape moral cognition in individuals (Greene, 2009; 
Mallon & Nichols, 2011) but, when we move to groups, how does their interplay 
affect collective moral cognition? This question will be addressed in §§ 3.1.1, 3.1.2 
and 3.1.3. 
 
2.3.1.1 Fast, affective, and automatic cognition (system 1) 
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As mentioned in § 2.2.1, many cognitive scientists follow Hume’s lesson in 
emphasizing the central role of emotion and automaticity in moral cognition (Blasi, 
1980; Greene, 2007; Haidt, 2001; 2007; Haidt & Kesebir, 2010; Prinz, 2010; but 
see Huebner et al., 2009; Pölzler, 2015). In particular, social intuitionist models 
insist on the primacy of affective and intuitive states in individual moral cognition. 
These processes operate mainly at the unconscious level while remaining 
introspectively opaque. In this sense, they are the opposite of slow and effortful 
deliberative processes, which eventually play a role only in producing an a 
posteriori rationalization of fast moral reactions.  
It is well established that individuals in groups experience emotions differently 
than those who are isolated (e.g., Barsade & Gibson, 1998; Smith, E. R. & Mackie, 
2015; 2016). But how does this transfer to collective moral decisions and 
judgments? In other words, if we accept that the emotional/automatic system is so 
central to individuals’ moral cognition, how does it influence information 
processing at the collective level? 
In 1932, the leading U.S. theologian Reinhold Niebuhr (1932) wrote that 
emotional impulses express themselves more vividly in groups, leading to an 
increase in immoral actions. At the collective level, Niebuhr believed that emotions 
burst out free of the constraints that would be generally imposed by human 
reasoning, leading to egoistic decisions. Empirical research supports this idea that 
people violate moral norms more often when in groups: they lie more (Conrads et 
al., 2013; Kocher et al., 2018), are less compliant to norms (Fochmann et al., 2021), 
show more antisocial behaviors (Behnk et al., 2017), and are unfair in resource 
distribution (Bornstein & Yaniv, 1998; El Zein et al., 2020).  
Previous research provides some potential explanation for these phenomena. 
Since norm violation is tied to emotional processing (Baron et al., 2018; Choe & 
Min, 2011; Greene, 2007; Wiech et al., 2013), groups can play a role in reducing 
the related emotional burden, i.e., regulating decision-related proximal (stress) or 
predicted (anticipated regret) emotions (for analogous effects in non-moral 
domains, see El Zein & Bahrami, 2020; El Zein et al., 2019). As a result, the 
negative affect resulting from norm violation can be alleviated. Indirectly 
supporting this hypothesis, a number of findings show the beneficial effect of the 
group dimension on emotional processing: group discussion reduces individuals’ 
negative emotions even when these feelings are artificially induced (Kaplan & 
Miller, 1978), while group belongingness induce positive emotions (Van Kleef & 
Fischer, 2016). In turn, positive emotions tend to be correlated with more utilitarian 
decisions, which may lead to breaking norms or harming victims to maximize the 
general utility (Strohminger et al., 2011; Valdesolo & Desteno, 2006). 
 
2.3.1.2 Slow, effortful, deliberative cognition (system 2) 
Not all moral psychologists see emotions as so central to moral cognition (e.g., 
Bloom, 2010). Even if they do so, they often do not entirely dismiss the role of 
reasoning and deliberation (e.g., Haidt, 2001). Previous research has already 
emphasized that the decision-making setting (e.g., more time to deliberate) can 
modulate the respective contribution of emotions and reasons (see Greene, 2007). 
Here, we suggest that group moral discussion can also boost slow and effortful 
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deliberation, helping discussants to act more reasonably (i.e., according to 
commonsense). 
 In non-moral domains, several studies have emphasized that, when people 
discuss, they feel less uncertain (Bang & Frith, 2017; Fusaroli et al., 2012), provide 
arguments (Darmstadter, 2013), understand problems from a different angle and 
reach solutions they would not have endorsed had they been alone (Smith, E. R. & 
Collins, 2009). This suggests that deliberation and analytical reasoning get 
promoted in group contexts: people are forced to hear and provide arguments, 
engage in perspective-taking, and possibly converge on shared deliberative moral 
judgments (Mercier, 2011).  
Consistently, collective contexts and social interactions are proposed to be 
exceptional settings in which the emotional and automatic mechanisms can be 
controlled and dominated by reasons (Haidt, 2001), especially in certain age groups 
(Takezawa et al., 2006). As already mentioned, some studies even show that moral 
cognition in small groups is developmentally more advanced than among 
individuals (Damon & Killen, 1982; Nichols & Day, 1982). Based on this, 
interacting people may enter a social-deliberative mode of thinking, countering the 
effect of automatic and emotional processes. This may contribute to shifting 
collective moral cognition towards dynamics and outputs that would not have been 
reached had reasoners been alone. 
 
2.3.1.3 Putting the pieces together: reason and emotion in groups 
Based on §§ 3.1.1 and 3.1.2, both automatic/affective and reason-
based/deliberative mechanisms can be at play and even be boosted in group level 
interactions. At a further level, we can speculate that the thinking styles of 
interacting group members – more emotion-based or reason-based – can give rise 
to unprecedented processes and outputs, i.e., with one’s emotional states triggering 
deliberative reasoning in another and vice versa (for how this may apply to political 
discussions, see Sloman & Rabb, 2019).  
Obviously, the interplay between the two systems may occur at the individual 
level as well and be driven by different factors. For instance, concealing emotions 
and actively suppressing analytical or intuitive reasoning (Lee & Gino, 2015), 
solving mathematical puzzles to enter a deliberative mode (Kvaran et al., 2013), 
increasing emotional distance by presenting moral issues in a foreign language 
(Białek et al., 2019), decreasing cognitive fatigue (Timmons & Byrne, 2019), 
reducing negative feeling behaviorally (Strohminger et al., 2011; Valdesolo & 
Desteno, 2006) or with anti-anxiety drugs (Perkins et al., 2013; but also see Zhao 
et al., 2016) can all shift individual moral reasoning towards deliberative or intuitive 
processing. But whether, how, and to what extent these factors can swing collective 
moral cognition is far from being clear. Therefore, understanding the mechanisms 
by which a group, as a whole, acts deliberatively or emotionally remains an open 
pathway for future research.  
In sum, we used dual system accounts to explain group-level dynamics in moral 
discussions and suggested that their processes and outputs may be driven by the 
interplay between the emotion-based and the reason-based system. Both manifest 
themselves at different degrees within individuals and groups, depending on 
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various factors and potentially leading to opposite outcomes. The upshot is that 
collective moral decisions and judgments can be different from the aggregate of 
individual opinions. The crucial task for future research is thus to examine the 
mechanisms underlying such differences.  
 
2.3.2 Social Motivations 
Dual system accounts are only part of the story of how collective moral cognition 
unfolds. Additionally, motivations specifically arising at the social level may affect 
the dynamics, and even the goal, of the interaction. Indeed, the purpose of engaging 
in moral discussions may exceed that of solving a specific moral issue. As 
individuals, we join groups also in the guise of ‘intuitive’ (Haidt, 2007) or strategic 
politicians. For instance, we can take advantage of the collective context as a 
medium to convey messages about our moral selves – ‘who we are’ and sometimes 
‘how we wish to be seen’ morally (§ 3.2.1). Or we may implicitly or explicitly aim 
to reduce our responsibilities, by blending into the group, for difficult moral choices 
and their negative consequences (§ 3.2.2). 
 
2.3.2.1 Virtue signaling 
Morally connotated statements and actions communicate crucial social 
information about our inclinations but also, perhaps more importantly, about how 
we want to present ourselves to others (Bostyn & Roets, 2017; Everett et al., 2016; 
Kreps & Monin, 2014; Rom & Conway, 2018; Uhlmann et al., 2013). For instance, 
when one publicly says that eating meat is morally wrong, she might communicate 
two messages: her decision not to eat meat and the general moral stance by which 
she wants to be recognized by.  
This tendency to signaling virtues, even pretending to be more virtuous than one 
actually is, may then affect the content and output of the group discussion. Indeed, 
signaling to be virtuous is generally associated with expected benefits: people who 
explicitly agree with harming few but benefiting many are seen as less agreeable 
than their deontological counterparts (Everett et al., 2018), are praised and chosen 
more often as social partners (Everett et al., 2016), are perceived as especially 
prosocial in economic games (Capraro et al., 2018) and are regarded as having 
integrity, empathy, and other valuable moral qualities (Uhlmann et al., 2009, 2013). 
As a result, people may publicly reject certain solutions to moral problems to 
present themselves as particularly ‘virtuous’, and thus to promote themselves as 
trustworthy and likable (Sacco et al., 2017).  
 In line with this view, people exhibit specific moral features when they are 
aware of being observed (Kurzban et al., 2007; Lee et al., 2018), feel more socially 
connected (Lucas & Livingston, 2014), are with a friend (Van Gils et al., 2020) or 
even watch themselves in a mirror (Reynolds & Conway, 2018). This self-
representation is known to be strategic: people sometimes have an explicit meta-
perception of the moral information they convey, think in advance about how others 
will receive it, and modify their behaviors accordingly (Rom & Conway, 2018). 
Alternatively, this process may even occur at a more implicit level. In both cases, 
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we predict that moral signaling would strongly influence group dynamics, with 
groups opting for solutions that single members would not opt for in private.  
 
2.3.2.2 Diffusion of responsibility  
Outsourcing knowledge and sharing effort for demanding tasks are among the 
main reasons people decide to join groups. The dark side of this is, however, that 
people may feel less responsible for their own share. Thus, another important social 
motive affecting collective moral cognition is the pernicious phenomenon of 
diffusion of responsibility whereby single members feel less responsible for the 
negative outcomes of their behaviors. 
Research shows that even the mere presence of others can make individuals feel 
less responsible. This is typically observed in relation to the well-known bystander 
effect: when several observers witness a norm violation, each of them is less likely 
to intervene – compared to what they would have done had they been alone 
(Chekroun & Brauer, 2002; Darley et al., 1968). Diffusion of responsibility is 
proposed as one underlying reason for the increased incidence of norm violation in 
groups (Forsyth et al., 2002). Feeling less responsible, people are less generous in 
groups (Freeman et al., 1975), show more extreme behaviors (Mathes & Kahn, 
1975), punish wrongdoers less if costly (Feng et al., 2016), but are generally more 
punitive (Bandura et al., 1975) and aggressive (Meier & Hinsz, 2004; for a review, 
see El Zein et al., 2019).  
The presence of others affects both explicit (subjective reports) and implicit 
(neurophysiological correlates) markers of responsibility: people may feel less in 
control of, and thus less responsible for, the outcome of their actions when others 
are around (Beyer et al., 2017). The fact that participants verbally report 
responsibility reduction suggests that they may intentionally join groups to feel less 
accountable (El Zein et al., 2019). Indeed, participants themselves link their 
dishonesty to their ‘feeling less responsible’ when in groups (Conrads et al., 2013). 
These observations predict that diffusion of responsibility contribute explaining the 
peculiarities of moral cognition at the group level. 
 
To sum up, in this section we reviewed several factors emerging at the social 
level and that may make groups’ moral decisions and judgments interestingly 
different from the aggregate of the individuals’ ones. In particular, we trace this 
back to the interaction between the automatic/emotional and the 
deliberative/reason-based system, and to specific social motives, notably virtue 
signaling and diffusion of responsibility. Further investigation is needed to 
determine how exactly these elements may contribute to collective moral cognition. 
 
2.4 Collective moral vs. Collective non-moral cognition 
In § 3, we emphasized the differences between individual and collective moral 
cognition. To delve further into how people jointly discuss what ought to be done 
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or should have been done, here we contrast collective moral and collective 
nonmoral decisions and judgments. In particular, we focus on people’s 
understanding of, and commitment to, their morals as something that may deeply 
affect the dynamics and outputs of collective moral cognition. To this end, we first 
have to briefly introduce a branch of moral philosophy interested in the nature of 
morals, i.e., metaethics, and then explain its potential relevance for empirical moral 
psychology.  
Metaethics is devoted to exploring the nature of moral beliefs and values, i.e., 
whether certain moral statements have a truth value (cognitivism (Sayre-McCord, 
1986)) or just express non-cognitive attitudes, such as emotions (non-cognitivism 
(Stevenson, 1937. See also Gibbard, 1990)); whether they are true objectively 
(objectivism (Enoch, 2011; Railton, 1986; Sturgeon, 1985)) or subjectively 
(subjectivism (Blackburn, 1984)); whether they are true universally (universalism) 
or relatively to cultures, traditions or even individuals (relativism) (Harman, 1996). 
Unsettled disputes about ethical disagreements (Greene, 2002) or ethical expertise 
(McGrath, 2019) make cognitivism, objectivism and universalism vulnerable and 
puzzling, potentially resulting in forms of moral skepticism (Copp, 1991).8  
Drawing on these philosophical categories, empirical moral psychologists have 
recently been keen to understand how people think of their ethical beliefs and 
values, in particular whether they tend to be objectivists or subjectivists, 
universalists or relativists (Beebe, 2014; Goodwin & Darley 2008; 2013; Hopster, 
2019; Sarkissian, 2016; Wright et al., 2013). This research endeavor is grounded in 
the hypothesis that people have such meta-beliefs about (or at least an implicit 
commitment to) their morals, and that these meaningfully overlap with standard 
philosophical categories – although laypeople may lack understanding of the related 
fine-grained details.  
To some extent, knowing how people think of their morals may be relevant even 
for philosophical metaethics. In particular, many metaethicists consider making 
sense of laypeople’s metaethical beliefs as part of their job (Sarkissian, 2016). 
However, methodological concerns have been raised as to whether survey-based 
research is apt to test the match between philosophical and psychological categories 
(Hopster, 2019). Moreover, surveys might be more suited to capture quick, affect-
laden and context-driven guesses rather than firmly held beliefs (Bengson, 2013; 
Ludwig, 2010). In any case, whereas their contribution to philosophical metaethics 
remain debated, answering such questions would provide some relevant insight on 
people’s explicit or implicit commitment to their morals (Wright et al., 2013). 
Among other factors (e.g., personality, age, education), this should be investigated 
as a reliable predictor of how people will argue for their morals, or even fight for 
them, in collective contexts.  
 
8 For a more systematic review of the philosophical background, see Goodwin & Darley 2013. 
Following their standard metaethical categories, here we distinguish between questions about the 
source of the ethical beliefs (whether they are true objectively or subjectively) and their scope 
(whether they are true universally or relatively). However, we bear in mind that, both in the 
philosophical and the empirical literature, these distinctions are not universally accepted. In 
particular, universalism and objectivism are often grouped together and contrasted with relativism 
(e.g., Gowans, 2021; Wright et al., 2013).  
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Philosophers vastly hold the view that laypeople are metaethical objectivists 
(Blackburn, 1984; Smith, M. A. 1994. But see Wong, 2006). However, recent 
empirical research on the so-called psychology of metaethics (Goodwin & Darley, 
2010) has yielded mixed results (§ 4.1), suggesting that laypeople are neither fully 
objectivists/universalists nor fully subjectivists/relativists, and can be best 
categorized as metaethical pluralists (Beebe, 2014; Sarkissian, 2016; Wright et al. 
2013). Thus, a worth investigating question concerns what the effect of metaethical 
objectivism/universalism, subjectivism/relativism or pluralism is on group-level 
moral cognition. Indeed, this is seemingly a crucial angle to empirically examine 
how people will collectively gauge their morals, i.e., when they deliberate about 
what to do, convince others, aggregate opinions, or reach consensus on morally 
divisive issues.9 
To discuss the psychology of metaethics at the group-level, we rely on an 
existing classification (§ 4.2), distinguishing (on a continuum) between collective 
tasks that are treated as matters of objective truth (intellective) and collective tasks 
that are matters of subjective preferences (judgmental). Then we consider where 
moral decisions and judgments fall on this continuum. In this respect, many non-
moral collective tasks can be more neatly categorized as intellective (think of 
solving a mathematical equation) or judgmental (think of a beauty contest), and 
therefore approached with corresponding suitable strategies. By contrast, moral 
tasks have a less neat status – with people being neither fully objectivists nor fully 
subjectivists at the intraindividual and the interindividual level. On this ground, we 
focus on three typical difficulties people encounter in moral discussions and that 
are likely to affect its dynamics and outputs. These concern the value of group 
discussion (§ 4.2.1), ethical disagreement (§ 4.2.2) and ethical expertise (§ 4.2.3). 
Whereas these difficulties may also emerge whenever people think about their 
morals in isolation, they become pressing when they have to intersubjectively 
accommodate their moral views. As such, we indicate them as three fertile research 
avenues for group-level empirical moral psychology. Building on this, we comment 
on the challenges that empirical moral psychology must face if the concrete 
dynamics of collective moral cognition are to be studied (§ 4.3). 
 
2.4.1 The psychology of metaethics in individuals 
In the last few years, the empirical research on the psychology of metaethics – 
i.e., on how people think of their morals – has started flourishing. In particular, 
objectivism (often jointly with universalism) is associated with the belief that moral 
statements are objectively true or false and that, in case of disagreement, one of the 
parties must be mistaken. Conversely, subjectivism (often jointly with relativism) 
is associated with the belief that morals are mind-dependent and tied to subjective 
preferences or conventions, and that, in case of disagreement, both opponents can 
 
9 Group reasoning about political matters may have analogous features. However, truly divisive 
political issues, e.g., about taxing the rich or welcoming immigrants, often incorporate moral 
concerns about how society must be organized. 
Chapter 2. Making Moral Decisions and Judgments Together 
42 
 
be justified in holding their beliefs (Goodwin & Darley, 2008; Hopster, 2019; 
Wright et al., 2013). 
Several classic studies, often in the field of developmental psychology, have 
argued that laypeople tend to be objectivists. Starting in early childhood (Nucci, 
2001; Turiel, 2008; Wainryb et al., 2004), healthy individuals distinguish between 
moral convictions and less stringent social commitments, such as conventions and 
behavioral standards (Bucciarelli & Johnson-Laird, 2020; Heiphetz & Young, 
2017; but see Kelly et al., 2007 for a criticism of the moral/conventional 
distinction). Moral convictions are seen as almost as objective as scientific facts 
(Goodwin & Darley, 2008) and not alterable even by God’s intervention (Reinecke 
& Horne, 2018).  
Along these lines, Skitka and colleagues (2021) reviewed a range of evidence 
that people are objectivists or universalists about their moral convictions, and that 
they strongly care about defending them. In particular, moral convictions are: 
metacognitively perceived as having universal, generalizable, and absolute validity, 
while being rooted in some fundamental factual truth (Van Bavel et al., 2012); 
experienced as having a solid link with emotions (Skitka & Wisneski, 2011), with 
moral agreements or disagreements eliciting specific emotional reactions (Ryan, 
2014); considered as intrinsically obligatory, even in the absence of sanctions, and 
self-justifying rather than as imposed by some external authority. This to the extent 
that, if circumstances so require, people prioritize core moral norms over unfair 
juridical norms (Skitka et al., 2009; Smetana, 1983; Turiel, 1983).  
Furthermore, compared to non-moral beliefs, moral convictions are relatively 
resistant to changes and majority influence and tied to intolerance for conflicting 
views (Aramovich et al., 2012; Skitka et al., 2005). Supporting this, research shows 
that moral diversity is perceived as socially more problematic than other diversities, 
including demographic diversity (Haidt, 2003). Strong confidence in one’s morals 
is associated with unwillingness to compromise (Ryan, 2019) and the tendency to 
dissociate oneself from dissimilar others, demonstrating resilience to 
disenfranchisement fears (Wright et al., 2008). In this respect, it seems that 
laypeople’s objectivist tendencies can peacefully co-exist with the inconsistencies 
of everyday moral life (Campbell, 2017), such as biased resistance to persuasion 
(Ahluwalia, 2000), affect-laden reactions (Tangney et al., 2011), context-dependent 
variations (FeldmanHall et al., 2018), self-serving and confirmation biases (Lin et 
al., 2017), introspection failure (Nisbett & Wilson, 1977) and framing effects 
(Hertwig & Gigerenzer, 2011).10  
However, more recent research has provided a more nuanced, and somehow 
contrasting, picture of laypeople’s metaethical commitments (Beebe, 2014; 
Hopster, 2019). At the interindividual level, the balance between objectivist and 
subjectivist tendencies has been shown to depend on individual traits, such as 
religiosity (Goodwin & Darley, 2010), age (Beebe & Sackris, 2016), or personality 
(Feltz & Cokely, 2008). Moreover, at the intraindividual level, people tend to be 
 
10 Not all inconsistences are consciously perceived as such. For instance, in an experiment by Hall 
and colleagues, participants failed to notice that their surveyed moral opinions were systematically 
altered by the experimenter and provided post-hoc justifications for defending views opposing their 
original positions (2012). 
2.4 Collective moral vs. Collective non-moral cognition 
43 
 
objectivists about certain moral topics and subjectivists about others (Davis, 2021). 
For instance, moral statements condemning moral transgressions are seen as more 
objective than positive statements praising good actions (Goodwin & Darley, 
2012). While public consensus on a topic increases the tendency to see the 
supporting moral statements as objective (Goodwin & Darley, 2012), controversial 
matters elicit the relativist belief that no universally correct answers exist (Heiphetz 
& Young, 2017). Finally, contextual factors, such as in-group and out-group 
dynamics between the disagreeing parties, may increase or decrease laypeople’s 
objectivism (Sarkissian et al., 2011).  
One possible explanation of these mixed results is that people are actually full-
fledged objectivists or universalists but vary in their ways of classifying what 
counts as a moral problem. In this case, people’s commitments might not be 
intrinsically ambivalent. More simply, subjectivist/relativist tendencies may refer 
to topics that participants in experiments do not consider as authentically moral. If 
so, once people are given the opportunity to freely choose authentically moral 
problems, they should then reveal objectivist tendencies. However, research has 
shown that people express subjectivist/relativist tendencies even when they 
autonomously decide what counts as moral. As a result, many have concluded that 
laypeople actually are metaethical pluralists, i.e., their metaethical tendencies vary 
both at the interindividual and intraindividual level depending on various factors 
(Pölzler, 2017; Wright et al., 2013). 
Brain imaging studies have lent indirect support to the claim that laypeople are 
not full-fledged objectivists. If anything, they seem to bend towards subjectivism 
(Theriault et al., 2017). Broadly speaking, the research on the moral brain has 
reliably distinguished between the neural response to moral vs. nonmoral stimuli 
(Moll et al., 2001) but has failed to single out neural substrates that uniquely support 
moral cognition (Young & Dugan, 2011). Indeed, moral cognition is seemingly 
made up of the contribution of domain-general neural substrates processing 
emotion and social cognition, such as the ventromedial prefrontal cortex, amygdala, 
superior temporal sulcus, bilateral temporoparietal junction, posterior cingulate 
cortex, and precuneus (Greene & Haidt, 2002). This domain-general nature of the 
neural processing contributing to moral cognition matches the view that moral 
decisions and judgments are generated by a combination of rational reasoning 
(Monin et al., 2007), affective inputs (Haidt, 2001), individual preferences (Yang 
et al., 2017), and social motivations (Everett et al., 2016).  
However, looking for the neural correlates of moral reasoning is not the same as 
looking for the neural correlates of metaethical beliefs. In this more niche area of 
research, a study by Theriault and colleagues (2017) showed that the neural 
representations of morals and subjective preferences exhibit a significant 
overlapping within the dorsal-medial prefrontal cortex while no common pattern of 
activation was found between the representation of morals and objective facts. The 
authors concluded that laypeople’s metaethical beliefs are more subjectivist than 
previously thought, with the underlying neural commonalities between morals and 
preferences potentially explained by their analogously eliciting representations of 
mental states. 
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Taken together, the evidence in § 4.1 suggests that people are likely to be 
metaethical pluralists. Asking whether they are objectivists or subjectivists full stop 
might therefore be meaningless. More interestingly, one may wonder under which 
conditions people express objectivist or subjectivist tendencies (Sarkissian, 2016). 
But how does this pluralist outlook affect the dynamics and output of collective 
moral cognition? We discuss this point in the following sections. 
 
2.4.2 From I to We: intellective and judgmental tasks 
In a number of works, Laughlin and colleagues provided a useful classification 
of collective or group tasks. This classification organizes group tasks on a 
demonstrability continuum, anchored by intellective and judgmental tasks 
(Laughlin, 2011; Laughlin & Adamopoulos, 1980; Laughlin & Ellis, 1986). In this 
section, we take advantage of this existing classification to discuss the features of 
collective moral tasks. 
Intellective tasks are heterogeneous, but all have objective solutions. These are 
demonstrably correct within a scientific system or system of reference, i.e., 
mathematical, logical or verbal-conceptual. Consider, for example, a pool of 
engineers arguing about the dynamic of a car crash, a team of meteorologists 
forecasting the weather or a group of lawyers arguing about whether underage 
criminals can be prosecuted in a certain jurisdiction. To solve intellective tasks, 
people make evidence or reason-based decisions and judgments about what is true 
or false.11 People who have access to sufficient information can profitably 
participate in the discussion, possibly detect (in)correct answers, and be convinced 
by evidence or arguments provided by (expert) group members: if someone points 
at the correct answer, the others can then converge on the same solution.  
By contrast, judgmental tasks require people to make subjective evaluations for 
which no demonstrably correct answer can be provided, e.g., aesthetic and attitude-
based judgments like preferences about food, art, physical attractiveness. In 
judgmental tasks, people might have more or less solid attitudes but are not 
equipped with reliable tools or a solid reference system that can be referred to in 
order to convince opponents or novices. Therefore, these tasks have to do with 
negotiating preferences with others, e.g., finding solutions that fulfill most group 
members’ desiderata (Laughlin, 2011; Laughlin & Adamopoulos, 1980; Laughlin 
& Ellis, 1986). 
Categorizing a whole task as judgmental or intellective is often an over-
simplification, and people might diverge on how they subjectively interpret whether 
a task is intellective or judgmental. Most decisions and judgments are based on 
various parameters or include sub-tasks, some of which will be judgmental and 
some of which will be intellective, and all of which may weigh in on the final 
solution. Consider, for example, a family that is deliberating about whether to buy 
 
11 We remain agnostic here about how truth must be interpreted (for an overview, see Burgess & 
Burgess, 2011), i.e., as correspondence with reality (David, 2018); coherence between what is held 
as true and a systematic set of beliefs (Walker, 2018); or, as in pragmatist theories, as what works 
in practice and does not conflict with experience (Misak, 2018). 
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their children’s clothes from a local shop or an online store. Typical considerations 
may concern what items are more durable or less expensive (intellective task) or 
more likable (judgmental task), the upshot being that the final solution will be a 
trade-off between the most valued parameters.  
At the psychological level, depending on whether one perceives a task or a sub-
task as more intellective or judgmental, one is expected to put forward different 
fitting strategies to argue for a given solution. For example, a pool of lawyers will 
likely use argumentative strategies based on previous records to discuss a criminal 
case (intellective task). Conversely, previous records become irrelevant when the 
jury in a beauty contest must crown a winner and each member has a vote to cast 
(judgmental task). However, assuming some metaethical pluralism at the 
psychological level, people will not uniformly see moral tasks or subtasks as 
intellective or judgmental and will carve out specific argumentative strategies 
depending on circumstances. Consider a daughter aiming to convince her reluctant 
parents that buying from the local shop is ethically praiseworthy: does she think 
that she is expressing an objective (as in intellective tasks) or a subjective (as in 
judgmental tasks) truth? Are her parents expected to simply converge on the same 
solution or can they legitimately have alternative views?  
On this ground, we will now examine three specific difficulties that people may 
experience when discussing their morals, and that may thus affect the dynamics and 
outputs of collective moral cognition: value of group discussion (§ 4.2.1), ethical 
disagreement (§ 4.2.2), and ethical expertise (§ 4.2.3). 
 
2.4.2.1 What’s the value of discussing morals with others? 
Groups demonstrably outperform individuals in several intellective tasks. This 
routinely happens in sensory domains (Sorkin et al., 2001), especially when 
participants’ confidence is matched (Bahrami et al., 2010), numerical cognition 
(Bahrami et al., 2012), and non-moral problem solving (Mason & Watts, 2012). In 
these tasks, performances are measured by closeness to right/better answers 
according to standardized parameters (Jayles et al., 2017). For example, a pool of 
meteorologists performs better than one meteorologist depending on how close 
their respective predictions match the weather, and experts are expected to do better 
than novices. In this respect, people may join groups to distribute tasks and increase 
their chances of doing a good job. 
 In judgmental tasks, performance parameters cannot be quantitatively assessed 
with respect to numerical benchmarks. In such cases, the impact of group reasoning 
is more difficult to evaluate. Indeed, although we may value group discussions even 
in these contexts, it is often unclear whether a jury is better than single jurors (think 
of jurors in a beauty contest). 
How do people assess the value of group discussions about morals? In what 
sense should we say that groups outperform (or underperform) individuals? 
Depending on the metaethical tendencies of group members, the discussion may be 
alternatively cast as a truth-seeking collective effort or rather as a work of mediation 
between individual preferences – with different people having different views about 
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this matter. In both cases, whenever contrasts arise, people cannot easily update 
their credence by relying on demonstrably correct or better answers.12  
How do people tell right from wrong in controversial cases and convince others? 
Basic moral theories in Western philosophy – i.e., deontology, utilitarianism, virtue 
ethics – provide intersubjectively valid reference systems against which individual 
moral claims can be tested, with the result of being more or less justifiable with 
respect to that reference system. However, different moral theories often endorse 
contrastive views about the justifications of moral judgments, and sometimes even 
about the solutions to ethical dilemmas. No moral system has been canonically 
accepted as the correct reference system – even among ethicists, let alone non-
experts, thus leaving the solution we should ultimately go for underspecified.  
Independently of truth-seeking efforts, group reasoning can still be seen as 
advantageous based on different utility functions, e.g., homogeneity of results 
(Himmelroos & Christensen, 2013), informed understanding (Chambers, 2003) or 
social inclusivity (Tajfel & Turner, 2004). However, these values are not 
evidentially self-sufficient in the same way as solutions to intellective tasks are and 
can be valued as more or less relevant depending on the group members’ 
inclinations. Consider, for example, the vaunted value of inclusivity: inclusivity in 
healthcare practices actually favors the patients’ intellectual autonomy (Sandman 
& Munthe, 2010). Nonetheless, obsessing over finding an agreement between 
interested parties – particularly in pediatric contexts, where both doctors and 
parents are involved – has been challenged as potentially detrimental to the patients’ 
interest in terms of granting them a better quality of life (Birchley, 2014).  
These issues raise interesting empirical questions about how pluralist 
metaethical stances may affect how people evaluate the scope and value of group 
discussion. In turn, this may shape the strategies and effort group members will put 
in place to discuss with others and make their voices heard.  
 
2.4.2.2 How can people solve ethical disagreements?  
Compared to nonmoral disagreement, moral disagreement is often treated as 
especially intractable (Enoch, 2009; Wilkinson & Savulescu, 2018). On the one 
hand, this is obviously related to the lack of a unified benchmark against which 
moral claims can be tested (§ 4.2.1). On the other hand, this also depends on how 
variable morals are and have been throughout history and across people (Feinberg 
et al., 2019; Graham et al., 2009). 
Indeed, moral standards do not display the same intertemporal stability that is 
shown by solutions to intellective tasks (Hermann, 2019). Even widely accepted 
moral standards can be presented as the byproduct of political, social, and cultural 
upheavals rather than as resulting from some demonstrably correct reasoning 
(Sloman & Rabb, 2019). For example, the Western idea that all humans are entitled 
to the same rights gained momentum after the French revolution, which saw the 
rise of the modern bourgeoisie’s wisdom and economic interest, and previously was 
 
12 The popularity of conspiracy theories raises questions as to whether we actually have 
intersubjectively shared reference systems even for intellective domains (Douglas et al., 2019; 
Pennycook et al., 2021).  
2.4 Collective moral vs. Collective non-moral cognition 
47 
 
not so widespread (Brubaker, 1989). Analogously, the now diffused ethical 
preoccupations for non-human animals emerged relatively late in human history 
(Mayer, 2010). 
Despite welcome homogeneity in moral values (e.g., most people would agree 
that genocide is morally wrong), hardly tractable moral diversity and disagreement 
still pervade our societies and are often clearly visible. In particular, people do not 
uniformly endorse the very same notions of fairness, purity, harm, authority, and 
loyalty (Graham et al., 2013), and have different inclusivity criteria about what 
creatures deserve moral consideration or what values should be prioritized in case 
of conflict (Hermann, 2017; Laham, 2009). Furthermore, people may have different 
views on how distributive justice should be fairly implemented (Ueshima et al., 
2021) or on the extent to which a society should balance the pursuit of values such 
as equality, justice, or personal freedom (Giebler & Merkel, 2016).  
To address moral problem solving constructively, we are often encouraged to 
take the perspective of others into account and to appreciate that individual values 
are tied to deep-seated personal and cultural sensitivities,13 which is inappropriate 
to simply override. When moral disagreement is rooted in fundamentally different 
ways of seeing things, it is unclear what evidence or arguments can be legitimately 
used to convince others or whether we should even try to persuade them at all. 
Indeed, such attempts might be seen as inconsiderate to another person’s values. In 
this respect, subjectivism at the individual level has been experimentally linked to 
more tolerant behaviors (Wright et al., 2008) and to the ability to explore alternative 
possibilities (Goodwin & Darley, 2010). Moral disagreement is associated with 
negative emotions that people tend to shield themselves from, sometimes 
purposedly avoiding engaging in debates with dissimilar others (Frimer et al., 
2017). This marks an important distinction between moral and pure intellective 
tasks, where people, in principle at least, aim to seek the truth more than to be 
respectful of interindividual differences. Furthermore, in case of moral, compared 
to non-moral, disagreement people perceive personal experiences as more 
trustworthy than objective facts (Kubin et al., 2021).  
Acknowledging that ethical disagreement is often intractable does not mean that 
people never have tools to convince others, as it is rather the case in judgmental 
tasks – it would be pretty meaningless to convince someone that apples are more 
delicious than pineapples based on argumentative reasoning. By contrast, engaging 
in moral discussion, people usually feel the pressure to provide intersubjectively 
acceptable (impartial) justificatory reasons for their actions (Pizarro et al., 2006), 
and tend to rely on non-moral facts supporting their moral views. For instance, non-
moral evidence of animals’ suffering typically grounds the argument that exploiting 
animals is immoral (Schwitzgebel et al., 2020; Singer, 2009). This appeal to 
justificatory reasons places moral tasks far from mere judgmental tasks. 
At the societal level, moral disagreement can be pragmatically annihilated via 
the imposition of a shared code of conduct. This was typical of traditional societies 
where moral differences were forcefully synchronized through unified norms and 
 
13 Think of bioethical committees including people with religious and secular backgrounds 
(Jokowitz & Glick, 2009). 
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the rigid sanctioning of code violations (Chaves, 1994; Taylor, 2007). Religious or 
tribal leaders, in such cases, played the self-assigned role of moral experts and 
custodians of the shared moral knowledge (Orvis, 2001). However, the schema is 
unlikely to fit contemporary societies wherein a certain degree of tolerance towards 
diversity (Brown, 2008) is a welcome element of what (democratically) facing 
ethical disagreement is thought to imply. Democratic societies may tend to handle 
these problems pragmatically by letting people free to act in a way or another (e.g., 
in the case of abortion or organ donation). However, when autonomously chosen 
solutions are not permissible, a society must converge on shared ethical solutions 
that can also work as the basis for political or juridical deliberation (Farah & 
Heberlein, 2007; Greene & Cohen, 2004). 
Contrasting moral and intellective tasks, as if disagreement in the latter could 
always be easily overcome and truth securely pursued, may sound overly idealistic. 
In particular, consider that intellective tasks are typical of scientific disciplines: the 
history and philosophy of science have shown that even science can hardly be seen 
as a linearly cumulative endeavor, indomitably progressing towards truth 
(Maxwell, 2017). Indeed, intractable disagreements (Dieckmann & Johnson, 2019), 
scientific pluralism (Kellert et al., 2006), incommensurability (Fayerabend, 1962), 
and radical paradigm shifts (Kuhn, 1962) are part of how science evolves as well. 
However, here we are not concerned with the status of science as a discipline – i.e., 
whether science, probabilistically and fallibilistically (Peirce, 1931-60), 
approximates an independent truth or is rather a social construct (Berger & 
Luckmann, 1967) –, but on how people think of the scientific knowledge that is 
central to pure intellective tasks. In this sense, psychological evidence suggests that 
people experience scientific knowledge as providing solid and uniform guiding 
principles while its fallibilistic nature remains a challenge to its public 
understanding (Bromme & Goldman, 2014). Differently from the moral domain, 
when disagreement in science manifests itself in the public eye, it is then perceived 
as strange and unsettling (Koehler & Pennycook, 2019): assuming that science 
solidly pursues the truth, it is no accident that people feel disconcerted about the 
tentativeness of empirical approaches to currently uncharted issues (Kreps & 
Kriner, 2020). 
 
2.4.2.3 How can people rely on ethical experts? 
The status of ethical expertise as a specialization is controversial both in 
theoretical (Singer, 1972) and applied ethics (Iltis & Sheehan, 2016) – as opposed 
to the scientific or technological expertise that proves useful in solving pure 
intellective tasks.  
In general, knowledge outsourcing is a fundamental cog of human cognition and 
one of the most common reasons we join groups (Hemmatian & Sloman, 2020; 
Sloman & Fernbach, 2018; Sloman & Rabb, 2019). Indeed, relying on the 
information that one does not know but presumes that others can provide allows 
humans to exploit the community’s representational and computational capacities 
in view of more sophisticated goals (Hemmatian & Sloman, 2020). However, this 
strategic outsourcing implies that people can reliably identify the individuals who 
are more likely to provide the required expertise. This routinely happens with 
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intellective tasks linked to professional fields, e.g., mechanical engineering, 
meteorology, or the law (but see Scharrer et al., 2016). But how do people 
experience the outsourcing of expertise, i.e., relying on group or community’s 
knowledge (Sloman & Rabb, 2019), in moral decisions and judgments?  
In general, creative members of society and public figures may be taken as moral 
models in virtue of their social influence skills (Pizarro et al., 2006). Iconic 
individuals like Martin Luther King or Gandhi are often invoked as ethical experts 
in the sense of being good at knowing what ought to be done in given settings, 
inspiring generations to come (Rudolph, 2010). However, they did not leave behind 
systematic manuals14 we can consult to mechanically solve our everyday moral 
issues as we would do for solving a mathematical equation (but see Spinoza, 
1677/1985-2016). Social epistemologists have emphasized the role of (expert) 
testimony to reach justified beliefs in social scenarios. Yet, the justificatory force 
of testimony or social influence has often been called into question since it remains 
unclear on what grounds people should decide to trust selected others (Hills, 2009). 
Ethicists, occasionally or systematically, play the role of expert advisors on 
applied ethical matters, such as health care or environmental issues (McLean, 
2007). Although they are recognizably good at pointing out what moral issues arise 
in a given context, no consensus exists about whether they have any relevant 
expertise at telling people how to solve their ethical worries (Baylis, 1989): on the 
one hand, current research surveying samples of ethics professors suggests that their 
field expertise does not positively correlate with moral action (Schönegger & 
Wagner, 2019; Schwitzgebel & Rust, 2009). On the other hand, people have a 
systematic tendency to see themselves, rather than others, as morally superior to the 
average population (Alicke et al., 2001; Gebauer et al., 2013; Tappin & McKay, 
2016). 
Taken together, the controversial status of ethical expertise and the widespread 
sense of self-righteousness raise interesting questions about how people may then 
defer to others in group discussion, eventually overcoming individual positions and 
idiosyncrasies. 
 
2.4.3 Collective moral problem solving 
The general question underlying this section is to what extent people’s 
metaethical commitments affect the process and output of joint moral decisions and 
judgments. If laypeople are metaethical pluralists, they are then expected to 
approach moral tasks also in a pluralist manner, i.e., unlike tasks that can be more 
neatly thought of as intellective or judgmental. On this ground, we will now review 
some of the specific challenges that moral psychology must face in the study of 
collective moral cognition. 
In psychology, group-level differences in moral and nonmoral cognition have 
been previously studied as standing alone independent variables. In particular, 
 
14 An exception seems to be that of religious codes providing moral rules. However, religious codes 
are rarely seen as morally authoritative outside the circle of those who already share the same 
religious beliefs.  
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previous work has focused on how group features affect the expected outputs, e.g., 
whether diversity (Gomez & Bernet, 2019), group size (Rezmer et al., 2011), 
confidence level (Bahrami et al., 2010) or expertise (Patel et al., 2000) affect 
collective performance. Research has also shown that being in a group affects our 
metaethical commitments: people tend to be objectivists in competitive frameworks 
and subjectivists in cooperative ones (Fisher et al., 2016), and they are more 
objectivists when fellow members share their moral views (Sarkissian, 2016). Other 
cognate research strands have investigated how rational agents incorporate social 
inputs when they have (a)symmetrical information (Blomqvist & Léger, 2005); 
how social reinforcement promotes options that others have previously selected 
(Mann, 2018); how intergroup differences (Ellemers et al., 1997), group 
membership (Tropp & Pettigrew, 2006), in-group and out-group mechanisms 
(Vives et al., 2021) and cultural and political affiliation (Ellemers et al., 2013) 
influence individual moral decisions and judgments. Our, related but 
distinguishable, concern is how groups make moral decisions and judgments given 
people’s pluralist tendencies. 
One more specific question concerns the aggregation rules underlying moral 
group reasoning. Consider a simple aggregation rule like the majority rule 
(Condorcet, 1785/2014). Overall, the truth-seeking value of the majority rule in 
group decision-making is the target of a long-lasting discussion (Austen-Smith & 
Banks, 1996). A simple rather than weighted majority rule can be detrimental to the 
group’s fitness in intellective tasks where experts would outperform uninformed 
group members (Correa & Yildrim, 2021). By contrast, a simple majority rule 
might be considered the fairest solution when mediating between different 
preferences in judgmental tasks (Bang & Frith, 2017). Mechanically applying the 
majority rule to moral problem solving might favor compromise but also be 
experienced as outrageous when the engaged moral views are radically different. 
When the hearers are highly confident, attempts at steering their moral opinions 
easily backfire, and they may be scarcely open to hear and discuss divergent views 
(Wright et al., 2008; Wright et al., 2014).15 
Even psychological solutions that prove (un)effective in intellective tasks may 
not work analogously in moral tasks. For instance, the so-called equality bias – 
allocating to all group members the same amount of time to discuss the solution to 
a problem – is detrimental to collective perceptual decisions. Indeed, in intellective 
tasks, the optimum is reached when participants are allocated discussion time based 
on their actual competence (Mahmoodi et al., 2015). Assuming people’s self-
righteousness in moral matters and the dubious status of ethical expertise, one 
problem is to define what the optimum would be in moral discussions, e.g., by 
recognizing competent moral decision-makers to allocate time accordingly. 
How do then groups reach consensus and compromise along the line that goes 
from intolerance to openness? Existing research in non-moral domains has shown 
 
15 In particular, one interesting research direction obviously connects this empirical research with 
recent developments in the theory of judgment aggregation, looking at the structural properties and 
problems of the aggregation rules for reaching consistent collective judgments (for a review, see 




that people willingly strive to make sure that their views are paid attention to (Hertz 
et al., 2017) and systematically devise arguments to persuade others (Mercier & 
Sperber, 2011). However, both personal effort and communication must be 
effectively targeted to convince others (Baek & Falk, 2018). As mentioned, 
evidence-based argumentative strategies may work well in intellective tasks but less 
so in judgmental tasks. What persuasion strategies are more likely to be successful, 
and what strategies are people likely to implement when discussing their morals? 
What is the specific weight given to truth-seeking rational argumentation compared 
to idiosyncratic preferences or emotions?  
According to the well-known social intuitionist model, justificatory reasons are 
just debunkable post hoc rationalizations: emotion-based automatic patterns, 
preceding effortful deliberative reasoning, lie beneath our educated moral views 
(Haidt, 2001). Indeed, verbal and non-verbal communication within the group is 
affected by specific moral sentiments that may steer the deliberative process 
towards novel results. In addition to what discussed in § 3, the sentiment of empathy 
is nourished by mechanisms – such as mimicry (for a critical discussion, see 
Holland et al., 2020) or perspective-taking (Mata, 2019) – that can only emerge in 
ongoing or at least simulated interactions (Ruby & Decety, 2001). We do not 
dispute that this affect-based model might describe how moral decisions and 
judgments are often taken. But, even so, people’s ways of experiencing and 
communicating their morals, as we aimed at illustrating in this section (and as the 
proponents of intuitionist models acknowledge (Haidt, 2001)), require a more 
encompassing explanation, discussing how they value the group’s contribution to 
moral tasks, approach disagreement, and defer to the expertise of selected others. 
In sum, we highlighted that collective moral cognition displays peculiar features 
that we should take into account if we are to study this field empirically. Unlike 
nonmoral decisions and judgments, the moral ones cannot be easily categorized as 
matters of truth or preference, nor ethical challenges can be treated as purely 
intellective or judgmental tasks. While the evidence about our individual 
metaethical commitments is mixed, the vulnerabilities of moral reasoning are likely 
to become especially vivid when we deliberate together with others and have to 
justify our moral standpoint or outsource decisions and judgments to (experts) 
others. The interplay between these aspects makes the study of collective moral 
cognition a fertile target for empirical investigation.  
 
2.5 Conclusion 
The scope of the paper was threefold. First, we showed that a good deal of the 
current research in moral cognition is individualistic, reviewed some of the 
underlying motivations for this, and acknowledged some more recent research 
trends that highlight the relevance of the collective dimension. Second, we 
discussed specific factors arising in collective moral cognition as having a worth 
investigating impact on the ensuing decisions and judgments. We would miss out 
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some vital information if we simply approached collective moral cognition in terms 
of the aggregate of individual moral views. Third, we proposed that group moral 
cognition differs significantly from collective non-moral cognition. Therefore, it 
must be addressed with targeted tools if essential details of how the related 
processes work are to be captured. In conclusion, this paper aimed to urge 
researchers in the field of moral cognition to pay more attention to the collective 
dimension, filling the gaps between individual and group dynamics.  
The role of interactions in moral cognition ties together several timely questions 
about the societal and political impact of moral discussion, moral persuasion, social 
deliberation and moral change. In this light, across psychology, philosophy, and 
cognitive neuroscience, new models and frameworks are needed to foster 
understanding of the processes that make collective moral decisions and judgments 
possible. We hope that our theoretical overview of open issues in collective moral 
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Abstract: Moral judgments have a very prominent social nature, and in 
everyday life, they are continually shaped by discussions with others. Psychological 
investigations of these judgments, however, have rarely addressed the impact of 
social interactions. To examine the role of social interaction on moral judgments 
within small groups, we had groups of 4 to 5 participants judge moral dilemmas 
first individually and privately, then collectively and interactively, and finally 
individually a second time. We employed both real-life and sacrificial moral 
dilemmas in which the character’s action or inaction violated a moral principle to 
benefit the greatest number of people. Participants decided if these utilitarian 
decisions were morally acceptable or not. In Experiment 1, we found that collective 
judgments in face-to-face interactions were more utilitarian than the statistical 
aggregate of their members compared to both first and second individual 
judgments. This observation supported the hypothesis that deliberation and 
consensus within a group transiently reduce the emotional burden of norm 
violation. In Experiment 2, we tested this hypothesis more directly: measuring 
participants’ state anxiety in addition to their moral judgments before, during, and 
after online interactions, we found again that collectives were more utilitarian than 
those of individuals and that state anxiety level was reduced during and after social 
interaction. The utilitarian boost in collective moral judgments is probably due to 
the reduction of stress in the social setting. 
 
Keywords Topic: Collective Moral Judgments, Group Moral Decisions, 
Moral Dilemmas, Moral Conformity, Moral Influence, Social Deliberation 
Keywords Method: Logistic Mixed Effect Model, Bayesian Mixed Effect 







 Collective consensual judgments made via face-to-face and online group 






 Group discussion did not change the individual judgments indicating a 
normative conformity effect. 
 
 Individuals consented to a group judgment that they did not necessarily buy 
into personally. 
 
 Collectives were less stressed than individuals after responding to moral 
dilemmas. 
 
 Interactions reduced aversive emotions (e.g., stress, regrets) associated with 
violation of moral norms. 
3.1 Introduction 
Moral judgments are often collective. We discuss our individual opinions about 
the moral actions of friends, institutions, celebrities, and authorities within our 
social network. In fact, we spend most of our social conversations discussing others' 
moral failures (Dunbar, 2004). However, often different people have different 
moral opinions about the same moral issue. Consider the following scenario:  
"After a violent murder in Germany, a journalist who investigates the 
case found evidence that the government of a foreign country ordered the 
murder. That country is a long-time trade partner of Germany, with which 
the German state is about to conclude a large trade agreement. This 
agreement will create 10,000 new jobs in Germany. If the journalist blows 
the whistle, the trade deal will collapse. The journalist decides to ignore the 
evidence. The trade deal goes through successfully, bringing wealth and 
employment to thousands of people. Was the journalist’s decision morally 
acceptable?"  
 
Here, one might argue that upholding the principles of justice and journalistic 
duty requires pursuing and revealing the truth at any cost. This line of argument 
would conclude that what the journalist did was morally wrong. Others, who prefer 
to look at the outcome, may approve of the decision because it brought so much 
benefit and prosperity to many people.  
Although fictional, these kinds of scenarios are not far from reality. Many 
decisions and actions involve breaking a norm, a promise, a rule, or a moral code 
to increase the utility for a larger group (e.g., active and passive euthanasia, 
abortion, white lies, restricting children’s education to protect the elderly in the time 
of a global pandemic, discontinuing life support in comatose patients, etc.). The 
moral permissibility of such decisions may raise strong disputes in different people 
and lead to public and private discussions. In reality, however, within a group, a 
panel, among friends, or in families, when people discuss these decisions, how do 
they collectively decide about these moral issues? More generally, how collective 
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moral judgments are shaped by individual members’ opinions? Conversely, do 
group interactions change the individual’s private moral judgments?  
Previous works have extensively examined the philosophical, social, cognitive, 
and neurobiological substrates of individual moral judgments and decisions (e.g., 
Greene et al., 2001; Greene et al., 2004; Haidt, 2001; Mallon & Nichols, 2011; Moll 
et al., 2008). However, most of the previous theories in moral psychology explain 
morality at the individual level. Several recent works have underscored this 
overwhelming focus on examining individuals making decisions or judgments in 
isolation (Bloom, 2010; Ellemers, 2017; Ellemers et al., 2019; Fedyk, 2019; Gert, 
2005; Haidt, 2007; Leach et al., 2015). Here we set out to examine this overlooked 
but fundamental role of social interaction among individuals in groups that engage 
in moral discussions. 
The relationship between the individual and the collective morality has been at 
the heart of some of the most influential works of the post-war 20th-century 
philosophy (Arendt, 1987) and social psychology (Festinger & Carlsmith, 1959; 
Milgram, 1963; Myers & Bishop, 1970; Myers & Kaplan, 1976; Myers & Lamm, 
1976; Wallach et al., 1964; Wallach & Kogan, 1965). Our questions – posed above 
– invite the reader to evaluate the reciprocal interactive relationship between the 
group and individual moral judgments in the light of those previous influential 
works.  
We first provide a brief overview of the literature on moral judgments in 
individuals. Rather than being exhaustive, we highlight the contextual or 
psychological factors that have been shown to drive moral judgments towards or 
away from one moral theory or another in individuals and in isolation. Then we turn 
to the literature on social interaction and majority influence to examine the effect 
of interaction on the same contextual and psychological factors that modulate moral 
judgments. Putting our review of the two fields together, we provide our theoretical 
synthesis, which is then tested empirically.  
 
3.1.1 Moral dilemmas  
Moral dilemmas describe situations where it is necessary to choose between 
alternative actions, each of which violates a moral principle (e.g., holding on to a 
secret or informing a happily-married friend that his/her partner has been cheating 
on them). Moral dilemmas are difficult to resolve because they admit two 
incompatible moral actions. Often each of these conflicting actions is related to a 
different moral theory. For instance, according to a broad family of utilitarian moral 
theories, an action is acceptable if it maximizes the utility for the greatest number 
of people (Mill, 1863; Rosen, 2006) even if securing that utility entails violating 
moral rules like disregarding promises, duties, norms, etc. Utilitarianism, therefore, 




it primarily cares about the consequences of that action. In contrast, deontological 
moral theories care primarily about upholding universal moral principles - what 
Kant (1948) called categorical imperatives- and give consequences a lower priority. 
These principles often make direct, inflexible, universal, and unequivocal moral 
rules such as ’Do not lie,’ ‘Do not kill’ or ‘Do not break a promise’ (Kant, 1948; 
Scruton, 2001). 
Borrowed from philosophy, a class of moral dilemmas known as ‘sacrificial 
dilemmas’ are commonly used in moral psychology, which entails instrumental 
harm to some in order to save others (see "Trolley Problem”; Foot, 1967; Thomson, 
1976 for a review, see Christensen et al., 2014). In these dilemmas a utilitarian 
moral agent (whose does not benefit personally from the consequences) would 
harm one innocent person if the harm benefits many. Conversely, harming an 
innocent person is wrong for deontology regardless of the number of lives that the 
inflicted harm might save. 
To study the psychological and neural processes underlying these conflicting 
motives in individuals, experimenters often have participants read scenarios that 
include different sacrificial dilemmas (or, more recently, experience the scenario in 
virtual reality), imagine themselves in the situation, and decide what they would 
choose to do. Similarly, moral judgments are measured by having the participant 
evaluate a scenario in which an action was taken by a protagonist and see if (or how 
much) the participant would endorse the protagonist’s decision. 
Moral Dilemmas and Deliberation 
Over the last two decades, this research line has shown that moral judgments are 
not fixed in stone and can be modulated in individuals. For instance, several 
converging pieces of evidence support the effect of deliberation and reasoning in 
utilitarian judgments. Across diverse measurements, reasoning and deliberation led 
to more utilitarian responses (Patil et al., 2020). Reflection and deliberation 
encouraged more utilitarian views (Paxton et al., 2012). Giving participants 
analytical mathematical puzzles before reading the moral scenarios made them 
more utilitarian by ‘activating their thinking mode’ (Kvaran et al., 2013). Asking 
participants to be more deliberative and analytical had a similar effect (Li et al., 
2018). Better performance in the cognitive reflection test (CRT) predicted more 
utilitarian decisions (Byrd & Conway, 2019). Conversely, increasing cognitive load 
decreased the utilitarian choices (Greene et al., 2008). Participants who experienced 
cognitive fatigue showed a similar result (Timmons & Byrne, 2019). Contrariwise, 
decreasing cognitive load by showing the ratio of ‘killed’ vs. ‘saved’ people in 
sacrificial scenarios increased utilitarian decisions (Trémolière & Bonnefon, 2014). 
Restricting the response time reduced the utilitarian responses in some studies as 
well (Cummins & Cummins, 2012; Suter & Hertwig, 2011).  
Moral Dilemmas and Emotions 
Moral judgments have not only been attributed to increased deliberation and 
reasoning but to emotional factors. Both the nature and intensity of the feelings that 
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one experiences when contemplating these dilemmas modulate moral judgments. 
For instance, difficulties in emotion regulation (Zhang et al., 2017) and emotional 
reappraisal (Feinberg et al., 2012) decreased deontological responses. Similarly, 
presenting the dilemmas in foreign languages increased the reported emotional 
distance and reduced deontological choices (Hayakawa et al., 2017). Active 
suppression of emotions (Lee & Gino, 2015) and administration of anti-anxiety 
drugs (i.e., Lorazepam) in normal participants increased utilitarian judgments 
(Perkins et al., 2013; but also see Zhao et al., 2016), and so did the induction of 
some (but not all) positive emotions (Strohminger et al., 2011; Valdesolo & 
Desteno, 2006). On the other hand, negative and aversive emotions reduced 
utilitarian preferences. For instance, socially induced physiological stress (e.g., by 
having the participants anticipate a rigorous social evaluation such as public 
speaking) which elevates the stress hormone Cortisol in humans (Kirschbaum et 
al., 1993), decreased utilitarian responses (Starcke et al., 2012; Youssef et al., 2012; 
Zhang et al., 2018). 
Moral Dilemmas and Aversive Feelings Towards Norm Violations  
One hypothesis for these complex links between emotions and moral judgments 
points to people having aversive feelings towards norm violations associated with 
the utilitarian branch of moral dilemmas. Since utilitarian actions in moral 
dilemmas entail norm violations such as instrumental harm in sacrificial dilemmas, 
it has been hypothesized that moral judgments are shaped by our sensitivity to norm 
violation and aversive emotional reaction to harm. In line with this hypothesis, 
reduced emotional responsiveness to the aversive nature of harm was associated 
with more utilitarian responses (Cushman & Greene, 2012; Greene, 2007). In fact, 
utilitarian judgments have been frequently found in patient groups who purportedly 
demonstrate hampered emotional responses, such as patients with ventromedial 
prefrontal cortex brain lesions (an area related to socio-emotional processing)  
(Ciaramelli et al., 2007; Koenigs et al., 2007) frontotemporal dementia (Mendez et 
al., 2005), and psychopaths (Koenigs et al., 2012). In healthy individuals, utilitarian 
judgments have been more frequently found in antisocial personality traits (Bartels 
& Pizarro, 2011) and psychopathy (Paytas, 2014; Pletti et al., 2017). A recent model 
that disentangled sensitivity to Consequence (or utilitarianism), Norm (or 
deontology), and Inaction showed that psychopaths had a weaker sensitivity to 
moral norms and therefore were less deontological in their moral decisions 
(Gawronski et al., 2017). Therefore, the previously reported utilitarian boost in 
psychopaths was probably not related to the higher-order reasoning or their concern 
for the greater good but less acceptance of norms (see Everett & Kahane, 2020; 
Kahane, 2015). Two interventional studies showed that experimentally increasing 
sensitivity to norm violation by induction of stress (Li et al., 2019) or by 
exogenously enhancing serotonin level (i.e., Citalopram administration) (Crockett 
et al., 2010) decreased utilitarian responses.  




The role of emotional valence in moral judgments has also been linked to post-
decisional emotions such as regret. In fact, participants not only minimized their 
current distress at the time of the moral decision, but they also tried to minimize the 
post-decisional negative emotions such as regret (Tasso et al., 2017). Supporting 
this idea, one study showed that experiencing higher regret was negatively 
correlated with utilitarian choices (Szekely & Miu, 2015). Another work found that 
endorsing the utilitarian (vs. deontological) judgments induced more affective 
(rather than cognitive) regret (Goldstein-Greenwood et al., 2020). Experiencing 
other post-decisional negative emotions such as guilt, shame, anger, and disgust 
have also been reported in sacrificial moral dilemmas (Pletti et al., 2016).  
Emotion vs. Deliberation in Moral Dilemmas: Dual Process Models 
The role of emotion vs. deliberation has been has been at the heart of 
understanding moral behavior. For instance, the extensive body of empirical 
evidence for the role of emotions in moral judgments was preceded by much earlier 
works of Unamuno (1954), the Spanish philosopher who passionately argued that 
‘moral reasoning’ is nothing but the conscious, ex-post, phenomenal experience of 
some underlying, (emotional) unconscious process that has already made the 
agent’s mind about the issue at hand before the agent starts to consider the reasons 
for or against it (Unamuno, 1954). Later, inspired by Unamuno’s views, Blasi 
(1980) argued that moral decisions and actions motivate moral reasoning, not the 
other way around (Blasi, 1980). In line with this view, the social intuitionist account 
of morality (Haidt, 2001) described moral reasoning as post-hoc justifications of 
the unconscious, automatic and emotional processes that are only suitable for 
communicating one’s moral position. The intuitionist account would argue that 
objective (e.g., less emotionally driven) moral reasoning might be possible but is 
very rare and happens under specific circumstances in which emotions and 
intuitions are kept under control such as in social interactions (Haidt, 2001). 
Inspired by the dual-process models of cognition (Evans & Stanovich, 2013; 
Sloman, 1996; Stanovich, 2009, among others), dual-process approaches to 
morality framed the evaluation of moral dilemmas neither as purely 
automatic/emotional nor purely deliberative but as a competition between a. fast, 
intuitive processes that involve emotions and b. slower deliberative processes that 
involve reasoning. Dual-process models suggest that deontological judgments arise 
when the emotional-intuitive process overrides the cognitive system. Conversely, 
the more ’intellectual’ utilitarian judgment is favored when the slower deliberative 
cognitive system overrides the emotional-intuitive one (Greene et al., 2001; 2004; 
2008). Therefore, in deontological judgments, the emotional-intuitive system 
shapes the individual’s conscious narrative of "why" they came to the deontological 
judgment. In the case of utilitarian judgments, the deliberated cost-benefit analysis 
of the cognitive system is communicated.  
Put together, the above theoretical and empirical works show the role of 
emotions alongside deliberation and reasoning in moral judgments. They also 
suggest that moral judgments are not rigid. Rather than having to choose between 
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moral rationalists (e.g., Kohlberg, 1973), who claimed that moral judgments are the 
outcome of pure rational deliberation on the one hand, and the moral intuitionists 
(e.g., Unamuno, 1954; Blasi, 1980; Haidt, 2001), who prioritized emotions and 
intuitions exclusively on the other, more recent theories such as dual-process 
models (discussed above) suggest that the outcome of moral judgments in a specific 
situation is the inevitable result of the interplay between the deliberative and the 
emotional systems that are simultaneously present in human mental processes and 
lead the moral agent towards or away from utilitarian (or deontological) moral 
judgments. 
 
3.1.2 Social interaction and modulators of moral judgment  
In the previous section, we highlighted a number of factors that could modulate 
moral judgment. Next, we examine the existing evidence from social cognition 
about how these modulators may be affected by social interaction. 
 
Social Interaction and Group Deliberation 
Interpersonal communication of information in social contexts allows groups of 
people to surpass what each individual could have achieved in decision-making 
under uncertainty in sensory domains (Bahrami et al., 2016; Sorkin et al., 2001) in 
numerical cognition (Bahrami et al., 2012) and in problem-solving (Mason & 
Watts, 2012). Studies have shown that when people talk to one another, they could 
calibrate their uncertainty (Bang & Frith, 2017; Fusaroli et al., 2012), produce 
diverse arguments (Mercier & Sperber, 2011), understand the same problem from 
various viewpoints, and arrive at solutions that had not been available to any single 
member of the group (Smith & Collins, 2009). These studies strongly suggest that 
group interactions are likely to increase conscious deliberation, reasoning, and 
analytical thinking. We previously reviewed that deliberation could lead to more 
utilitarian decisions. 
Social Interaction and Group Norm Violation 
Utilitarian decisions are also often operationalized by breaking different norms, 
and individuals seem to break norms more often when they decide together. 
Niebuhr, in 1932, found the ‘limitations of human nature’ responsible for the moral 
failure of individuals in social groups to the extent that he thought man's collective 
moral behavior could never be dominated by reason. Thus groups always remain 
more immoral than their members (Niebuhr, 1932). Although Niebuhr’s ideas about 
individuals being more immoral in groups were related to social groups, different 
studies confirmed his predictions, even in informal groups. In fact, in diverse moral 
domains, immoral actions in forms of norm violations were more probable in 
groups: people lied more in groups (Conrads et al., 2013); communication within 




made individuals excessively more lying (Weisel & Shalvi, 2015), free-riding and 
social loafing were more probable in groups (Heuzé & Brunel, 2003; Latane et al., 
1979), groups showed less compliance to defined norms than individuals 
(Fochmann et al., 2021), and people tended to be less generous in groups. Bornstein 
& Yaniv (1998) and later, El Zein et al. (2020) showed that people violated the 
fairness norm more often when they are in groups of three, compared to when they 
were alone.  
More recently, this increased incidence of norm violation in groups has been 
attributed to shared responsibility (Conrads et al., 2016; El Zein et al., 2019, 2020; 
El Zein & Bahrami, 2020). For instance, when participants were asked to provide 
reasons for being dishonest in groups, their arguments were based on ‘feeling less 
responsible’ rather than ‘benefiting other group members by their lies’ (Conrad et 
al., 2017). One clear demonstration of the role of this collectively shared 
responsibility in moral decision-making is the bystander effect: when several 
observers witnessed a norm violation, it was less likely that any one of them would 
intervene (Darley & Latané, 1968; Forsyth et al., 2002; Wallach et al., 1964). In a 
group, the responsibility for an action is not focused on anyone but is rather shared 
among all present (see El Zein et al., 2019). Norm violation (Wilson & O’Gorman, 
2003) and their corresponding feeling of responsibility (Bell, 1982, 1985; Giorgetta 
et al., 2012; Loomes & Sugden, 1982; Zeelenberg, 1999) both are associated with 
a diverse range of negative emotions such as distress, disappointment, and regret. 
Sharing responsibility among members of a group decreases these emotions, such 
as feelings of anticipated regret in group economic decisions (El Zein & Bahrami, 
2020). It also helped mitigate the negative emotions such as stress that accompanies 
difficult choices that may have long-lasting emotional repercussions (Botti et al., 
2009; Frey & Tropp, 2006). Together, these studies span a diverse range of 
situations in which social context can reduce the emotional burdens of norm 
violation, both at the time of the decisions (e.g., stress) and the predicted emotions 
in future states (e.g., anticipated regret) in individuals. 
 
3.1.3 Current study: moral judgment and social interactions 
 
Study Overview  
In the current study, we asked three questions: how are collective moral 
judgments different from individual ones? How are individual moral judgments 
different before and after a discussion? And finally, what is the underlying 
mechanism at work in collective moral judgment which explains these differences? 
To address these questions, we had small groups of interacting individuals, 
individually (in private) and collectively (after short discussions), rate the moral 
permissibility of actions (or inactions) described in different scenarios. In each 
scenario, a character’s decision violated a moral norm to increase some utility for a 
greater number of people. For instance, in one scenario, the character had to lie to 
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collect money for people in need. In another, he had to kill someone to prevent more 
deaths or had to stay silent about the infidelity of a friend’s partner to avoid 
disturbing a happy relationship. Examining these scenarios one at a time, 
participants started by reading each scenario privately and rated the acceptability of 
the character’s choice in the scenario (First individual judgment). Then, for half of 
the scenarios, they proceeded to discuss the case with their fellow group members 
and rate the acceptability of choice as a group (Collective judgment). Finally, 
participants revisited all scenarios privately once again and rated the moral 
acceptability of what the character had done (Second individual judgment). 
Moral Domain: Emergent Properties Related to Interaction   
Earlier, we discussed some of the factors that modulate moral judgments and 
how those factors are affected by social context as examined by prior researchers. 
Here, we also note that collective deliberation is not equivalent to the aggregation 
of many individuals that deliberate independently. The interaction may shape the 
content and quality of deliberations producing emergent phenomena at the 
collective level that would not have been observed if many individuals’ opinions 
were aggregated statistically (Karpowitz & Mendelberg, 2007). We focus on the 
interactions to see how their emergent properties differ from statistically aggregated 
groups.  
Virtue Signaling via Interaction 
One such emergent effect is the adaptive utility of taking a deontological position 
in public: previous research has shown that people who expressed deontological 
judgments were valued more, chosen more often as social partners (Capraro et al., 
2018), and were perceived to be more prosocial in economic games (Everett et al., 
2016). In a social context, people may express deontological judgments to advertise 
virtues and curate their social images by promoting perceptions of trust and 
likeability (Sacco et al., 2017). In line with this view, utilitarians were often 
regarded as lacking integrity, empathy, and moral character (Uhlmann et al., 2013). 
Conversely, it has been reported that utilitarian agents sometimes are regarded 
positively as well (as logical, competent, deliberative and intelligent, and leader-
like; Uhlmann et al., 2013). However, in previous research, strategic self-
presentation has been found more consistently in the deontological rather than 
utilitarian direction (Sacco et al., 2017; Everett et al., 2016). For instance, 
participants who were socially observed by a third person (Lee et al., 2018) or even 
by themselves in the mirror (Reynolds et al., 2019) preferred deontological 
judgments. By contrast, there is hardly any evidence to show that people may 
actually practice utilitarianism as a reputation management tactic. Therefore, we 
hypothesize that virtue signaling (VS) in groups may decrease collective utilitarian 
consensus. However, due to its social signaling function, we do not expect 
individuals to change their minds privately. Virtue Signaling hypothesis (VS) 
would also predict that group deliberation would not change individual (private) 




Deliberation via Interaction  
The second emergent effect of social interaction is the deliberative role of social 
discussions. Social discussion promotes deliberation and analytical reasoning, 
permitting participants to spend more time, provide and hear more arguments, 
combine their perspectives, and share resources to reason about moral issues. One 
study that compared group vs. individual moral judgments showed that groups 
displayed more advanced moral reasoning than individuals (Nichols & Day, 1982). 
In addition, the discussion provides the participants with more pieces of information 
and arguments than individual deliberation. More deliberation and reasoning 
increase utilitarian judgments (Paxton et al., 2012; Paxton & Greene, 2010). Based 
on these findings, we offer our Social Deliberation (SD) hypothesis: collective 
judgments would be more utilitarian because they happen after social deliberation. 
Importantly, this utilitarian boost would be expected to permeate to the second 
individual judgment because deliberation facilitates better reasoning and sharing of 
information, helping to convince the individual participants to change their minds. 
In addition, in the second individual judgment, participants read the moral scenarios 
for the third time, allowing them to deliberate individually after the first and the 
collective social deliberations. This hypothesis, therefore, predicts that the second 
individual judgments would also be more utilitarian than the first individual 
judgments, but specifically for the scenarios discussed collectively. Indeed, a recent 
work that investigated moral reasoning in groups of students (Curşeu et al., 2020) 
found that discussion in groups led to more utilitarian decisions. This study 
evaluated majority influence, minority influence, and normative deviance as 
mechanisms that explain the association between individual and group level moral 
preferences using mediation analysis. However, it did not measure individual 
opinions after the discussion, leaving open any conclusions about the change of 
mind as the result of social deliberation in moral judgments. Myers & Kaplan 
(1976) previously examined the impact of social interactions on private opinions. 
They measured individual opinions after the discussion but did not include a 
consensus decision-making stage. 
 
Stress Reduction via Interaction  
A third hypothesis for how interactions may impact collective judgments is the 
reduction of negative feelings in groups. Group discussion decreased negative 
feelings in individuals on their decisions even when these negative feelings were 
artificially induced (Kaplan & Miller, 1978). We also saw earlier that social context 
could reduce the negative emotions associated with norm violation and facilitate 
the violation of different norms in groups. Previous research showed that reducing 
negative current emotions (e. g., stress) or future negative emotions (e.g., 
anticipated regret) could both increase utilitarian judgments. Therefore, once in the 
group, individuals may find it easier to endorse utilitarian actions that involve 
trading off violations of a norm such as "do not harm anyone" with the greater good 
for a larger number of people. Thus, this Stress Reduction (SR) hypothesis makes 
a similar prediction to Social Deliberation (SD). However, if more utilitarian 
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collective judgments arise from the transient regulation of emotional responses and 
temporary reduction of negative emotions such as stress and regret in groups, then 
SR would expect that when participants decide a second time individually, then 
group-induced stress reduction would no longer be available. SR hypothesis 
diverges from SD here and predicts that the second individual judgments would be 
no more utilitarian than the first. In the interest of transparency, we clarify here that 
in our OSF pre-registration, VS and SD hypotheses (but not SR) were included. 
Conformity via Interaction  
The role of the conformity effect must be carefully considered and clearly 
separated from interactions when trying to understand moral judgments in a social 
context. By conformity, we refer to opinion changes that follow from (merely) 
knowing other people’s judgments. Conformity, therefore, does not involve any 
bilateral social interactive elements, and our group-interaction hypotheses 
discussed above (VS, SD, and SR) do not apply to it. However, previous conformity 
literature does offer important clues for drawing some testable predictions for our 
experiments. Those for whom the majority supported the utilitarian option did not 
differ from control. Using a social conformity paradigm similar to Asch’s (1956), 
one study showed that conformity increased both permissible and impermissible 
moral actions depending on the majority opinion (Kundu & Cummins, 2013). In 
another study, participants who judged moral dilemmas were simultaneously 
presented with information about the percentage of other people favoring the 
deontological or utilitarian option. Those for whom the majority supported the 
deontological option deviated from the control condition (i.e., no social 
information) (Bostyn & Roets, 2017). Another study showed that conformity to 
publicly announced majority opinion was generally followed by a change of private 
attitudes (Cornwell et al., 2019). In yet another study, participants shifted their 
public (but not private) responses towards more or less utilitarian judgments 
depending on what a hypothetical, observing evaluator favored (Rom & Conway, 
2018). Thus, although all four studies do show that conformity could indeed affect 
moral judgments, the latter two studies disagree on whether individual moral 
cognition could be genuinely susceptible to conformity. Whereas one study 
(Cornwell et al., 2019) showed evidence for change of private opinion in line with 
‘informational’ conformity, the other (Rom & Conway, 2018) suggested that 
individual moral judgments are likely to superficially conform and demonstrate 
‘normative’ influence without any change of private attitude (see Cialdini & 
Goldstein, 2004; See also Deutsch & Gerard, 1955). 
Based on these findings, we propose two additional hypotheses. First, we expect 
that collective judgments would be different from individual judgments, and the 
direction of this change would follow the majority opinion of the group's individual 
members. Second, examining the individual opinions after discussion would allow 
us to distinguish between normative and informational conformity. If people only 
conform normatively, they change their opinion in public but hold on to their 




2004). If, on the other hand, informational conformity is at work, one would predict 
that the collective judgment should pull the second private judgment towards itself.  
To sum up, we put forward two complementary sets of predictions to examine 
the possible psychological substrates of social interactive moral judgments (see 
Figure 1). Our conformity hypotheses do not make any directional predictions about 
whether groups favor utilitarian or deontological judgments, but the three 
interaction hypotheses (VS, SD, and SR) do. On the other hand, interaction 
hypotheses – but not conformity – are silent about any relationship between the 
distribution of individual opinions (e.g., the majority) and group consensus. Finally, 
both sets of theories make overlapping predictions about the change of second 
individual opinion: Informational Conformity and Social Deliberation hypotheses 
predict that second individual opinions would follow the consensus, but Normative 
Conformity, Virtue Signaling, and Stress Reduction hypotheses predict that 




Figure 1. Top left: Virtue Signaling hypothesis (VS) predicts a deontological boost in collective 
judgments (i.e., fewer utilitarian judgments in collective condition). However, this deontological 
Chapter 3. Many Heads Are More Utilitarian Than One 
92 
 
boost is not expected to change individual judgments (i.e., no difference between I1 and I2), 
compatible with normative conformity (NC). Middle: Conversely, the Stress Reduction hypothesis 
(SR) predicts a utilitarian boost in collective judgments (i.e., less utilitarian deontological judgments 
in collective condition), but similar to VS, this deontological boost is not expected to change the 
individual judgments (i.e., no difference between I1 and I2), compatible with normative conformity 
(NC). Right: Similar to SR, the Social Deliberation hypothesis (SD) predicts a utilitarian boost in 
collective judgments. However, unlike in SR, this boost is expected to be followed by private 
individual judgments after the discussion (i.e., I2), compatible with informative conformity (IC). 
Bottom, conformity (both normative and informational) predicts that the collective judgments 
should correlate with the majority of the first individual opinions (i.e., before the discussion). 
 
 
3.2 Experiment 1. 
 
3.2.1 Material and Method 
 Participants 
 Our sample size estimation was based on Myers and Kaplan (1976) c.f., pre-
registration at https://osf.io/jmkx5/. We initially aimed for 12 groups with 5 
participants. Due to a technical error, some collective responses were not recorded 
in groups 1 to 5 and not properly recorded in group 6. We, therefore, collected 
another 6 groups. Wherever possible, we have provided the analysis of all data 
together. We have also provided separate analyses in the Supplementary Material 
(Section A. Part 7.1, Table 6), showing no significant difference in the results when 
excluding the initial groups with missing data points, indicating that the results are 
not driven by missing values. One group’s responses were removed because 
screening analysis prior to hypothesis testing proved their data to be gross outliers 
confirmed by the convergence of several different outlier detection methods (see 
Supplementary Material; Section A, Part 6). The final sample consisted of 73 
participants (38 females; mean age 25.72, range: 18-56; SD=8.42) in 16 mixed-
gender groups, each including 4 or 5 members. All participants were native 
Germans recruited via MELESSA (Munich Experimental Laboratory for Economic 
and Social Science). The study was approved by the School of Advanced Study, 
University of London Ethics committee (SASREC_1819-313). 
Scenarios 
To contrast utilitarian vs. deontological judgments, we adopted sacrificial moral 
scenarios used in previous research (Greene et al., 2001) in addition to our 
independently validated scenarios (see Supplementary Material, Section D). It is 
important to note that moral judgments' complexity is far from contrasting 
deontology vs. utilitarianism in hypothetical scenarios (Everett & Kahane, 2020; 
Kahane, 2015; Kahane et al., 2015). Utilitarianism and deontology depend more on 
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moral reasoning than on individual responses (Hennig & Hütter, 2020). Due to 
these limitations, we tried to overcome two important caveats which the sacrificial 
moral dilemmas suffer from: 
1. Sacrificial moral dilemmas used in the previous literature (e.g., Greene et al., 
2001) consist of utilitarian actions, but they miss utilitarian inactions (or 
omissions). Therefore, any tendency towards utilitarianism in these scenarios could 
be alternatively interpreted as a preference for action rather than inaction (Crone & 
Laham, 2017). 
2. Sacrificial dilemmas operationalize utilitarianism exclusively by approving to 
‘kill’ someone to prevent other people’s death, which can be far from real-life 
situations, jeopardizing the external validity (Bauman et al., 2014; Schein, 2020) 
and the essence of utilitarian philosophy (Everett & Kahane, 2020; Kahane, 2015; 
Kahane et al., 2015). 
Therefore, in addition to the sacrificial scenarios conventionally used in the 
literature, we constructed and validated our vignettes which a. included cases of 
omissions that maximized the greater good for many, b. were related to real-life 
situations, c. no direct instrumental harm such as killing was needed for utility 
maximization and d. the protagonist (or his/her family) would not generally benefit 
from the outcome of the utilitarian decision.  
 We used these scenarios to examine the role of discussion in the change of mind 
by answering three questions 1. Whether the collective judgment would differ from 
an average of individual judgments and, if so, in which direction 2. Whether 
discussion would change the individual moral judgments, and 3. To disentangle 
different mechanisms at play by taking into account the First individual private 
judgments before the discussion, the second individual judgments after the 
discussion, and the differences between these two. We used 8 scenarios adopted 
from Greene et al. (2001) in addition to our 8 scenarios (independently validated, 
see Supplementary Material, Section A, Part 4). All 16 items were translated to 
German. The translation was done by two German native speakers, back (double) 
translated by AI Assistance for Language ("DeepL") GmbH (Cologne, Germany). 
Later, the texts were also checked by Munich Experimental Laboratory for 
Economic and Social Sciences. 
Each scenario included: (1) A situation: a protagonist was in a situation that 
required her decision. She had two mutually exclusive options a. to act according 
to a moral duty or an accepted norm although they are against a higher utility b. to 
break a norm to maximize the utility for the greater number (2) The decision: the 
protagonist always decided in favor of the utilitarian option at the expense of 
violating a norm (3) An outcome: the vignette confirmed that the outcome took 
place, with the expected greater utility. 
 Utilitarian Score: participants had to rate the moral acceptability of the 
protagonist's decision on the scale of 1 (not acceptable at all) to 7 (totally 
acceptable). As all decisions in the scenarios were utilitarian, we refer to this rating 
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as ‘utilitarian score’. The ‘utilitarian score’ is only an experimental label, and the 
fact that these decisions were utilitarian (or not) was never made explicit to 
participants. 
3.2.2 Procedure 
The procedure and the design of this study were adopted from Myers & Kaplan 
(1976). Participants were invited to the lab in groups of 4-5 in separate sessions. 
Once the participants were seated, general instructions were presented to them 
orally in English. Then, each participant received a tablet (Surface Pro). The 
experiment was programmed in Testable (https://testable.org). On the tablet, the 
instructions were repeated in German and followed by one practice round. 
Throughout the experiment, a timer on top of the screen always showed the 
remaining time for each scenario's ratings. For a demo in German, see here. 
 The experiment started with each participant going through the 16 scenarios 
individually (First individual judgment; see Figure 2). The order of the scenarios 
was randomized across participants. Participants had 90 seconds to read each 
scenario privately and judge the moral acceptability of the action (or inaction) 
described in the scenario. When the last participant rated the last scenario, the first 
part of the experiment was completed. 
 
 
Figure 2. Design of the experiment. Participants read each scenario alone and responded 
individually to all items (1st individual judgments), then were asked to discuss half of the items in 
groups to provide a collective judgment (collective judgments) and finally responded again to all of 
the items alone (2nd individual judgments). 
 
 
Next, in the collective judgment stage (see Figure 2), the participants were asked 
to read 8 of the 16 scenarios (pseudo-randomly selected, see Supplementary 
Material: Section A, Part 5) with other group members in the room. Each scenario 
was projected on a screen for everyone to see. Participants were given 3 minutes to 
discuss each scenario and arrive at a collective judgment. They all had to enter their 
Undiscussed items
Discussed Items
Collective Judgment1st Individual Judgment 2nd Individual Judgment
3.2 Experiment 1. 
95 
 
collective agreement on their tablets. Discussed vs. Non-discussed scenarios were 
randomized and counterbalanced across groups. All discussions were conducted in 
German (i.e., the participant's native language). 
Finally, each participant went through all 16 scenarios privately for 30 seconds 
in the Second individual judgment stage. 
We used a repeated measure design with three levels for our main independent 
variable (Condition: First individual, Collective, Second individual). When 
examining the individual judgments, we had one additional factor (Type: 
Discussed, Undiscussed). The dependent variable (Utilitarian Score) was a Likert 
scale ranging from 1 (Not acceptable at all) to 7 (Totally acceptable), and the middle 
point was defined as ‘morally neutral’ in the instructions.  
Data availability statement: experiment’s pre-registration, materials, data, and 
analysis can be accessed at https://osf.io/jmkx5/ 
 
3.2.3 Result 
Statistical analysis was conducted using R programming language 
(https://www.r-project.org/), employing generalized ordinal mixed-effects models 
appropriate for our design's hierarchical structure. Since our dependent variable was 
in the Likert scale, we employed ordinal mixed-effect models using the package 
‘ordinal’ designed for ordinal logistic mixed models (Christensen, 2019). In 
addition, we adopt a Bayesian approach in the mixed-effect model using brms 
package in R (Bürkner, 2018). 
We began by examining how collective and individual judgments differ (see the 
hypotheses illustrated schematically in Figure 1 top row). An ordinal logistic 
mixed-effect model was employed with one fixed factor of Condition (Collective, 
First individual, Second individual) while accounting for random effects of items 
(different scenarios) as well as participants within groups (as a random nested 
effect; see Supplementary Material Section A - Part 7.1 - Table 3, for model 
comparisons). Collective judgments were significantly more utilitarian than 
individual judgments (z = 3.688, b = .3689, SE = .100, p = .0002) both when 
comparing the Collective judgments to the First (z=3.688, b = .3689, SE = .1, p = 
.0007) as well as the Second individual judgment (z=3.657, b = .3630, SE = .0993, 
p = .0007), both in Action and Inaction scenarios (see Supplementary Material, 
Section A, Figure S2 and Table 8). In addition to this frequentist approach, a 
Bayesian mixed-effect model was performed which showed similar results (BF01= 
.0005, b = .35, SE = .09, CI95= [.18, .52]; see Supplementary Material, Section A, 
Figure S3.a and Table 12). For individual responses, we included all items, both 
discussed and undiscussed. However, a separate analysis only for the discussed 
items also confirmed the same results and is provided in the Supplementary 
Material (Section A, Part 7.1, Table 7). 
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Having demonstrated more utilitarian collective judgments conclusively, we 
then proceeded to examine if individual judgments before and after the discussion 
were different. In a second model, we excluded the collective judgments from the 
analysis and only considered the individual conditions (First individual, Second 
individual) and type (Discussed, Undiscussed) as fixed factors. Random factors 
were similar to the previous model described earlier. We did not observe any 
difference between individual judgments before and after the discussion in the 
previous model (z = .079, b = .006, p = .996, Figure 3a). This model, in addition, 
showed that there is no difference between the discussed and the undiscussed items 
in the first and the second individual condition (see Supplementary Material, 
Section A, Part 7.1, Table 10). In addition to this frequentist approach, a Bayesian 
mixed model as well showed the similar results (BF01 = 15.57, b = .01, SE = .06, 
CI95= [-0.13, 0.12]; see Supplementary Material, Section A, Figure S3.b and Table 
12). 
Together, these results supported the Stress Reduction hypothesis (compare 
Figure 1 to Figure 3a). On the one hand, significantly more utilitarian Collective 
judgments (vs. the First condition) rejected the Virtue Signaling hypothesis. On the 
other hand, the significant reduction of utilitarian judgments in the Second 
condition (vs. Collective) and the lack of any difference between First and Second 





Figure 3 a. Distribution of responses over conditions. Collective judgments (in purple) are more 
utilitarian (higher utilitarian score) than individual judgments in the first and the second condition, 
but there is no difference between individual judgments before and after the discussion for discussed 
(dark green) and undiscussed (light green) items. Error bars: 95% confidence interval. b. There is a 
correlation between collective and majority (Discussed items before the discussion) at the level of 
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groups. To illustrate the effect observed in the mixed-model results, the correlation between different 
items within each group is separated and presented with different colors and symbols for each group 
(excluding the groups with missing data points). Data points with the same color and symbol refer 
to the same group. Lines are least-squares fits to the data within each group. Each group has 8 data 
points corresponding to the 8 discussed questions 
 
We then proceeded to test our conformity hypotheses by first noting that the lack 
of a difference between First and Second (described above) was already more 
supportive of the normative (vs. informational) conformity hypothesis. We then set 
out to examine the effect of the group majority opinion on the collective judgment 
(Figure 1 bottom row). Note that the majority opinion was not experimentally 
manipulated or controlled in our study. However, given that we had elicited private 
individual opinions before discussions (First judgments), we could assess the group 
majority by averaging group members’ individual judgments for each item before 
the discussion and examine the correlation between this metric and collective 
judgment to test our conformity hypothesis (Figure 1, bottom row). We describe 
conformity here as the relation between First judgments (before the discussion) and 
Collective judgments (in the ordinal logistic model; while controlling for the 
random effects of items and participants within each group). Consistent with our 
first conformity hypothesis, individual ratings prior to the discussion within each 
group were significantly correlated with the collective judgments (z = 2.987, b = 
.2920, SE = .1016, p = .004; see Figure 3b). See Supplementary Material, Section 
A, Part 8, Table 13, for details of the mixed-effect model. 
We also examined the same hypothesis using a more intuitive definition of the 
majority vote. We first categorized the individual judgments by comparing them to 
a criterion based on the mean of the ratings of all First individual judgments over 
our entire sample across all to-be-discussed scenarios (Mean = 3.994) and classified 
each opinion as Utilitarian-inclined and Deontologically-inclined before the 
discussion. We then counted these opinions within each group for each to-be-
discussed scenario and categorized each group as majority utilitarian or majority 
deontological for that item. In a new mixed-effect model with collective judgment 
as the dependent variable, we used this classification as a fixed factor (Majority) 
with two levels (Utilitarian, Deontological) while controlling for random effects of 
groups and items. We observed a significant main effect of majority (z = 4.145, 
b=1.62, SE = 0.392, p < .0001; See Supplementary Material, Section A, Part 8 for 
details and extra analysis). 
 
3.2.4 Discussion  
In Experiment 1, we discovered that groups, in comparison to individuals, are 
more utilitarian in their moral judgments. Importantly, this utilitarian boost was 
only observed at the collective level and not when participants rated the same 
questions privately later again. If the collective utilitarian boost was the result of 
deliberation and reasoning or due to conscious application of utilitarian principles 
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with genuine concern for the greater good, we expected that the effect would remain 
in the second private judgment. Consequently, our findings are inconsistent with 
the Social Deliberation (SD) and Virtue-Signaling (VS) hypotheses and in favor of 
the Stress Reduction (SR) hypothesis (Compare Figure3a to Figure 1).  
 
3.3 Experiment 2 
In order to examine the Stress Reduction (SR) hypothesis more directly, we 
performed Experiment 2, in which, in addition to moral judgments, we measured 
the stress level of each participant in each condition after responding to moral 
dilemmas. 
3.3.1 Material and Method 
 Participants 
 The target sample size estimation was predetermined using a Monte Carlo 
simulation via the SIMR package (Green & MacLeod, 2016) to have 90% power 
(fixed factor effect size of Collective condition: 0.296). The final sample consisted 
of 70 participants (33 females, age: M = 25 years, SD = 4.9, range: 19 to 58) in 15 
mixed-gender groups, each including 4 or 5 members (one group had 3 members). 
Due to the internet connection issue of two participants, two groups were excluded. 
All participants were native Germans recruited via MELESSA (Munich 
Experimental Laboratory for Economic and Social Science). The study was 
approved by the School of Advanced Study, University of London Ethics 
committee (SASREC_1819-313). 
Scenarios 
8 scenarios were chosen from Experiment 1 (Sacrificial Dilemmas and Real-life 




The procedure and the design of this study were similar to Experiment 1, albeit 
performed online via Zoom (Zoom.us) due to the COVID19 pandemic. Participants 
were invited to separate Zoom sessions in small groups, their names were removed 
and replaced with experimental ID (given by the experimenter). General 
instructions were presented to them orally and written in English via screen share. 
Then, each participant received the internet link of the experiment via chat. The 
experiment has been programmed through the online software (‘Qualtrics’) (for a 
demo, see here; password: CMD2021) 




After filling out a consent form, participants were requested to shut their phones 
off, close all of the windows on their computers (except Zoom), disable all 
notifications, mute their sound on Zoom, and start video sharing while hiding their 
own videos to not be seen by themselves (by turning the ‘Self-view’ function off 
and use ‘Gallery View’ afterward). This was done to exclude confounding factors 
such as the ‘mirror’ effect on moral dilemmas (see Reynolds et al., 2019).  
 
 Participants were then presented with the instruction in German via the 
questionnaire and asked to read and respond to 8 fully randomized moral scenarios 
chosen. This stage was followed by 10 questions measuring participants’ affective 
states by the short version of the State-Trait Anxiety Inventory (STAI) validated 
for the German language (Jürgen, 2009). At this point, the First Individual stage 
was finished. The experimenter unmuted the participants and presented the same 8 
scenarios – one at a time - via Screen Share in Zoom. In Collective condition, the 
order of presentation of the scenarios was fully randomized across groups via the 
'randomizeR' (Uschner et al., 2018) package in R. In this stage, after reading each 
scenario, participants were asked to discuss the scenario with other participants at 
the Zoom session to reach a consensus. After this short discussion, they were asked 
to enter their consensus judgment in the questionnaire individually. Once all 
collective scenarios were discussed, participants answered the 10-item STAI 
individually once again. The experimenter muted all participants and instructed 
them to go through all 8 scenarios privately in the Second individual judgment 
stage. Similarly, after responding to the scenarios individually for the second time, 
STAI were presented to measure their stress level for one last time. The time limit 
of each condition was identical to Experiment 1.  
 
To exclude other confounding factors in social settings, two sets of questions 
were asked at the end of the survey. The first set was employed to assess whether 
participants had a self-presentation strategy in mind in the collective stage. In this 
part, participants’ metaethical perceptions were directly measured to evaluate how 
they thought they had been seen by others in their groups during the discussions. 
We measured the warmth and competence index using items adapted from Fiske et 
al. (2002) and Rom & Conway (2018). We measured coming across as logical, 
competent, intelligent, confident, and as a good leader during group discussions to 
measure competence and as warm, moral, good, tolerant, and trustworthy to 
measure warmth (items were translated to German; Questionnaires in the 
Supplementary Material Section E)  
 
The second set assessed if participants felt socially connected to other members 
during the discussions. Previous research showed that feeling socially connected to 
others increases the utilitarian tendency in dyads. For instance, one study showed 
that participants endorsed utilitarian resolutions more often if they were more 
socially connected (Lucas & Livingston, 2014). In order to examine this possibility, 
adopted from Lucas & Livingston (2014), feeling socially connected, loneliness, 
and feeling of being accepted by others during discussions were also measured. 
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Two items of Affective Regret adopted from Goldstein-Greenwood et al. (2020) 
were also measured for exploratory analysis.  
 
Similar to Experiment 1, we used a repeated measure design with three levels 
for the main independent variable (Condition: First individual, Collective, Second 
individual). The dependent variable (Utilitarian Score) was identical to Experiment 
1. Data availability statement: experiment’s pre-registration, materials, data, and 
analysis can be accessed at https://osf.io/jmkx5/ 
 
3.3.3 Result 
Statistical analysis was conducted using R programming language 
(https://www.r-project.org/), employing generalized ordinal mixed-effects models 
appropriate for our design's hierarchical structure. Since our dependent variable was 
in the Likert scale, similar to Experiment 1, we employed ordinal mixed-effect 
models using the package ‘ordinal’ designed for ordinal logistic mixed models 
(Christensen, 2019). In addition, we adopt a Bayesian mixed-effect model using 
brms package in R (Bürkner, 2018). 
We began by examining how collective and individual judgments differ. An 
ordinal logistic and a Bayesian mixed-effect model were employed with one fixed 
factor of Condition (Collective, First individual, Second individual) while 
accounting for random effects of items (different scenarios) as well as participants 
within groups (as a nested random effect). Similar to experiment 1, Collective 
judgments were significantly more utilitarian than individual judgments (z = 2.437, 
b = .263, SE = .108, p =. 0148). Pairwise comparison tests corrected the p-value for 
multiple comparison showed that this difference was significant in the First 
judgments vs. Collective (M Collective = 4.11 > M First individual = 3.87; z=3.688, b = 
.2689, SE = .1, p = .035; BF01 = 1.94, CI95= [0.425, 0.041]). Collective judgments 
were also more utilitarian that Second individual judgments (M Collective = 4.11 > M 
Second individual = 4.01) but this difference did not reach the statistical significance 
(z=3.657, b = .3630, SE = .0993, p = .4; BF01 = 0.141, CI95= [-0.085, 0.301]; Power: 
62.00%) (See Figure 4.a; c.f. General Discussion for Online vs. Face-To-Face 
interaction; Supplementary Material Section C). As in Experiment 1, our 
observation in Experiment 2 was consistent with the Stress Reduction hypothesis 
(Compare Figure 4.a to Figure 1, SR hypothesis). 
 
 




Figure 4 a. Distribution of responses to moral dilemmas over conditions. Collective judgments 
(in dark green) are more utilitarian (higher utilitarian score) than individual judgments in the first 
condition, but there is no difference between individual judgments before (in purple) and after the 
discussion for discussed (in light green). b. Participants reported less stress after Collective 
conditions (in dark green) than individual judgments in the first condition (in purple), but more than 
the second individual condition (in light green). Error bars: 95% confidence interval. 
 
Having replicated the results of experiment 1 and demonstrated more utilitarian 
collective (vs. individual) judgments, we then proceeded to examine if individual 
judgments before and after the discussion were different. In a second model, we 
excluded the collective judgments from the analysis and only included the 
individual conditions (First individual, Second individual). Random factors were 
similar to the previous model described earlier. As in Experiment 1, we did not 
observe any difference between individual judgments before and after the 
discussion (z = 1.27, b = .139, p = .2, Figure 4a), another observation consistent 
with SR. In addition to this frequentist approach, a Bayesian mixed model showed 
the similar results (BF01 = 0.219, b = .12, SE = 0.10, CI95= [-0.314, 0.072]). As in 
Experiment 1, the lack of difference between the First and Second conditions was 
inconsistent with the Social Deliberation hypothesis (Compare Figure 4.a to Figure 
1, Social Deliberation hypothesis to see the difference) and in line with SR and VS 
hypotheses. 
Next, to test the Stress Reduction (SR) hypothesis directly, we performed a linear 
mixed-effect model (package lme4; Bates et al., 2015). We examined the Stress 
measure across different conditions in individuals within groups with a fixed factor 
of Condition (Collective, First individual, Second individual) while accounting for 
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expected, the Stress level in Collective condition was significantly lower than first 
individual judgments (pairwise comparison tests corrected for p-value (z = 2.6, b = 
3.71, SE = .108, p = .027) (See figure 4b).  The Stress level was even less in the 
Second individual condition vs. Collective condition (z = 2.47, b = 3.53, SE = .108, 
p = .038), probably due to a carry-over effect. 
To examine the alternative explanations, we measured the correlation between 
ratings of warmth and competence scale. There was no significant correlation 
between these ratings and utilitarian scores at the group level using both linear 
regression (corrected for multiple comparisons; see Supplementary Material, 
Section B, Part 15) and Bayesian regression (Smartness: CI= [-0.902, 1.583], BF10 
= .749; Reasonable: CI= [-0.902, 1.583]; BF10 = .696, Confident: CI= [-1.302, 
0.332], BF10 = .696, Leader-like: CI= [-0.902, 1.583]; BF10 = .572, Competent:   
CI= [-1.568, 1.128], BF10 = .729). This result ruled out the possibility of 
competence signaling as an alternative explanation of our result (c.f. General 
Discussion).  
To examine the effect of social connection, we measured the correlation between 
feeling lonely, accepted, and socially connected with the utilitarian score at the 
group level. In contrast to previous findings (Lucas & Livingston, 2014), we did 
not find evidence showing that feeling socially connected to others is related to 
more utilitarian scores at the group level using both logistic mixed effect model 
(corrected for multiple comparisons; see Supplementary Material, Section B, Part 
15) as well as Bayesian analysis (Lonely: CI= [-0.50,  0.86], BF10 = .476; Accepted: 
CI= [-0.65,  0.98] , BF10 = ..441; Connected: CI=  [-1.88,  0.11] , BF10 = .2.88) 
suggesting that the collective utilitarian boost has not driven by feeling socially 
connected. Together, these results supported the Stress Reduction hypothesis for 
the First vs. Collective conditions. 
 
3.3.4 Discussion  
In Experiment 2, with a sample size aimed at 90% power, we replicated the result 
of Experiment 1. Groups, in comparison to individuals, found utilitarian decisions 
more morally acceptable. Similar to Experiment 1, this utilitarian boost was short-
lived and only observed at the collective level. We did not see this boost when 
participants rated the same questions privately later again. This was in line with the 
Stress Reduction hypothesis. To test this hypothesis more directly, we also 
measured the state anxiety level in each phase of the experiment. Consistent with 
the SR, the anxiety level was significantly reduced in the Collective phase 
compared to the First individual phase. Measuring the metaethical evaluations of 
participants as well as social connection excluded alternative explanations for this 
collective utilitarian boost. Hence, the findings of Experiment 2 were consistent 
with SR. 
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3.4 General Discussion 
Moral judgments are ubiquitously social affairs that take place in the public 
sphere and are often shaped by the consensus in this sphere. Cognitive and 
psychological studies of moral judgment have so far predominantly focused on 
individuals and examined moral choices made privately. Across two experiments 
(N=143), we compared collective and individual moral judgments and examined 
the impact of face-to-face (Experiment 1) and Online (Experiment 2) interactions 
on these judgments. Participants, individually and collectively, examined actions 
(or inactions) of fictional characters that led to a higher utility for the greatest 
number at the expense of disregarding a moral norm in moral scenarios. We found 
that collective judgments are more utilitarian than individual judgments. 
Utilitarian judgments are considered as the outcome of the inductive reasoning 
process; therefore, they entail a level of deliberation and abstraction that common-
sense morality lacks. It has been argued that utilitarian decisions that necessitate 
certain norm violations (e.g., in moral dilemmas) require deliberation and reasoning 
to support utilitarian principles that entail greater happiness for the greater number 
of people (e.g., Greene et al., 2004). However, norm violation is emotionally 
aversive (as introduced above). Therefore, utilitarian choices often depend not just 
on cognitively costly deliberation but also on overcoming negative aversive 
emotions. Social context (e.g., group discussion) could change either of these 
factors, and our hypotheses (Figure 1) outlined three ways this could occur. 
Our analysis revealed that groups, in comparison to individuals, are more 
utilitarian in their moral judgments. Thus, our findings are inconsistent with Virtue-
Signaling (VS), which proposed the opposite effect. Crucially, the collective 
utilitarian boost was short-lived: it was only seen at the collective level and not 
when participants rated the same questions individually again. Previous research 
shows that moral change at the individual level, as the result of social deliberation, 
is rather long-lived and not transient (e.g., see Ueshima et al., 2021). Thus, this 
collective utilitarian boost could not have resulted from deliberation and reasoning 
or due to conscious application of utilitarian principles with authentic reasons to 
maximize the total good. If this was the case, the effect would have persisted in the 
second individual judgment as well. That was not what we observed.  
Consequently, our findings are inconsistent with the Social Deliberation (SD) 
hypotheses. Our observation was consistent with Stress Reduction (SR), which 
proposed a transient utilitarian boost. In the second experiment, measuring the 
stress level to test SR more directly, in addition to replicating the previous result, 
we observed that the stress level was significantly lower in collective conditions 
compared to the first individual conditions (see Figure 1; Figure 4), which was in 
line with the Stress Reduction (SR) hypothesis. This observation partially 
confirmed our SR hypothesis. 
We showed that groups are more utilitarian than individuals. We proposed and 
tested the reduction of negative emotions (i.e., stress) as the most plausible 
mechanism for this boost. Other possibilities, however, were also examined. For 
Chapter 3. Many Heads Are More Utilitarian Than One 
104 
 
instance, one study showed that participants endorsed utilitarian resolutions more 
often in dyads if they were more socially connected (Lucas & Livingston, 2014). 
Since in our experiment the discussion might have made groups more socially 
connected and therefore increased collective utilitarian responses, we measured the 
feeling of being socially connected. We found no relationship between social 
connection and utilitarian score, discarding this alternative explanation. 
Another alternative explanation for our result, the opposite of the ‘virtue 
signaling’, was also ruled out. This effect refers to the possibility that people may 
present themselves especially logical and intelligent in a group setting. For instance, 
Rom & Conway found that utilitarian decision-makers were viewed as especially 
logical, competent, deliberative, intelligent, and leader-like (Rom & Conway, 
2018). People viewed scientists as more utilitarian than others (Sosa & Rios, 2019). 
Rom and colleagues moreover found that people were meta perceptively accurate 
gauging how others would view them upon making a utilitarian decision, and found 
that people select utilitarian decision-makers for important social roles such as 
running a hospital. Since it was equally plausible that people self-present 
strategically as more utilitarian than they privately prefer - to present themselves as 
logical and competent and leader-like and/or scientific - we measured the warmth 
and competence scale, following Rom and Conway (2018). However, no significant 
relation was observed between these meta-ethical perceptions and utilitarian 
judgments. 
At another level of explanation, we tested the predictions of social conformity 
theory for the role of social context in moral judgments. At the group level, the 
within-group average of private utilitarian scores before discussion (as well as the 
majority private opinion) were positively correlated with the collective score. 
However, neither within-group average nor the majority of the first private opinion 
was correlated with the second private judgments. The combination of these two 
sets of results was more consistent with our normative but not informational 
conformity hypothesis. Importantly, we took care to set hypotheses such that they 
clearly separate conformity from the interaction. Conformity was defined as the 
majority influence which flows, unidirectionally, from the majority to the 
individual. The interaction effect, however, was defined as the bidirectional impact 
of group and individual on one another. 
Some previous research shows that people in groups lie more, are less likely to 
offer help in urgent situations, are less generous, and more often engage in free 
riding and social loafing (c.f. 1. introduction). In this view, individuals are more 
egocentric in groups and more focused on maximizing their own utility. However, 
in our scenarios, the greater good for others never benefited the protagonist, let 
alone the participant. Therefore, the collective boost in utilitarian judgment cannot 
be explained by more egoism in the social context: the higher utility of norm 
violation in moral dilemmas had no utility consequences for the participant.  
Our results could be interpreted as a sign of a transient shift in moral values when 
people make moral judgments in groups, creating a temporary (but actual) moment 
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of consensus during collective deliberation. Some previous works in social 
psychology (Heider, 1946) and neuroeconomics (Izuma & Adolphs, 2013) have 
also shown that social context can shift economic value preferences transiently. On 
the other hand, while noting that moral judgments are far from the economic value 
preferences examined in these studies, this collective utilitarian boost could be 
alternatively interpreted as a compromise rather than a genuine consensus, showing 
that the participants, individually, were not persuaded by the more utilitarian 
judgments that they rated collectively. We look forward to future works to examine 
this issue in depth.   
Our attitude towards violating a norm consists of what we feel about the act as 
well as the consequences of the violation, e.g., guilt, blame, regret, empathic 
concern for the victim (Cushman et al., 2012; Miller et al., 2014; Reynolds & 
Conway, 2018). Negative emotions towards norm violation could therefore be 
aversive reactions to the act (McDonald et al., 2017) or its consequences (Miller & 
Cushman, 2013). The social context could trigger either of these mechanisms by 
diffusing responsibility related to norm violation (El Zein et al., 2019; Li et al., 
2010) and thereby give rise to our observation that collectives were more utilitarian 
than individuals. We note here that our experimental design cannot distinguish 
between aversion to the norm-violating utilitarian act or its consequences. 
However, since we measured stress levels, we offer positive evidence that reduction 
of stress can contribute to this effect. We found that the stress was even more 
reduced in the second individual condition, probably due to a carry-over effect, 
which, by design, was inevitable. The question of why the reduction of stress in the 
second individual stage did not affect moral judgments needs further investigation.  
We chose to employ a diverse range of moral scenarios, including different 
norms – some sacrificial and others not – to get close to the real-life heterogeneity 
of moral issues. To our knowledge, for the first time, we employed moral scenarios 
that included ‘inactions’ (e.g., staying silent) as well as actions that all led to a 
utilitarian outcome. Our participants were, correspondingly, richly heterogeneous. 
Contrary to the prescriptions of normative moral theories, participants showed 
flexibility in applying one or the other principle. This is an interesting and useful 
corollary of our study that previous researchers had predicted but had not been 
tested (Kahane, 2015). This variability of responses was evident in the distribution 
of scores across items (see Supplementary Material, Section A, Part 7). The 
diversity of responses across different norms calls into question the generalizability 
of the previous findings that operationalized utilitarianism merely by accepting 
harm which saves many in sacrificial dilemmas involving extremely unlikely (if 
not bizarre) conditions. Despite the heterogeneity of our scenarios and participants’ 
responses to them, an item-based analysis confirmed that our key findings in Figure 
3 are robust across items (see Supplementary Material, Section A, Part 7.2). Our 
novel stimuli could be used in future moral psychological researches to disentangle 
better the effect of different norms in moral judgments with greater ecological 
validity.  
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Comparing Experiment 1 (Face to Face) and Experiment 2 (Online) reveals a 
remarkably high correspondence between private responses in the two experiments. 
The shape of the distributions was very similar, indicating a very high level of 
replication in the private responses (see Supplementary Material Section C, Figure 
S11). Interestingly, the distribution of the consensus responses showed very 
different distributions between the Online and Face-to-Face versions of the 
experiment. This observation is in line with studies that have recently showed the 
differences between lab and online experiments comprising collective discussions 
(e.g., Tomprou et al. 2021; Hietanen et al., 2020; Schneider et al., 2002). Schneider 
et al., 2002 for instance, showed that online group discussions entail shorter 
comments (sometimes just a few words of agreement) compared to face-to-face 
interaction. Hence, online discussions are uniform. Similarly, we performed several 
exploratory analyses to examine if the variance of the consensus responses were 
different across the two experiments. Multiple measures of squared rank test of 
homogeneity revealed a significant difference in variance between online vs. face-
to-face moral judgments scores: face-to-face (but not online) interaction promoted 
more diverse consensus opinions. No difference in variance was observed in the 
First or Second private responses between the two studies (Supplementary 
Material, Section C, Part 16). The effect size of collective vs. individual conditions 
in the online experiment was also smaller than Face to Face interaction, showing a 
smaller utilitarian boost in online interactions. More research is needed to 
understand the difference between online vs. in-person interactions in the moral 
domain. 
Given the extended limitations imposed on laboratory work by the conditions of 
the global pandemic and the fact that many real-life meetings and social activities 
have been replaced by online video conferencing, we thought this would be a good 
opportunity to contribute to this very timely issue comparing the results of 
Experiments 1 and 2 in more detail, in addition to comparing the variance. A 
number of studies have examined the possible differences between face-to-face and 
in-person interactions and web-based video conferencing in various domains (e.g., 
Tomprou et al. 2021; Hietanen et al., 2020; Schneider et al., 2002). Therefore, we 
provided a number of further exploratory analyses that we have found instructive 
(Needless to say, these findings were not part of the original hypothesis) – See 
Supplementary Material, Section C.  
Our data speak to a number of previous studies that examined the role of group 
synergy in moral decision-making. The synergy here refers to the possibility that 
interaction between group members during deliberation may result in a consensus 
that - rather than convergence to an opinion within the range privately held by the 
members - exceeds the maximally utilitarian opinion of the group. One reviewer’s 
helpful advice, we examined this hypothesis in Experiment 1, we observed that the 
consensus score (M= 4.25) was lower than the highest individual utilitarian score 
within groups (M=4.76). Within Subject ANOVA revealed that this difference is 
significant (tstudent(15), p = .002; dcohen=.96; see Supplementary Material, Section D, 
Part 19, Figure S13). A similar result was observed in Experiment 2: consensus 
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score (M= 4.11) was lower than the highest individual utilitarian score within 
groups (M=4.78). Within Subject ANOVA revealed that this difference is 
significant (tstudent(14), p = .002; dcohen=1.01; see Supplementary Material, Section 
D, Part 19, Figure S14). Interestingly, this pattern of results is consistent with 
Curşeu et al. (2013; 2020) and Meslec & Curşeu (2013). 
In our experiment, participants had limited time for the discussion (i.e., three 
minutes) and responding to the questions. It is possible that by increasing the 
discussion time (or its frequency), we would have seen a different pattern in the 
second individual moral judgments. This is an important limitation of empirical 
approaches in assessing interactions in groups’ judgments in the laboratory setting 
(for a critical review of such methods, see Weiten & Diamond, 1979). Being aware 
of this limitation, in two pilot groups, we had observed that participants needed 
around 90 seconds to read one dilemma (for the first time) and respond to it 
privately in a self-paced manner without the time pressure. In these pilot studies, 
we also observed that participants spent, on average, 3 minutes discussing each 
dilemma before moving on.  In the final private judgment, as the participants had 
already seen the dilemmas and were going through them for a second or third time, 
self-paced responses were much quicker and did not take more than 30 seconds. 
Another critical limitation was that our behavioral measure, conventionally, 
connected utilitarian and deontological judgment inextricably to one another: being 
less deontological or more utilitarian could not be distinguished from one another 
in moral dilemmas.  Therefore, whether reduction of stress affected utilitarian 
responses or change the deontological tendencies is unclear, as utilitarian and 
deontological tendencies are often measured in the opposite directions of one single 
measure. Recent methods such as process dissociation (Conway & Gawronski, 
2013) or computational models such as CNI (Consequence, Norm, Inaction; 
Gawronski et al. 2017) can be used in future studies to achieve this distinction. 
Future research that employs methodologies such as Natural Language Processing 
techniques to analyze the content of the arguments could also bring about a deeper 
understanding of social interaction in moral judgments.   
To conclude, we found that collective consensual judgments made via face-to-
face and online group interactions were more utilitarian compared to private 
individual judgments. Group discussion did not change the individual judgments, 
indicating a normative conformity effect whereby individuals consented to a group 
judgment that they did not necessarily buy into personally. We measured stress 
levels and showed that participants registered less state anxiety in solving moral 
dilemmas in groups than individually. The results were consistent with the 
hypothesis that interactions reduce aversive emotions (e.g., stress) associated with 
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3.5 Supplementary Material   
3.5.1 A: Experiment1  
 
1 Consent and data management 
 
Each participant received detailed information on the conduct of the study and 
signed the informed consent letter. They were informed that their participation 
was voluntary, that they could stop at any time and without having to justify 
themselves. Participants knew that they would be able to access their own data 
and research results if they wish. All data (relative to participants’ performance in 
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the computer-based task) were anonymized by using an arbitrary code (one code 
per participant). These codes did not contain any information to identify the 
participant (such as first name, surname, or date of birth). Participant identifiable 
information (name, surname, date of birth) was not collected. 
2 Variables 
 
We manipulated two independent variables: 1. Condition: First (Individually 
before the discussion), Collective, Second (Individually after the discussion), and 
2. Mode (Discussed, Undiscussed) and measured the dependent variable (ratings 
related to the moral acceptability of each scenario) measured in the Likert scale 1 
(Not at all acceptable) to 7 (absolutely acceptable). 
3 Instruction  
 
The following instructions were provided in a written form in German and 
English. There was no deception involved; the instructions reflected the whole 
process of the experiment. 
This experiment has three stages. In the irst one, you will read 16 moral 
scenarios. We are interested in your honest opinion about the moral 
acceptability of a given choice in these scenarios. For instance, you may be 
provided with a scenario about a doctor and his patient, asked, "Is it morally 
permissible for Dr. Herzog to lie to his patient?" Depending on whether you 
think the action is not morally right or perfectly right, you will need to enter 
your response on the scale provided after each scenario. You cannot go back 
to your previous responses. In the second phase, you will be asked to discuss 
some scenarios with your group. Here, after discussion, you will be asked to 
provide a collective judgment and enter it on the tablet provided for each of 
you. In the third phase, you will get the opportunity to read all the scenarios 
again and provide a judgment about them individually for the second time. 
The written instructions were accompanied by a visual aid and further 
explanation of the experimenter to secure comprehension. 
After general instructions were given, participants familiarized themselves 
with the task and the relevant moral stimuli by performing one practice round. 
Participants then performed the task of responding to moral scenarios on the tablet 
screen individually for 1.5 minutes for each question. A timer on top of the screen 
showed the time. Responses that took more time than 1.5 minutes were not 
excluded. Participants were then asked questions together (8 items). The 
experimenter presented one scenario on the screen using the projector in the room, 
asked them to discuss each question with their groups in order to reach a consensus 
within 3 minutes. Each participant submitted their collective answers in the tablets 
for each question at the same time. The participants collectively reached a 
consensus, and each and every one entered the collective response on their 
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respective devices. After the collective conditions, they responded again 
individually to each question for 0.5 minutes each. The instructions made it clear 
that participants had a second chance to express their individual opinion, which 
could deviate from consensus. In nearly all trials, our participants followed these 
instructions. Participants were then debriefed, compensated, and thanked for their 
participation. 
4 Scenario Validation 
Flesch-Reading-Ease-Score was calculated (adapted to the German language) 
for all scenarios using the online Flesch value 
calculator (https://fleschindex.de/). The final score across all the scenarios was 
61, which indicates "Plain English" that is easily understood by 13- to 15-year-
old students (Thomas et al., 1975). 
The German names used in each scenario were carefully chosen based on the 
most common German names from the lists of the first 100 hits from 1970-1990, 
excluding the ones that might have negative connotations (e.g., Kevin or 
Jaqueline). 
We validated the above scenarios in a separate pilot study by asking n = 50 
participants (recruited via Academic Prolific; www.prolific.co) to measure 
whether the utilitarian responses were perceived as the choices which maximized 
the utility for many in a two-alternative forced-choice task. Twenty scenarios were 
given to each participant, and each participant answered which choice has the 
highest benefit for the many (for 20 scenarios). 
One example is as follows: 
A German investigation journalist has been violently murdered. Anna is in charge 
of the investigation, and there is mounting evidence that the murder was ordered by 
a foreign country, which is a long-time trade partner for Germany and with which the 
German state is about to conclude a large sale deal. The new sale deal would create 
10,000 well-paid jobs in Germany over the next two years and take 10,000 people out 
of unemployment. The trade deal with the foreign country will be compromised if 
Anna processes the evidence that foreign power is involved.  
 
The participants then were asked: 
 
Which decision has a higher benefit for many people: 
 
1. For Anna not to process the evidence that the foreign power is involved. 
2. For Anna to process the evidence that the foreign power is involved. 
One of the responses was always related to utilitarian inaction (here 1) and the 
other to non-utilitarian action (here 2). The order of the scenarios and choices was 
random across individuals. 
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We also asked the participants whether they needed other information to 
answer the questions. We modified the final version of our scenarios according to 
their responses. Finally, we chose the scenarios (8 out of 20) with significantly 
higher responses in choices of utilitarian inaction than a non-utilitarian 
(deontological) action across all participants (we set p-value ≤ 0.07 since the study 
was underpowered). 
5 Randomization  
 
Discussed items were pseudo-randomized across groups according to Table 1. 
Items across Group11 to Group 17 were the same as 1 to 5 (See Table1). 
 
Table 1. 
Randomization of discussed items 
 Action. Inaction. 
Group1 1,2,3,4 9,10,11,12 
Group2 2,3,4,5 10,11,12,13 
Group3 3,4,5,6 11,12,13,14 
Group4 4,5,6,7 12,13,14,15 
Group5 5,6,7,8 13.14,15,16 
Group6 6,7,8,1 14,15,16,9 
Group7 7,8,1,2 15,16,9,10 
Group8 8,1,2,3 16,9,10,11 
Group9 1,3,5,7 2,4,6,8 
6 Outlier detection 
 
To perform tests of outlier detection, we used <outlier_function.r> from the 
Performance package (Lüdecke et al., 2021), which uses a composite measure 
combined of several distance and/or clustering methods (see Figure S1 and Table 
2). Using a multivariate approach of outlier detection, we calculated the mean of 
moral judgments in First, Collective and Second conditions for both discussed and 
undiscussed items for each group. The composite measure detected one group as 
an outlier (see Figure S2). 

















Figure Figure S1. Multiple methods of outlier detection detected group 4 (in red) as an outlier 
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In addition to the composite method above, different univariate methods from 
the outliers R package (Komsta, 2011) were used. Grubbs test (recommended for 
small samples) (Grubbs et al., 1950) - G = 3.43389, U = 0.21697, p<.0001, in 
addition to Dixon test (Q = 0.75, p<.0001) showed the same group (i.e. group 4) 
as an outlier. 
7 Mixed effect models 
 
7.1 Logis c mixed eff ect model  
We performed different ordinal logistic mixed-effect models by using the 
package ordinal (Christensen, 2019). In model 1, Items in model 2, groups and 
individuals, and in model 3 items, groups and individuals were considered as 
random factors of the model. Model comparisons favored model 3 (see Table 3). 






Model comparison for different random slopes. 
Row no.par AIC logLik LR.stat df Pr.Chisq. 
model1 9 9799.4 4890.7 
   
model2 10 10351.8 5165.9 549.40 1 1.00 





Logistic regression results for the winning model 
 Rating 
Predictors Odds Ratios CI p 
1|2 0.07 0.04 – 0.13 <0.001 
2|3 0.36 0.21 – 0.63 <0.001 
3|4 0.87 0.50 – 1.52 0.616 
4|5 1.48 0.85 – 2.59 0.169 
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5|6 3.70 2.11 – 6.48 <0.001 
6|7 22.71 12.78 – 40.3
3 
<0.001 
Condition [Collective] 1.45 1.19 – 1.76 <0.001 




τ00 id: group 0.41 
τ00 group 0.00 
τ00 Item 1.16 
N Item 16 
N id 73 
N group 16 
σ2 3.29 
Observations 2768 
Pairwise comparison between conditions for model 3 is presented in Table 5 
  
Table 5 
Pairwise comparison between conditions 
contrast estimate SE z.ratio p.value 
First - Collective  -0.3689 0.100  -3.686  .0007  
First - Second  -0.006  0.074  -0.080  .9965  
Collective - Second  0.3630  0.0993  3.657  .0007  
P-value adjustment:  Tukey method for comparing a family of 3 estimates 
 
 
The same model was performed on a subset of the data, excluding the groups 
with missing data (see Table 6) and only on discussed items (see Table 7). 





Pairwise comparison between conditions (excluding groups with missing data 
points) 
contrast estimate SE z.ratio p.value 
First - Collective  -0.3577 0.1091 -3.278 .003  
First - Second  -0.0373 0.0913 -0.410 .911  
Collective - 
Second  
0.3201 0.1081 2.962 
.0086  




Pairwise comparison between conditions only for discussed items 
contrast estimate SE z.ratio p.value 
First - Collective  -0.3688 0.114 -3.226 .0036 
First - Second  -0.0512 0.106 -0.482 .8797 
Collective - Second  0.3176 0.112 2.826 .0131 
P-value adjustment:  Tukey method for comparing a family of 3 estimates 
 
 
In addition, we examined the effect of conditions on items which include 
actions (Sacrificial Dilemmas) and inactions (Real-life Dilemmas) (see Table 8 
and Figure S2). 
 
 
   Table 8 
   Pairwise comparison between conditions for Action and Inaction items 
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contrast estimate SE z.ratio p.value 
First Action - 
Collective Action 
-0.3685 0.1000 -3.685 .0031 
First Action - 
Second Action 
0.0059 0.0747 0.080 .1 
Collective Action - 
Second Action 
0.3626 0.0993 3.653 .0035 
First InAction - 
Collective InAction 
-0.3685 0.1000 -3.685 .0031 
First InAction - 
Second InAction 
-0.0059 0.0747 -0.080 .9999 
Collective InAction - 
Second InAction 
0.3624832 0.0993 3.653 .0035 
P-value adjustment:  Tukey method for comparing a family of 3 estimates 





Logistic regression results of the interaction between item type and 
condition 





1|2 0.06 0.03 – 0.12 <0.001 
2|3 0.29 0.13 – 0.62 0.001 
3|4 0.69 0.32 – 1.48 0.341 
4|5 1.18 0.55 – 2.53 0.670 
5|6 2.95 1.38 – 6.33 0.005 
6|7 18.12 8.36 – 39.26 <0.001 
Condition [Collective] 1.44 1.11 – 1.87 0.005 
Condition [Second] 0.94 0.77 – 1.16 0.582 
type [InAction] 0.63 0.22 – 1.82 0.395 
Condition [Collective] * 
type [InAction] 
1.00 0.68 – 1.47 0.992 
Condition [Second] * 
type [InAction] 
1.14 0.85 – 1.53 0.377 
Random Effects 
σ2 3.29 
τ00 id:group 0.41 
τ00 group 0.00 
τ00 Item 1.12 
N Item 16 
N id 73 








Figure S2. In both items, which involved utilitarian action and utilitarian inaction, the 
utilitarian score was higher in the collective condition than the first and second condition. 
 
Finally, to compare the utilitarian score of Discussed and Undiscussed items 
before and after the discussion, we excluded collective judgments and only 
included First and Second conditions in a new model. In this model, we compared 
the change of utilitarian score as a function of the interaction between Condition 
(First vs. Second) and Mode (discussed vs. undiscussed). The result of the 




Pairwise comparison between discussed and undiscussed items in First and Second 
condition 
contrast estimate SE z.ratio p.value 
First Discussed - Second 
Discussed 
0.0548 0.105 -0.521 0.9540 
First Discussed - First 
Undiscussed 
0.0208 0.107 -0.194 0.9974 
First Discussed - Second 
Undiscussed 
0.0117 0.106 0.109 0.9995 
Second Discussed - First 
Undiscussed 
0.0339 0.106 0.319 0.9888 
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Second Discussed - 
Second Undiscussed 
0.0665 0.105 0.630 0.9223 
First Undiscussed - 
Second Undiscussed 
0.0326 0.105 0.309 0.9898 





7.2 Linear mixed models 
Excess mass test (using multimode package; Ameijeiras-Alonso, 2021) 
confirmed that the distribution of responses across conditions is bimodal when we 
include both item and individual variability (excess mass = 0.05123, p-value 
<.0001; alternative hypothesis: true number of modes is greater than 1). In order 
to assure that this did not affect our result in the logistic model described in 7.1, 
we adopted an alternative analysis: instead of considering items as random effects, 
we averaged them across individuals in different conditions. The outcome 
distribution is no longer bimodal (p-value =.99; alternative hypothesis: true 
number of modes is greater than 1). In our new model, we considered groups and 
subjects as random factors and Conditions as fixed factors. Since the average 
rating for items is no longer on the Likert scale, we performed a linear mixed-
effect model (package lme4; Bates et al., 2015) instead of an ordinal logistic 
mixed model. The result of this analysis (pairwise comparison) is shown in Table 








Figure S3. Different simulations with the properties extracted from the mixed effect model 
showed that the model (in grey) captured the distribution of actual data (in red). 





Pairwise comparison between conditions in the linear mixed model 








First - Second  0.0037427 0.0818339 0.0457349 .9988475 
Collective - 
Second  
0.4054550 0.0818339 4.9546111 .0000060 
df= 144. P-value adjustment: Tukey method for comparing a family of 3 estimates 
7.3 Bayesian Mixed Model 
In addition to the frequentist approach above, here, we also performed 
Bayesian mixed effect models. This is especially important since two of our 
hypotheses mentioned in the manuscript, SD and VS, were based on the null effect 
between the First and the Second judgments. We used brms package in R 
(Bürkner, 2018), with 5000 iterations, five chains, and weakly informative prior 
(model betas drawn from normal distribution; mean = 0 and SD =1). 
 
Table12 
Bayesian Mixed Effect Model Results 
 Rating 
Predictors Estimates CI (95%) 
Intercept 3.86 3.34 – 4.37 
Condition: Collective 0.35 0.18 – 0.53* 
Condition: Second -0.01 -0.13 – 0.12  
Mode: Undiscussed 0.04 -0.16 – 0.25 
   
 




Figure S3. Posterior distribution of fixed factors of the Bayesian mixed effect model for a. 
collective condition (in purple) and b. the second condition (in green). The vertical red line crossed 
zero, and the blue dotted lines show the confidence intervals (95%).  
8 Conformity models 
 
We performed different logistic mixed-effect models by using the package 
ordinal (Christensen, 2019). to see the relation between Collective judgments 
(JC) and individual judgments and while controlling for the random effects of 
items and participants within each group, summarized in Table 13.  
 
Table13  
Conformity Mixed Effect Model 
  JC 
Predictors Odds Ratios CI p 
1|2 0.01 0.00 – 0.03 <0.001 
2|3 0.11 0.05 – 0.24 <0.001 
3|4 0.44 0.22 – 0.90 0.024 
4|5 1.35 0.67 – 2.74 0.401 
5|6 4.09 2.01 – 8.42 <0.001 
6|7 24.70 11.22 – 54.36 <0.001 
J1D 1.34 1.10 – 1.63 0.004 
Random Effects 
σ2 3.29 
τ00 id:group 0.00 
τ00 group 1.42 
τ00 Item 0.28 
N Item 16 
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N id 49 
N group 11 
 
 
In a new mixed-effect model with collective judgment as the dependent 
variable, we classified groups with utilitarian majority vs. deontological majority 
according to their first judgments. This classification is used as a fixed factor 
(Majority) with two levels (Utilitarian, Deontological) while controlling for 
random effects of groups and items. The result is shown in Table 14. 
 
Table14 
Majority Mixed Effect Model 
  JC 
Predictors Odds Ratios CI p 
1|2 0.04 0.01 – 0.15 <0.001 
2|3 0.35 0.19 – 0.64 0.001 
3|4 0.38 0.21 – 0.69 0.001 
4|5 0.41 0.23 – 0.74 0.003 
5|6 1.15 0.67 – 1.97 0.623 
6|7 1.21 0.70 – 2.07 0.497 
Majority (U) 2.99 1.64 – 5.46 <0.001 
Random Effects 
σ2 3.29 
τ00 group 0.00 
τ00 Item 0.00 
N Item 16 
N group 16 
 
9 Item-based analysis 
 
An item-based analysis was performed to compare the ratings for each item in 
different conditions. Repeated measure ANOVA test shows a significant 
difference between conditions across items. The result of the analysis is shown in 
Figure S4.  
 




Figure S4. Across 16 items, the ANOVA test shows a significant difference between 
different conditions. Items are rated more utilitarian in Collective condition in 
comparison to First and Second condition. The statistical test result is shown in the figure 
using the ggstatssplot package in R (Patil, 2021). 
 
 
10 ANOVA  
 
The primary analysis performed was the Logistic Mixed-Effect Models (in 
addition to the Bayesian Mixed Effect Models).  Mixed-effects Models are the 
more suitable tools for the nested designs (items within participants within groups) 
and another study has previously demonstrated that they can be usefully applied 
to data on moral dilemmas (Patil et al. 2020 c.f. Methodological Issues in the 
moral task). This approach is a more appropriate than simple ANOVAs because 
it takes into account the design structure to explain the sources of variance such 
as item and participants and groups. In addition, this method is better equipped to 
handle the missing data points, as well as modeling Likert-Scale measurements. 
However, the ANOVA test was also performed which shows a significant 
difference between the moral judgements in the three stages of Experiment 1, 
corrected for p-values adjustment using Holm test in multiple comparison of 









Figure S5. ANOVA test result for Experiment 1 - utilitarian scores (vertical axis) 
and different conditions (First – Collective – Second) across groups (each data point). 
Collective judgments are significantly higher than the first and the second conditions, 
using ggstastplot package in R (Patil, 2021). 
 
 
3.5.2 B: Experiment2  
 
11. Sample size estimation 
 
Our sample size estimation for our first experiment was based on Myers and 
Kaplan (1976) c.f., pre-registration at https://osf.io/jmkx5/. We initially aimed for 
12 groups with 5 participants. For the second experiment, we have reported the 
result of a replication study performed in Zoom software (n=70). The target 
sample size was predetermined using a Monte Carlo simulation, via the SIMR 
package (Green & MacLeod, 2016) to have 90% power using the parameters 
obtained via Experiment1’s Mixed Effect Model (fixed factor effect size was set 
to 0.296). The final sample consisted of 70 participants (33 females, age: M = 25 
years, SD = 4.9, range: 19 to 58) in 15 mixed-gender groups. (The simulation was 
informed by all the parameters obtained via Experiment1 Mixed Effect Model- 
not only the effect size). – see Figure S6 (outcome of SMIR package).  
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Figure S6. The target sample size was predetermined using a Monte Carlo simulation, using the 
SIMR package (Green & MacLeod, 2016) to have 90% power using the parameters obtained via 
Experiment1 Mixed Effect Model (fixed factor effect size: 0.296). The obtained effect size in 
experiment 2 is 0.2439782, and the power was 62.00% (51.75, 71.52) 
 
12. Mixed effect models 
 
12.1 Logis c mixed eff ect model  
We performed ordinal logistic mixed-effect models by using the package 
ordinal (Christensen, 2019). In this model, items, groups, and individuals were 
considered as random factors of the model and condition as the fixed factors with 
3 levels (First individual, Second Individual, Collective) – see table 15. The 


















1|2 0.09 0.05 – 0.19 <0.001 
2|3 0.36 0.18 – 0.74 0.006 
3|4 0.73 0.36 – 1.50 0.394 
4|5 1.31 0.64 – 2.68 0.463 
5|6 3.32 1.62 – 6.81 0.001 
6|7 17.96 8.62 – 37.39 <0.001 
Condition 
[Collective] 
1.30 1.05 – 1.61 0.015 
Condition 
[Second] 




τ00 CODE 0.82 
τ00 Item 0.95 
τ11 CODE.Group 0.01 
ρ01 CODE -0.71 
ICC 0.35 
N CODE 70 
N Item 8 
Observations 1680 
 
Pairwise comparison between conditions in the above model. 
  
Table 16 
Pairwise comparison between conditions 
contrast estimate SE z.ratio p.value 
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First - Collective  -0.2637 0.1082 -2.436 0.03 
First - Second  -0.1286 0.1055 -1.218 0.44 
Collective - Second  0.1351 0.1074 1.256 0.41 
                        P-value adjustment:  Tukey method for comparing a family of 3 estimates 
 
 
In addition, we examined the effect of conditions on items which include 
actions (Sacrificial Dilemmas) and inactions (Real-life Dilemmas) (see Table 17 
and Figure S4). 
 
 
     Table 17 
      Pairwise comparison between conditions for Action and Inaction items 
contrast estimate SE z.ratio p.value 
First Action -
Collective Action 
0.7164 0.1510 4.744 0.000 
First Action - Second 
Action 
0.0214 0.149 0.142 0.999 
Collective Action - 
Second Action 
1.713 0.480 3.570 0.004 
First InAction - 
Collective InAction 
0.205 0.156 1.319 0.774 
First InAction - 
Second InAction 
-0.222 0.149 -1.48 0.677 
Collective InAction - 
Second InAction 
-0.428 0.153 -2.78 0.060 
P-value adjustment:  Tukey method for comparing a family of 3 estimate 





Logistic regression results of the interaction of item type and condition 





1|2 0.21 0.11 – 0.43 <0.001 
2|3 0.84 0.42 – 1.67 0.617 
3|4 1.74 0.87 – 3.48 0.114 
4|5 3.11 1.56 – 6.21 0.001 
5|6 7.93 3.95 – 15.91 <0.001 
6|7 43.01 21.04 – 87.92 <0.001 
Condition [Collective] 2.05 1.52 – 2.75 <0.001 
Condition [Second] 1.02 0.76 – 1.37 0.886 
type [InAction] 5.55 2.17 – 14.22 <0.001 
Condition [Collective] 
* type [InAction] 
0.40 0.26 – 0.61 <0.001 
Condition [Second] * 
type [InAction] 
1.22 0.81 – 1.85 0.343 
Random Effects 
σ2 3.29 
τ00 CODE 0.82 
τ00 Item 0.41 
τ11 CODE.Group 0.01 
ρ01 CODE -0.70 
ICC 0.27 
N CODE 70  










Figure S7. In Action items, which involved Sacrificial Dilemmas the utilitarian score was 
higher in the collective condition than the first and second condition. 
 
13. Stress Models  
 
To examine the Stress score across different conditions, we first measured the 
stress score then we performed linear mixed-effect models by using the package 
(package lme4; Bates et al., 2015). In this model, groups and individuals were 
considered as random factors of the model and condition as the fixed factors with 
3 levels (First individual, Second individual, Collective) – see table 19. The 
pairwise comparison performed for this model is shown in table 20.  
 
Table 19. 
 Logistic Mixed Effect Model of Stress Responses 
  USTRESS 
Predictors Estimates CI p 
(Intercept) 40.03 35.94 – 44.12 <0.001 
Condition [Collective] -3.71 -6.51 – -0.91 0.009 










τ00 CODE:Group 215.48 
τ00 Group 3.87 
ICC 0.75 
N CODE 70 
N Group 15 
Observations 210 





Pairwise comparison between conditions in the linear mixed model of stress 
contrast estimate SE z.ratio p.value 
First - 
Collective 
3.714286 1.428417 138 2.600282 
First - Second 7.244898 1.428417 138 5.071978 
Collective - 
Second 
3.530612 1.428417 138 2.471696 
14. Bayesian Mixed Model for Moral Judgments 
 
In addition to the frequentist approach above, here, we also performed 
Bayesian mixed effect models. This is especially important since two of our 
hypotheses mentioned in the manuscript SR and VS, were based on the null effect 
between the First and the Second judgments. We used brms package in R 
(Bürkner, 2018), with 5000 iterations, 5 chains, and weakly informative prior 
(model betas drawn from normal distribution; mean = 0 and SD =1) The result of 
the model is shown in Table 21. Model detail is shown in Table 22. 
 
 
Table 21.  
Bayesian Mixed Model 
  Rating 
Predictors Estimates CI (95%) 
Intercept 3.91 3.04 – 4.77 
Condition: Collective 0.23 0.04 – 0.42 
Chapter 3. Many Heads Are More Utilitarian Than One 
142 
 
Condition: Second 0.12 -0.07 – 0.31 
Random Effects 
σ2 2.65 
τ00 Group 0.31 
τ00 Group:CODE 0.16 
τ00 Item 1.15 
ICC 0.38 
N CODE 70 
N Group 15 
N Item 8 
Observations 1680 






Bayesian Mixed Model 
 Parameter  
 
CI_low CI_high BF 
2 First - Collective  
 
-0.424 -0.040 1.8372 
3 First - Second  
 
-0.313 0.071 0.2181 
1 Collective - Second  
 




15. Added Measurements 
 
In Experiment 2, we included a number of questions in the survey to directly 
examine the possibility that expressing more moral judgments could be motivated 
by 1. the intention to appear competent or warm and/or 2. feeling socially 
connected to others in group discussions. 
Given that Rom and colleagues (2018) showed that people are meta-
perceptively mindful of how others may view them upon making a moral 
judgment, we tested if people had metaethical access to such information. 
Therefore, we measured the Warmth and Competence scale (items were translated 
to German) using items from Rom & Conway 2018. 
In addition, adopted from Lucas & Livingston (2014), feeling socially 
connected, loneliness, and feeling of being accepted by others during discussions 
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were also measured. We did not find any difference between these added 
measurements and group utilitarian score - using a Mixed Effect Model (Table 22; 
23; 24) - a null result which was observed in the Bayesian mixed effect model. 
The correlation between each item and the utilitarian score is presented the 
Figures S8, S9, S10. Each dot represents one group.  
 
15.1 Warmth Scale 
 







Linear regression of Warmth Scale 
 USCORE 
Predictors Estimates CI p 
(Intercept) 3.33 -3.37 – 10.02 0.290 
warm 0.01 -1.41 – 1.42 0.993 
good -0.32 -2.00 – 1.35 0.673 
moral 0.12 -1.20 – 1.43 0.845 
trustworthy -0.12 -2.23 – 2.00 0.904 
tolerant 0.41 -0.92 – 1.74 0.506 
Observations 15 
R2 / R2 adjusted 0.072 / -0.443 
 
15.1.2 WARMTH SCALE ITEM-BASED CORRELATIONS: 
The correlation between each item and the utilitarian score presented in Figure 
S8. Each dot represents one group.  
 




Figure S8. Correlation between each item of Warmth Scale (vertical axis) and the utilitarian 





15.2 Competence Scale 
15.2.1 Competence Scale Linear Regression: 
 
Table 23. 
Linear Regression of Competence Scale 
  USCORE 
Predictors Estimates CI p 
(Intercept) 6.14 0.93 – 11.35 0.026 
intelligent 0.88 -1.64 – 3.41 0.448 
reasonable -0.48 -2.06 – 1.11 0.513 
confident -0.42 -1.53 – 0.69 0.413 
Leader-like 0.34 -0.67 – 1.35 0.465 
competent -0.65 -3.13 – 1.83 0.569 




R2 / R2 adjusted 0.342 / -0.024 
 
 
15.2.2 Competence Scale Item-based correlation: 
The correlation between each item and the utilitarian score presented in Figure 
S9. Each dot represents one group.  
 
 
Figure S9. Correlation between each item of Competence Scale (vertical axis) and the 
utilitarian score (horizontal axis). Each dot represents one group.  
 
15.3 Social Connection Scale 
15.3.1 Social Connec on Scale Linear Regression Models: 
Here we performed regressions between different items of the Social 









Linear Regression Model of Social Connection Scale 
  USCORE 
Predictors Estimates CI p 
(Intercept) 7.41 0.99 – 13.84 0.028 
Lonely 0.30 -0.41 – 1.02 0.370 
Accepted 0.32 -0.65 – 1.29 0.487 
Connected -1.23 -2.38 – -0.07 0.039 
Observations 15 
R2 / R2 adjusted 0.377 / 0.206 
 
Here, in contrast to previous findings (Lucas & Livingston, 2014), one of the 
items of feeling socially connected to others was correlated with less utilitarian 
scores at the group level using linear regression model. However, when p-valued 
corrected for multiple comparisons following Benjamini & Hochberg (1995) 
method (i.e."BH" or its alias "fdr" via p.adjust function in R). We did not observe 
such effect after correcting for multiple comparisons. Here we report the corrected p values for 
Socially Connected: p = .1173451. 
15.3.2 Social Connec on Item-based correlations: 
 
The correlation between each item and the utilitarian score is presented in 
Figure S10. Each dot represents one group.  
 
 
Figure S10. Correlation between each item of Social Connection Scale (vertical axis) and the 
utilitarian score (horizontal axis). Each dot represents one group.  
3.5.3 C: Experiment 1 (Face to Face) vs. Experiment 2 (Online) 




16. Test of Variance  
 
We compare the distribution of responses to the same scenarios in Experiment 
2 (top row) and Experiment 1 (bottom row). Following our convention in other 
figures, the left panel in each row corresponds to first private response, the middle 
panel to the consensus and the right panel to the second private response.  As can 
be visually observed here, there was a remarkably high correspondence between 
private responses in the two experiments. The shape of the distributions was very 
similar indicating a very high level of replication in the private responses. 
Interestingly, the distribution of the consensus responses showed very different 
distributions between the Online (top) and face-to-face (bottom) version of the 
experiment (See Figure S11). 
 
   
Figure S11. The distribution of responses to the same scenarios (Utilitarian Scores – Vertical axis) 
in experiment 2 (top row) and experiment 1 (bottom row). The left panel in each row corresponds 
to first private response, the middle panel to the consensus and the right panel to the second private 
response. Items are colour coded. 
 
 
Exploratory analysis using multiple measures of squared rank test of 
homogeneity difference revealed a significant difference in the variance of Online 
vs. Face-to-Face moral judgments scores: face to face (but not online) interaction 
promoted more diverse consensus opinions on exactly the same dilemmas while 
the distribution of individual opinions remains identical. The Collective variance 
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difference of variance was seen in the First or Second conditions between the two 
studies. The squared rank test details for collective responses are as below: 
 
1) F test to compare two variances’ data: Rating by EXPF = 0.7, num df = 223, 
denom df = 639, p-value = 0.003 (alternative hypothesis: true ratio of variances is 
not equal to 95 percent confidence interval: 0.577- 0.889) sample estimates: ratio 
of variances 0.712. 
 
2) Levene's Test for Homogeneity of Variance (center = median) Levene's Test 
for Homogeneity of Variance (center = median) Pr(>F) = 18.7 1.7e-05 *** 
 
3) Fligner-Killeen test of homogeneity of variances data: Rating by 





17. Sacrificial Dilemmas (action) vs. Real-Life Dilemmas (inaction) 
 
In addition, we also report another feature of our design which turned out to 
show a marked difference between the face-to-face and online experiments. Note 
that in our study, we combined a number of sacrificial dilemmas adapted from 
previous literature (Greene et al., 2001) with a number of new independently 
validated items that we had specifically developed for our purpose to have real-
life scenarios. In the sacrificial dilemmas, the participants would judge a 
protagonist’s action, for example, to kill one in order to save many. In the non-
sacrificial dilemmas, the protagonist avoids an action and thereby violates a norm 
in order to maximize the benefit for many, e.g., stay silent about a cheating friend 
to avoid disintegrating the friend’s marriage and family. As such, our dilemmas 
can be classified as Action (sacrificial) vs. Inaction (non-sacrificial). In addition, 
we also report another feature of our design which turned out to show a marked 
difference between the face-to-face and online experiments. Note that in our 
study, we combined a number of sacrificial dilemmas adapted from previous 
literature (Greene et al., 2001) with a number of new independently validated 
items that we had specifically developed for our purpose to have real-life 
scenarios. In the sacrificial dilemmas, the participants would judge a protagonist’s 
action, for example to kill one in order to save many. In the non-sacrificial 
dilemmas, the protagonist avoids an action and thereby violates a norm in order 
to maximize the benefit for many, e.g., stay silent about a cheating friend to avoid 
disintegrating the friend’s marriage and family. As such, our dilemmas can be 
classified as Action (sacrificial) vs. Inaction (non-sacrificial). 
  
In Experiment 1, i.e., face-to-face interaction, we had observed similar moral 
judgments for the two categories. In Experiment 2, i.e., online interaction, we 
observed a marked difference between judgments of Action and Inaction 
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dilemmas (see table below). For Action dilemmas, the results replicated 
Experiment 1. Impressively, the effect size was almost identical between 
experiments 1-2. For Inaction dilemmas, however, a significant difference was 






Figure S12. For Action dilemmas, the results of Experiment 2 replicated Experiment 1. 
Impressively, the effect size was almost identical between Experiments 1-2 and closely replicated 
another previously published study which used the similar items (Cercu et al. 2020). For Inaction 
dilemmas, however, a significant difference was observed between moral judgements in 
Experiment 1 and 2. 
 
 
18. Rationale for time limits 
 
The time limit in our experiment was mainly driven by practical observations 
based on two pilot groups. Participants needed around 90 seconds to read one 
dilemma (for the first time) and respond to it privately in a self-paced manner 
without the time pressure. Participants spent, on average, 3 minutes discussing 
each dilemma before moving on.  In the final private judgment, as the participants 
had already seen the dilemmas and were going through them for a second or third 
time, self-paced responses were much quicker and did not take more than 30 
seconds. The effect of time pressure is debated in the literature (e.g., see Cummins 

































pHolm-Corrected  = .004
pHolm-Corrected  = .004
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showed that the time pressure that impacted participants' responses (towards more 
deontological judgment) was 3to 8 seconds which were considerably shorter than 
our 90-, 180- and 30-seconds time windows.  
 






Figure S13. Collective utilitarian scores (in green) are lower than the highest 
individual utilitarian scores within groups (In orange) In Experiment 1, pattern of results 
that fully replicates the results reported in Curseu et al (2020). Each dot represents one 
group. The statistical test result is shown in the figure using the ggstatssplot package in 










Figure S14. Collective utilitarian scores (in green) are lower than the highest 
individual utilitarian scores within groups (In orange) In Experiment 2, pattern of results 
that fully replicates the results reported in Curseu et al (2020). Each dot represents one 
group. The statistical test result is shown in the figure using the ggstatssplot package in 




3.5.4 D: Scenarios in English 
 
1- Emilia is negotiating with a powerful and determined terrorist who is about 
to set off a bomb in a crowded area. Her advantage is that she has his innocent 
teenage son in her custody. There is only one thing that she can do to stop him 
from detonating his bomb, which will kill thousands of people if detonated. To 
stop him, she must contact him over the satellite hook-up that she has established, 
and, in front of the camera, she breaks one of his son's arms and then threatens to 
break the other one if he does not give himself up. Emilia accepts to do this action. 
On a scale of 1 to 7, how morally acceptable was Emilia’s decision?  
2- Azzo is the captain of a military submarine traveling underneath a large 
iceberg. An onboard explosion has caused him to lose a large part of the oxygen 
supply and has injured one of his crew, who is quickly losing blood. The injured 
crew member is going to die from his wounds no matter what happens. The 
remaining oxygen supply is not sufficient for the entire crew to make it to the 
surface. The only way to save the other crew members is to shoot dead the injured 
crew member so that there will be just enough oxygen for the rest of the crew to 
survive. Azzo decides to kill the fatally injured crew member. On a scale of 1 to 
7, how morally acceptable was Azzo’s decision?  
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3- Ann is the late-night-watch nurse in a hospital. Due to an accident in the 
building next door, there are deadly fumes rising up through the hospital’s 
ventilation system. In a certain room of the hospital are three patients. In another 
room, there is a single patient. If Anna does nothing, the fumes will rise up into 
the room containing the three patients and cause their deaths. The only way to 
avoid the deaths of these patients is to hit a certain switch, which will cause the 
fumes to bypass the room containing the three patients. As a result of doing this, 
the fumes will enter the room containing the single patient, causing his death. 
Anna decides to hit the switch to kill this patient. On a scale of 1 to 7, how morally 
acceptable was Anna’s decision?  
4- A runaway trolley is heading down the tracks toward five workmen who 
will be killed if the trolley proceeds on its present course. Friedrich is on a 
footbridge over the tracks, in between the approaching trolley and the five 
workmen. Next to him on this footbridge is a stranger who happens to be very 
large. The only way to save the lives of the five workmen is to push this stranger 
off the bridge and onto the tracks below, where his large body will stop the trolley. 
The stranger will die if Friedrich does this, but the five workmen will be saved. 
Friedrich pushes the large stranger. The stranger dies, but the trolley stops, and 
the five workmen do not die. On a scale of 1 to 7, how morally acceptable was 
Friedrich’s decision?  
5- Alex is the leader of a small group of soldiers. He is on his way back from 
a completed mission deep in enemy territory when one of his men has stepped 
into a trap that has been set by the enemy and is badly injured. The trap is 
connected to a radio device that by now has alerted the enemy to your presence. 
They will soon be on their way. If the enemy finds his injured man, they will 
torture him and kill him. He begs Alex not to leave him behind, but if he tries to 
take the injured man, his entire group will be captured. The only way to prevent 
this injured soldier from being tortured is to shoot him. Alex shoots the soldier, 
who dies. On a scale of 1 to 7, how morally acceptable was Alex’s decision?  
6- Lena is a police officer, and she recently caught a criminal she has been 
hunting for some time. The criminal is allegedly responsible for rigging a series 
of explosive devices: some that have already gone off and some that have yet to 
detonate. He places explosives outside city cafes and sets them to go off at a time 
when people are drinking coffee on the patios. In this manner, he has injured many 
people and might injure many more. Now that the criminal is in custody, Lena 
wants to know where the unexploded bombs are so she can defuse them. He 
refuses to talk, so Lena decides to use "aggressive interrogation techniques" like 
holding his head under water and beating him. She decides to use "aggressive 
interrogation techniques". She knows she will be able to find and defuse the 
unexploded bombs. On a scale of 1 to 7, how morally acceptable was Lena’s 
decision?  
7- Mark is an expert motorcyclist participating in a Bike Week. As he is driving 
down the road in front of a large group of ten bikers, he suddenly notices that a 
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biker upfront is losing control over his machine. Mark speeds up to pull alongside 
the biker, who is going to crash any moment. If the biker crashes on the road, this 
will result in a large pile-up, and the group of ten bikers behind him will die. If 
Mark forces this biker off the road, the biker will crash into the trees. This will 
prevent the pile-up, but at his current speed, the biker will die in the crash. Mark 
decides to prevent the large pile-up by forcing this biker off the road and kills him. 
On a scale of 1 to 7, how morally acceptable was Mark’s decision?  
8- Eric is a miner. The only way out of the mine is to ride up with a simple 
cable elevator with small cubicles. It is the end of his turn, and everybody is riding 
up to the surface in the cubicles. While he is in the queue, he sees that the cable 
supporting all the cubicles is about to snap. 10 miners are riding the cubicles at 
this time. If he pushes an emergency switch, the last cubicle will be detached from 
the cable. This will reduce enough weight to maintain the cubicles of the other 10 
miners. This will kill the miner in the detached cubicle, but it will save the other 
ten. Eric decides to reduce the weight by pushing the emergency switch. This 
detaches the last cubicle, and the one miner in that cubicle dies, the other ten 
miners can reach the exit. On a scale of 1 to 7, how morally acceptable was Eric’s 
decision?  
9- Lucia is terminally ill and dying from cancer. Her doctor knows that she has 
just started using heroin, cocaine, and other illegal drugs as a way of distracting 
herself from her illness, but no one else knows. Lucia plans to consume many 
drugs over the next two months to enjoy the last moments of her life. Her doctor 
knows that the drugs are bad for Lucia’s health but using drugs will not shorten 
or extend her life at all. He knows that she will die for sure in two months. The 
doctor decides not to tell Lucia to stop using drugs even though it is illegal and 
bad for her health. Lucia enjoys consuming illegal drugs over two months and dies 
afterward. On a scale of 1 to 7, how morally acceptable was the doctor’s decision.  
10- Nina is a good friend of Martin, who is married to Linda. One day Nina 
discovers that Linda is having a love affair with another man for one year. It is 
clear that Linda does not want to leave Martin or tell him the truth but wishes the 
affair to continue secretly. Nina knows that for Martin, it is important that he and 
Linda are faithful to each other and do not sleep with anyone else. Nina also knows 
that John would leave Linda if he discovers that she has been lying to him. Nina 
decides not to tell Martin that Linda has an affair. Martin and Linda stay together, 
and Linda continues to have a secret affair. On a scale of 1 to 7, how morally 
acceptable was Nina’s decision?  
11- Dr. Beckert is a German doctor. He is working for a medical charity in 
Congo and gets infected with Ebola. The virus is spreading in the body fast, and 
he will die for sure unless he is returned to Germany for treatment. Bringing him 
back would save him, but it involves a high risk that the virus infects between one 
to four people: the nurse, driver, and two doctors who will need to attend to him. 
The risk that more than one person is infected is 50%. There are no alternative 
options, and it would be impossible to mitigate the risks of traveling back. Johann 
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is the head of the medical charity that employs Dr. Beckert. He has to decide 
whether to repatriate Dr. Beckert and risk the life of the four people needed to 
attend to him during the trip from Congo to Germany. The standard process would 
be to send only the nurse, driver, and two doctors voluntarily but not precisely tell 
them about the risks involved. Johann, the officer in charge of this case, decides 
not to return Dr. Beckert to Germany due to the risks involved. As a result, Dr. 
Beckert cannot receive life-saving treatment in Germany and dies in Congo. On a 
scale of 1 to 7, how morally acceptable was Johann’s decision?  
12- Simon is an engineer leading a project to build a water supply for a poor 
city in a developing country. One day, they discover the remains of an unknown 
ancient culture when drilling for water. Simon has to decide whether to inform the 
authorities, which would lead to archaeological excavations and greatly enrich the 
cultural world heritage and knowledge. But it would also put an end to the water 
supply project, leaving the 1000 inhabitants of the city in poverty. Simon decides 
to keep silent about the discovery. As a result, the cultural heritage is lost, but the 
wellbeing of the poor inhabitants is greatly increased. On a scale of 1 to 7, how 
morally acceptable was Simon’s decision?  
13- Amelie overhears her colleague at work, explaining on the phone that he 
has managed to hack a private pension saving. He has stolen the funds saved by 
10 elderly people who have reached their pension age, but instead of keeping the 
money for himself, he donated it to a poor orphanage that can now afford to feed, 
clothe, and care for 100 children until they reach adulthood. The colleague also 
explains that this is a one-off and that he will not do this again. Amelie knows that 
this type of private pension savings is not insured. If she goes to the authorities to 
denounce her colleague, the money will be returned to the pension scheme, but 
the 100 children will not be fed or dressed properly. Amelie decides not to 
denounce the man to the police, which means that the money from the private 
pension scheme of the 10 elderly people is gone forever, but 100 children will be 
fed and dressed properly until they reach adulthood. On a scale of 1 to 7, how 
morally acceptable was Amelie’s decision?  
14- Otto is a politician in a country of 3 million people. He has to decide 
whether to increase the tax on tobacco by 20% or keep the current tax policy. 
Medical experts can reliably predict that increasing the tax would prevent 10,000 
deaths every year due to lung cancer. However, from a purely economic point of 
view, the early deaths of 10,000 smokers have economic benefits: even with the 
new tax income, the government does not have to pay for pensions for 10,000 
smokers. Instead, it can invest in infrastructure and building schools so 1 million 
people would benefit from the early deaths of 10,000 smokers. Otto realizes that 
leaving the tax as it means that smoking will just continue as it is, and government 
money can be used in infrastructure and building schools. Otto decides to keep 
the current tax policy on tobacco, which means that 10,000 smokers will continue 
to smoke and die earlier because of lung cancer, but this keeps funding available 
to build schools and infrastructure for 1 million inhabitants. On a scale of 1 to 7, 
how morally acceptable was Otto’s decision?  
3.5 Supplementary Material 
155 
 
15- Joachim and Ingrid are a couple hosting a farewell party before emigrating 
to Australia the next day. At the farewell party, Ingrid meets Paul and is very much 
attracted to him. She asks Paul if he wants to sleep with her. Paul knows that Ingrid 
is in a relationship with Joachim and promises him never to sleep with anyone but 
him. Paul, too, is in a relationship and has promised his partner not to have sex 
with anyone but her. Both Ingrid and Paul know that if they secretly left the party 
and had sex together, nobody would ever find out, and they would have a very 
enjoyable night together. Paul does not decline to sleep with Ingrid. Both of them 
thus enjoy great pleasure but violate their promises.  
16- A German investigation journalist has been violently murdered. Anna is in 
charge of the investigation, and there is mounting evidence that the murder was 
ordered by a foreign country in Africa, which is a long-time trade partner for 
Germany and with which the German state is about to conclude a large sale deal. 
The new sale deal would create 10,000 well-paid jobs in Germany over the next 
2 years and take 10,000 people out of unemployment. Anna decides not to process 
the evidence that foreign power is involved. The case remains unresolved, and no 
one else is accused of it. The trade deal with the foreign country is not 
compromised by the results of the investigation, and wealth and 10,000 jobs are 
created. On a scale of 1 to 7, how morally acceptable was Anna’s decision?  
 
3.5.5 E: Added Measurements in German 
 
o Während der Diskussionen fühlte ich mich sozial mit anderen verbunden. 
o Während der Diskussionen habe ich mich von anderen akzeptiert gefühlt. 
o Während der Diskussionen fühlte ich mich einsam. 
o Ich denke, dass ich während den Diskussionen als warmherzige Person 
wahrgenommen wurde. 
o Ich denke, dass ich während den Diskussionen als selbstbewusst Person 
wahrgenommen wurde. 
o Ich denke, dass ich während den Diskussionen als moralisch Person 
wahrgenommen wurde. 
o Ich denke, dass ich während den Diskussionen als gutmütig Person 
wahrgenommen wurde. 
o Ich denke, dass ich während der Diskussionen als eine vernünftige Person 
wahrgenommen wurde. 
o Ich denke, dass ich während den Diskussionen als intelligent Person 
wahrgenommen wurde. 
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o Ich denke, dass ich während den Diskussionen als guter Anführer Person 
wahrgenommen wurde. 
o Ich denke, dass ich während den Diskussionen als vertrauenswürdig Person 
wahrgenommen wurde. 
o Ich denke, dass ich bei den Interviews als tolerante Person wahrgenommen 
wurde. 
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. 
Abstract: We show that people assign less punishment to individuals who 
cause harm together with others, compared to those who act alone. In Experiment 
1, participants (N=1002) assigned less punishment to individuals involved in 
collective violations leading to intentional and/or accidental deaths, but not failed 
attempts, emphasizing that harmful outcomes, but not malicious intentions, were 
necessary and sufficient for the diffusion of punishment. Experiment 2a compared 
the diffusion of punishment across harmful actions and ‘victimless’ purity 
violations (e.g., eating human flesh in groups; N=752). Punishments were reduced 




Experiment 2b (N= 500) exclusively examined purity violations and, as expected, 
found no diffusion. We propose discounting in causal attribution as the underlying 
cognitive mechanism for reducing punishment in collective norm violations. 
 
 
 3-5 Keywords regarding Methods used: Online data acquisition, Mixed 
Effects Models, Bayesian Regression, Open science, Open data 
3-5 Keywords regarding the scientific topic: Collective moral transgression, 
diffusion of punishment, Moral Foundations Theory, Causal Attribution, 
Discounting principle.  
 
Statement of Relevance 
We use cognitive and social psychology concepts to examine an 
overlooked contextual influence on moral judgments, with implications for 
forensic psychology. We not only show that the punishment reduces in 
collective harmful violations for each perpetrator but confirm discounting 
in causal attribution as a potential cognitive mechanism. The asymmetries 
found in the reduction of punishment based on intention and harmfulness 
have ramifications for individuals' propensity to commit moral 
transgressions as parts of groups and for any situation in which moral 
judgment is passed on such transgressions. Many of the actions represented 
by our stimuli show illegal behaviors where being part of a group should 
not affect punishment according to many justice systems (e.g., that of the 
United States). Our findings, therefore, raise the possibility that this 
intended aspect of legal code may not be easily implemented in practice, 
or if implemented, may clash with public perceptions of blameworthiness 
and deserved punishment.  
4.1 Introduction  
In 44 BC, 60 Roman senators conspired to murder Julius Caesar at a senate 
meeting. They collectively stabbed him 23 times, leading to his death. But who, 
exactly, was to blame — and how much? Many crimes are committed by groups, 
including gang rapes, collective hate crimes, co-offending, and conspiracies. 
Understanding how people assign blame and punishment in such ‘group crimes’ is 
important in its own right, and can also help resolve discrepancies between current 
theories of moral judgment. 
Generally, people judge an actor as fully blameworthy if they intentionally cause 
harm (Guglielmo et al., 2009; Malle et al., 2014; Malle & Knobe, 1997; Shaver, 
1985; Shultz & Wright, 1985). Much research suggests that these two factors — 
intentionality and causal responsibility for harm — play dissociable roles in moral 
judgment (Cushman, 2008; Young et al., 2007, 2010). But they may influence the 
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judgment of group crimes in different, even contradictory ways. Thus, our approach 
is to differentiate their relative contributions to the judgment of group crimes. 
4.1.1 Intentionality 
How do intent-based judgments of group actors compare to solo actors? One 
natural possibility is that group actors are held just as responsible, given that each 
volitionally decides to engage in transgressive behavior. Alternatively, they may 
also be held less responsible on the belief that they got "caught up" in something 
they would not otherwise have done (Malle et al., 2001; Malle & Knobe, 1997). In 
this case, group actors would receive less blame and punishment than solo actors 
committing equivalent crimes.  
4.1.2 Causal responsibility 
How will judgments of the causal responsibility of group actors compare with 
solo actors? One possibility is that causal responsibility is categorical— either one 
is responsible or not (see also Moore, 2009). Since participants in group crimes are 
causal contributors to the outcome, they would be held causally responsible to the 
same extent as a solo actor (e.g., felony murder, see Binder et al., 2016). For 
instance, in many US states (e.g., Connecticut General Statutes. tit. 53a-54c, 
Chapter 952; 2012), in the case of collective murder, it is argued that since the 
felony itself causes death, every participant in the felony is causally responsible for 
the death (Figure 1 – left).  
Alternatively, causal responsibility may be diminished as it is distributed across 
a number of people (Figure 1 - right). This comports with the well-studied 
phenomenon of causal discounting (Kelley, 1973; Morris & Larrick, 1995). 
Additionally, when harm is "overdetermined"–i.e., it would have occurred even 
without the action of any sole individual—people are likely to perceive each 
individual as less causally responsible (Lagnado et al., 2013). Similarly, the degree 
to which the individual has causal control over the outcome may be diminished in 
collective violations, and so causal power theory would suggest diminished 
attributions of causal responsibility (Cheng, 1997). Because punishment judgments 
are sensitive to attributions of causal responsibility for harm (Cushman, 2008), 
these theories predict diminished punishment for group actors. 
4.1.3 Existing research 
Existing research offers mixed evidence on the punishment of group compared 
to solo crimes. An archival study of sentences given out to individual and collective 
violations offered some evidence for reduction of punishment as judges gave 
harsher sentences to lone offenders controlling for the crime (Feldman & Rosen, 
1978). However, a follow-up experiment on hypothetical robberies failed to find 
corroborating evidence, a result ascribed to the small sample size (Feldman & 




punishment in fairness-based group games but found no difference between 
proposed punishment for lone fairness violators compared with collective ones (El 
Zein et al., 2020). In another study, comparing suspicious outcomes in a coin-toss 
task, although violators in a group were considered more honest (controlling for 
outcome), the difference in punishment judgments of dishonest individuals in 
isolation vs. in groups was only marginally significant (p = .08; Vainapel et al., 
2019). 
A key limitation of prior studies is that they cannot dissociate the potentially 
divergent role of intent-based versus responsibility-based processes in judgments 
of deserved punishment. To disentangle these, in Experiment 1, we compared 
accidental (where there is no intent, but causal responsibility is preserved) and 
attempted harm (where the intent is preserved, but no harm is caused). In 
Experiment 2, we investigated cases of collective "victimless" transgressions, such 
as disrespecting the deceased, and compared them to collective harmful 
transgressions. Like attempted harms, these preserve the element of transgressive 
volitional action while eliminating any relevant question of causal responsibility. 
 
 




Figure 1. a. Two models of punishment in individuals and joint actions: legal models suggest 
similar punishment for joint and individual violations. Discounting models predict less punishment 
in joint than individual violations. b. Causal links in two models of punishment. In legal models, all 
perpetrators in joint violations are causally responsible for the harmful outcome to the same degree 
as in solo violations. In the discounting models, each individual in the group is less causality 
responsible for the outcome than solo violations.  
4.2 Experiment 1 
Experiment 1 tested whether a third party punishes an individual less if she 
inflicts a harmful outcome on a victim as part of a group, rather than acting alone. 
We employed a 2x2x2 design with three factors: Collectivity, intention, outcome. 
Collectivity was treated as a between-subject, and intention and outcome as within-
subject factors. By independently manipulating the agents' intentions (malicious vs. 
neutral) and the actions' outcomes (harmful vs. harmless), we can differentiate the 
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effect of collectivity on intent- and responsibility-based processes of moral 
judgment.  
4.2.1 Methods  
4.2.1.1 Participants 
One thousand and seventy-five participants were recruited via Amazon's 
Mechanical Turk. Thirty-seven participants were excluded for having duplicated 
IDs. We used a data-driven Mahalanobis Distance measure (Dupuis et al., 2019) to 
identify non-human participants and inconsistent or inattentive responses in our 
data (see Supplementary Material). This step resulted in excluding 36 participants. 
The final sample of 1002 US residents (452 males, eight choosing the "other" 
option) had an average age of 24.5 years (SD = 10.5, range: 18 to 64). We replicated 
the main results, including those who failed the Mahalanobis exclusion criterion 
(see Table3, Supplementary Material). 
4.2.1.2 Material and procedure  
Each participant was randomly assigned to one of the two collectivity conditions 
(joint or individual scenarios) and read four moral scenarios in which a character 
committed an act either as part of a group (joint action) or alone (individual action). 
The dependent measure was always the deserved punishment for a given character 
on a 7-point scale (1 labeled as "not at all", 4 as "somewhat", and 7 as "a lot"). 
Intention (innocent, malign) and outcome (harmless, harmful) were crossed 
within subjects across the four scenarios. In neutral conditions, the agent(s) acted 
with no malign intention, and no harm ensued. Accidental conditions involved an 
unintended death following the described action. In the attempted and intentional 
cases, the agent(s) acted with malign intent, either failing or succeeding in 
murdering another person. The following is an intentional, individual violation 
scenario adapted from Young et al. (2010) (see Supplementary Material for full 
scenario texts): 
Stacey and Kate are friends and decide to go rock climbing. They are 
going to use new harnesses to scale a gigantic cliff.  
Kate starts to put on one of the new harnesses. The clamp on the new 
harness is subtly flawed, so the whole harness is incredibly unsafe to use. 
Because the clamp on the harness does not audibly click into place, 
Stacey realizes that the new harness is malfunctioning and may not be safe 
to use.  
She straps Kate into the harness and asks Kate to go first. Partway up 
the cliff, the harness gives way, causing Kate to fall and die. 
 
The three sentences in italics were substituted in joint action conditions with 
statements about "Stacey, Anita, James, and Kate" instead, implicating the first 
three characters in the harm inflicted on the last-named individual. 
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A random pairing of stories was first created for within-subject manipulations 
and then counterbalanced across participants. The order of scenarios was 
randomized. Demographics followed the last vignette, including age, gender, 
political orientation (from 1 denoted as "very liberal" to 7 marked as "very 
conservative"), ethnicity, and education level. 
4.2.2 Results 
Figure 3 shows the results of Experiment 1. Given that our moral scenario tasks 
followed a multilevel pattern (across items, conditions, and participants), and our 
dependent variable were measured in Likert scale, we used ordinal mixed-effect 
models in R (https://www.r-project.org/ ) to account for individual differences. 
Punishment ratings for intentional harm were significantly higher than 
accidental and attempted harm, and ratings in the mentioned conditions all 
exceeded those for the neutral condition, showing that the intention and outcome 
manipulations worked as intended (see Table 2 - Supplementary Material). To test 
the diffusion of punishment hypothesis, we included different combinations of 
Collectivity, intention, and outcome as factors in mixed-effect models. Model 
comparison favored the variant including all three factors (see Supplementary 
Material). The interaction of outcome and collectivity was significant (b = 1.4125, 
SE= .2, z =7.245, p <.001), while that of intention and collectivity was not (b = .138, 
SE = .163, z = 7.245, p = .3). Pairwise comparison showed less assigned punishment 
for characters when involved in joint actions compared to individual actions for 
intentional (b = .745, SE = .129, z = 4.451, p = .0002) and accidental killings (b 
=.4363, SE = .128, z = 3.411, p = .014), but not in failed attempts (b = .029, SE=.129, 
z =. 229, p = 1.0). Since we predicted a null effect for attempted murder, following 
Aczel et al.’s (2018) method, a Bayesian mixed-effects pairwise comparison was 
performed to confirm the pattern of results (intentional: BF10= 498.32, CI95= [.29, 
.69]; accidental: BF10 = 21.74, CI95= [.12, .52]; attempted: BF10= .05, CI95= [-.17, 
.22]; see Table 4 in Supplementary Material). Surprisingly, protagonists in neutral 
conditions received harsher proposed punishment for joint compared to individual 
actions (b =.9761, SE=.166, p<.0001; see Figure 1 and Table 2 in Supplementary 
Material). This effect was not predicted and could be due to a few outliers. 
Comparisons of specific items can be found in Supplementary Material, Figure S1. 
 
 




Figure 2. a. Four experimental conditions as the outcome of 2 by 2 design: Intention (Innocent, 
Malign) and outcome (Harmless, Harmful) b. Box-and-whisker plot of punishment ratings as a 
function of Collectivity (different colors) across neutral, accidental, attempted, and intentional 
actions (horizontal axis). The box = middle 50% of scores. The thick horizontal line within each box 
represents the median. Upper and lower whiskers show the range of scores in the highest and lowest 




We found a robust reduction in proposed punishment across instances of 
intended and accidental harm when perpetrators acted as part of a group rather than 
lone agents. The contrast between these results and previous studies (Feldman & 
Rosen, 1978; El Zein et al., 2020) may be attributed to the more representative range 
of clearly and more strongly harmful outcomes (i.e., death) represented in our 
materials. That no diffusion of punishment was observed for attempted harm 
suggests that diffusion of punishment depends on discounting principle in causal 
attribution of harmful outcomes.  
4.3 Experiment 2 
Not all immoral acts involve harmful outcomes. 'Victimless' purity violations are 
condemned on the basis of a transgressive action rather than the outcome (McHugh 
et al., 2017). For instance, research shows that they are judged based on 
perpetrators' impact on themselves rather than victims (Chakroff et al., 2013; 
Dungan et al., 2017) and they elicit disgust only when people judge immoral 
characters, and not the outcomes (Giner-Sorolla & Chapman, 2017).  
In Experiment 2, while directly measuring harmfulness and grossness of 
scenarios, we extended the context to impure victimless acts. This allowed us to 
investigate the role of discounting in causal attribution in more depth. If the 
Chapter 4. Diffusion of Punishment in Collective Norm Violations 
168 
 
diffusion of punishment results from a discounting principle in causal attribution, it 
would only apply to violations that cause harmful outcomes. Therefore, we 
expected it to be weaker for judgments of purity violations.  
4.3.1 Experiment 2.a 
In Experiment 2, we extended items to 'victimless' purity violations which 
involved no prominent harm. We hypothesized that the diffusion of punishment 
results from discounting in causal attribution, where more than one sufficient cause 
means less causal responsibility assigned to each agent for the harmful outcome. 
Therefore, if agents are not perceived as causing significant harm, we expect 
impartial observers to treat collective purity violations similar to the individual 
violation, resulting in no punishment reduction.  
Experiment 2a compared judgments for less grave harm than in Experiment 1 
(e.g., intentionally breaking someone's leg) with purity violations (e.g., 
masturbating over a grave). Collectivity was manipulated as before. Unlike most 
previous studies, instead of assuming that harm scenarios induce a sense of 
harmfulness alone and the purity vignettes only a sense of disgust, we asked our 
participants to rate how harmful or gross they found the protagonist(s)' action in all 
scenarios, in order to examine their evaluation of the outcome more directly. The 
same judgments allow us to compare the Moral Foundation Theory's predictions 
(Graham et al., 2011), which considers harm and purity judgments as fundamentally 
different from those of Dyadic Harm theory (Gray et al., 2014), which casts them 
both as reflecting judgments of harm.  
4.3.1.1 Methods  
4.3.1.1.1 Participants 
A target sample size was predetermined using a Monte Carlo simulation, 
following guidelines provided by DeBruine & Barr (2021; see the OSF repository). 
The final sample consisted of 752 US and UK residents (331 females; three others, 
age: M = 28.08 years, SD = 6.5, range: 18 to 60) recruited through Prolific 
Academic (https://www.prolific.co/ ) and compensated for their time. Twenty-six 
participants were excluded for having Prolific IDs that duplicated those from a pilot 
study. To increase precision, we used data-driven methods (as in Exp 1) and 
questionnaires for attention checks to exclude inattentive responders. No difference 
was observed between the two methods. Another 39 were excluded for failing 
attention checks—they assigned 0 to 49 (on a 100-point scale) blame to a person 
who "destroys the entire planet" (n = 18), or 51 to 100 for someone who "gives 
money to a charitable organization" (n = 21). 
4.3.1.1.2 Materials and procedure 
The Collectivity was manipulated as in Experiment 1. The moral domain (harm 
vs. purity) was additionally manipulated within subjects. Hence, each subject 
responded to four scenarios, presented to her in two blocks (harm block and purity 
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block). The scenarios were randomly chosen from a battery of 8 items, 
counterbalanced across participants. The order of blocks and the items within each 
block were randomized and counterbalanced across subjects. Four items were 
adapted from a previous study on Harm (Young et al., 2010, see Supplementary 
Material), and four items were original materials (some inspired by Rottman & 
Young, 2019) representing purity violations. The items were matched for severity 
of joint vs. individual action in a pilot study. 
For instance, a purity violation in the individual transgression condition would 
read: 
Dan's favorite singer has died and has been buried in a nearby cemetery. 
He always had wild fantasies about the singer, and one night, he forms the 
following plan: He enters the cemetery late at night and goes to masturbate 
over the singer's grave, making sure he cannot be seen. After that, he 
ensures that the grave is clean and exactly as it was before and leaves. 
 
The same scenario in the joint condition would introduce Dan, Ray, and Carl as 
friends who collectively committed the act. 
To provide more precision regarding variability in judgments by providing more 
options along the spectrum, we measured the punishment scenario on a 100-point 
Likert scale. Zero to 50 was labeled as mild and 50 to 100 as severe punishment. 
Perceived harmfulness and grossness were measured on similar scales. Other 
design aspects were identical to Experiment 1. 
4.3.1.2 Results 
We first tested whether our conceptual distinction between harm and purity is 
successfully reflected in our item construction. We included ratings of perceived 
harmfulness and grossness as factors in a mixed-effects model. As expected, a 
significant main effect of Domain was found for both harmfulness (b = 38.76, SE 
= 4.68, t = -8.29, df = 6.32, p < .0001) and grossness (b =41.45, SE = 2.43, t = 17.06, 
df = 7.37, p <.0001). No significant effect of collectivity was found for either 
Harmfulness ratings (b = .012; p = .1; BF10= .754, CI95 = [-1.68, 1.443]) and 
Grossness ratings (b = .0018; p =.4; BF10 = .768, CI95 = [-1.577, 2.268]), whether 
using linear mixed effects analysis or it’s Bayesian counterpart (see Figure 3). In 
addition to establishing the adequacy of our item construction, these results help 
address a corollary question for which Dyadic Harm (Gray et al., 2014; Schein & 
Gray, 2018) and Moral Foundation (Graham et al., 2013) theories make contrasting 
predictions regarding the determinants of moral judgments. Our results (Figure 3) 
supported the Moral Foundation account of disparate moral domains of harm and 
purity.  
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Figure 3. Harmfulness (left) and Grossness (right) ratings are matched across Joint and 
Individual actions but significantly different across domains: Harmfulness is higher in the Harm 
domain(left), and grossness is higher in the Purity domain (right). Graph conventions are the same 
as Figure 2. 
 
 
We investigated the interaction between collectivity (individual vs. joint) and 
domain (purity vs. harm) in a mixed-effect model. The predicted interaction with 
domain was not significant (b = 2.31, SE = 1.23, t = -1.88, df = 2053.67, p = .06). 
Performing a within subject analysis, we found that overall effect of diffusion was 
significant in both harm and purity domains (b = 8.81, SE = 1.3, df = 1103.83, t = 
6.79, p < .0001).  
However, an exploratory analysis revealed a possible carryover effect of purity 
on harm. A between-subject analysis on the first trials and the first blocks, in which, 
by design - no carryover effect occurred - showed the diffusion of the punishment 
only in harm (b = 6.99, SE = 3, p = .02, df = 230.55) and not in purity violations (b 
= 3.67, SE = 3.78, p = .33, df = 208.336). Similarly, a mixed effect model on the 
first blocks, accounting for item variability, showed that diffusion of punishment, 
as predicted, was only significant in harm blocks (b = 5.93, SE = 2.04, p = .003, df 
= 466) and not in purity blocks (b = 1.78, SE = 2.73, p = .514, df = 421) (see Figure 
4; for more details see Supplementary Material).  
These analyses suggested that the significant overall effect in purity could be 
due to a carryover between conditions due to the within-subject design. To examine 
the conclusions from our exploratory analysis, we conducted a pre-registered 
replication Experiment 2b, where we focused on purity violation in a between-
subject design. 
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Figure 4. In the first blocks, subjects punished individuals alone (green) more than in joint action 
(orange) across all items in harm (left) but not in the purity (right) domain.  
 
 
4.3.2 Experiment 2.b 
4.3.2.1 Methods Exp 2.b 
4.3.2.1.1 Participants 
A target sample size was predetermined using a Monte Carlo simulation, using 
SIMR package (Green & MacLeod, 2016). R script is accessible at OSF. The final 
sample consisted of 500 US and UK residents (250 females; three others, age: M = 
30.1 years, SD = 5, range: 18 to 58) recruited through Prolific Academic 
(https://www.prolific.co/ ) and compensated for their time. Five participants were 
excluded for having Prolific IDs that duplicated those from a pilot study. To 
increase precision, we used both data-driven methods (as in Exp 1) and 
questionnaires for attention checks (as in Exp 2.a). No difference was observed 
between the two methods (see Supplementary Material). Another 32 were excluded 
for failing attention checks. 
4.3.2.1.2 Materials and procedure 
The number of protagonists was manipulated as in Experiment 2.a while only 
one moral domain (purity) was provided to the subjects. Each participant responded 
to four fully randomized scenarios, all from the purity domain. The scenarios were 
the same as experiment 2.a. We measured punishment after each scenario on a 7-
point Likert scale, the same as Experiment 1. 




A linear mixed-effect analysis was performed with collectivity (joint vs. 
individual) as fixed, and participants and items as random factors (see 
Supplementary Material for more details). Pairwise comparison indicated that 
judgments were similar in group and individual transgressions (b = .1853, SE = 
.1190, t =1.557), which was confirmed by Bayesian mixed-effects analysis (BF10 = 
0.392, CI95= [-.429, .041]). 
 
 





Experiment 2b found, despite ample power, no diffusion of punishment for 
actions deemed impure but harmless. In other words, it appears that punishment is 
diffused only when the outcome of collective action is harmful.  
4.4 General discussion 
Group crimes are commonly performed, but punitive reactions to them are rarely 
studied. We know from research on solo crimes that punishment depends on two 
general processes: judgments of causal responsibility for harm and intent to harm 
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(Cushman, 2008). Drawing on two complementary and well-established methods 
for dissociating causal and intent-based processes, we studied how the two responds 
to collective violations.  
In Experiment 1, a reduction in the punishment of group crimes was attributable 
to the causal process of moral judgment—a diffusion of causal responsibility. This 
finding is consistent with discounting theories which argue that assigning 
punishment follows from a causal attribution of harmful outcomes, whereby having 
more than one sufficient cause results in lower responsibility assigned to 
(Gerstenberg & Lagnado, 2010; Halpern, 2016; Kelley, 1987; 1973; Lagnado et al., 
2013; Morris & Larrick, 1995; Shaver, 1985). In contrast, we found no reduction 
in punishment attributable to the intent-based process of moral judgment.  
Two different methods provided convergent evidence for the dissociation 
between causal and intent-based contributions to the judgment of group crimes.  
First, we found that accidental harm-doers (who bear causal responsibility for harm 
without intent) were punished less when in the group compared to when solo. Yet, 
attempted harm-doers (who act with harmful intent but bear no causal 
responsibility) were punished identically across these contexts. Second, we found 
that having an identifiable harmed victim was necessary for the diffusion: 
victimless violations were punished equivalently across group and solo contexts.  
Perhaps for this reason, individuals use group membership to minimize the 
negative consequences of their actions (e.g., regret and responsibility see El Zein et 
al., 2020) and protect themselves from the costs of violation such as punishment 
(El Zein et al., 2019). Our results reinforce that when seeking 'safety in numbers' 
by acting as part of groups, each perpetrator may expect to mitigate punishment and 
blame. The diffusion of punishment may, therefore, promote collective 
transgressions (Bandura et al., 1975; Darley & Latane, 1968; Latane et al., 1979). 
Our findings also bear on theories of moral judgment. First, they support the idea 
that causal and mental-state processes play dissociable roles in moral judgment 
(Cushman, 2008; Rottman & Young, 2019; Young et al., 2007, 2010). Second, they 
support important dissociations between the moral judgment processes regarding 
harmful versus "victimless" crimes (Chakroff et al., 2013, 2017; Dungan et al., 
2017; Giner-Sorolla & Chapman, 2017; Rottman & Young, 2019). Third, they 
reinforce the idea that punishment often involves a "backward-looking" retributive 
focus on responsibility, rather than a "forwards-looking" focus on rehabilitation, 
incapacitation, deterrence, etc. (which, we presume, would generally favor treating 
individual and group actors equivalently). Punishers' own future-oriented self-
serving motives and their evolutionary roots, as an alternative hypothesis for 
punishment diffusion, need further investigation. For instance, punishing joint 
violators can produce more enemies for the punisher, reducing the motivation for a 
severe reaction. 
Whether the diffusion of punishment and our causal explanation for it extends 
to other moral domains (e.g., fairness; Graham et al., 2011) is a topic for future 
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research. Another interesting extension would be to ask whether different kinds of 
causal structures reliably produce different effects. Our vignettes were intentionally 
ambiguous about the causal chains and whether multiple agents overdetermined the 
harmful outcome. Contrasting diffusion in conjunctive moral transgressions (when 
collaboration is necessary for norm violation) with disjunctive ones (when only one 
individual would suffice) would be informative, since attributions of responsibility 
would generally be higher in the former case than the latter (Gerstenberg & 
Lagnado, 2010; Kelley, 1973; Lagnado et al., 2013; Morris & Larrick, 1995; 
Shaver, 1985; Zultan et al., 2012). 
Our findings highlight a divergence between legal theories of justice and 
laypeople's perceptions of apt punishment in cases of severe collective harm. As 
such, they shed light on the cognitive underpinnings of collective atrocities in the 
hopes of a more moral future. Whether and how the discrepancy can be addressed 
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4.5 Supplementary Material 
4.5.1 Experiment 1 
4.5.1.1 Outlier detection 
To perform tests of outlier detection, we used <outlier_function.r> from 
Performance package (Lüdecke et al., 2021), which uses Mahalanobis distance. 
We calculated the mean of punishment in all conditions of Outcome by Intention 
and used a multivariate approach to exclude the inattentive subjects with the alpha 
threshold is set to 0.025 (corresponding to the 2.5% most extreme observations). 
4.5.1.2 Mixed effect models 
4.5.1.2.1 Logistic mixed effect model 
We performed different ordinal logistic mixed-effect models by using package 
'ordinal' (Christensen et al., 2019). In all models we accounted for subjects and 
Items variability by adding them as random slopes to the model. 
4.5.1.2.2 Sanity check  
In model 0 we include Outcome and Intention as main factors for sanity check. 
Pairwise comparison between conditions for model 0 is presented in Table S 1 as 
well as Figure 1. 
 
 
Table S 1. 
Pairwise comparison of punishment for different levels of Intention by Outcome 
contrast estimate SE z.ratio p.value 
Innocent Death - Malign Death -1.8760254 0.0883773 21.227456 <.0001 
Innocent Death - Innocent Harmless 2.2000354 0.1007347 21.839906 <.0001 
Innocent Death - Malign Harmless 0.5258203 0.0818840 6.421525 <.0001 
Malign Death - Innocent Harmless 4.0760608 0.1151210 35.406760 <.0001 
Malign Death - Malign Harmless 2.4018457 0.0923410 26.010611 <.0001 
Innocent Harmless - Malign 
Harmless 
-1.6742151 0.0985121 16.995017 <.0001 
               P-value adjustment:  Tukey method for comparing a family of 3 estimates 
 
  




Figure S1. Intentional murder received the highest level of punishment, more than accidental 
killings and attempted murders, while neutral actions received the lowest amount of punishment. 
 
 
4.5.1.2.3 Main models  
In model 1, we added outcome in model 2 Intention and in model 3 both to our 
effect of interest Collectivity as an interaction effect, while accounting for subjects 
(TurkIDs) and Items as random factors in all models. Model comparisons favored 
model 3 (p<.0001, AIC=12358). Pairwise comparison between conditions in model 
3 is presented in Table S 2. 
 
 
Table S 2. 
Pairwise comparison of punishment for different levels of Intention by Outcome by Collectivity.  
contrast estimate SE z.ratio p.value 
Individual Innocent Death – Joint Innocent Death 0.4363 0.1278 3.4115 0.0149 
Individual Malign Death –Joint Malign Death 0.5746 0.1290 4.4514 0.0002 
Individual Innocent Harmless – Joint Innocent Harmless 0.9761 0.1660 -5.8785 <.0001 
Individual Malign Harmless – Joint Malign Harmless 0.0294 0.1286 0.2291 0.9999 
P-value adjustment:  Tukey method for comparing a family of 3 estimate 




Table S 3. 
Pairwise comparison of punishment as in Table S2 but including outliers  
contrast estimate SE z.ratio p.value 
Individual Innocent Death – Joint Innocent Death 0.3500 0.126 2.782 0.0949 
Individual Malign Death –Joint Malign Death 0.5746 0.1290 4.4514 0.0274 
Individual Innocent Harmless – Joint Innocent Harmless 0.9761 0.1660 -5.8785 <.0001 
Individual Malign Harmless – Joint Malign Harmless 0. 0325 0. 127 0. 2561 1.0000 
P-value adjustment:  Tukey method for comparing a family of 3 estimates 
 
 
4.5.1.3 Bayesian mixed model 
In addition to the frequentist approach above, we also performed Bayesian mixed 
effect analysis. This is an important analysis since our effect of interest was not 
significant in attempted cases. In order to examine this null effect, we used brms 
package in R (Bürkner, 2018), with 5000 iterations, 5 chains and weakly 
informative prior (model betas drawn from normal distribution; mean = 0 and SD 
= 1). Result highlights the interaction Collectivity by Outcome (BF10= 1,720,000, 
b = .71, SE = .13, CI. Lower = .13, CI. Upper = .46) more than Intention (BF10= 0.32, b 
= .64, SE = .13, CI. Lower = - .439 CI. Upper = .18). Pairwise comparison result of this 
model is shown in Table S 4.  
 
 
Table S 4. 
Pairwise comparison of Bayesian mixed effect model. 
Parameter CI CI_low CI_high BF10 
Individual Innocent Death - Joint Innocent Death 95 0.12 0.52 21.74 
Individual Malign Death – Joint Malign Death 95 0.29 0.69 498.32 
Individual Innocent Harmless - Joint Innocent Harmless 95 -0.61 -0.22 63.12 
Individual Malign Harmless - Joint Malign Harmless 95 -0.17 0.22 0.05 
 
4.5.1.4 Item-based analysis 
An item-based analysis was performed to compare the ratings for each item in 
different conditions. Repeated measure ANOVA test shows a significant difference 
between conditions across items in intentional and accidental cases. The result of 
the analysis is shown in Figure S1.  




Figure S2. Across 4 items in intentional murder and accidental killings, ANOVA test shows a 
significant difference between different conditions. Items are rated more punishable in Individual 
Condition in comparison to Joint Condition. The statistical test result is shown on the figure, using 
ggstatssplot package (Patil, 2021). 
 
 
4.5.2 Experiment 2 
4.5.2.1 Mixed effect models 
4.5.2.1.1 Linear mixed effect model experiment  
We performed different linear mixed-effect models by using package LME4 
(package lme4; Bates et al., 2015). In all models we accounted for subjects and 
Items variability by adding them as random slopes to the model. 
For experiment 2.1 we used three models, with condition as fixed factor in 
model1, its interaction with Domain model2 and without the interaction in model3. 
Model comparison showed no difference (Table S 5). 
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Table S 5.  
Model comparison between two models of punishment 
 npar AIC BIC logLik deviance Chisq Df Pr(>Chisq) 
M0_punishment 5 24930.31 24959.91 -12460.16 24920.31 NA NA NA 
M2_punishment 6 24930.00 24965.51 -12459.00 24918.00 2.3150673 1 0.1281258 
M1_punishment 7 24931.98 24973.41 -12458.99 24917.98 0.0150753 1 0.9022800 
 
 
For Harmfulness and Grossness, we used a model with Condition and Domain 
(with interaction term) as fixed factors. The result is shown in Table S 6 and Table 
S 7, respectively. 
 
 
Table S 6. 
Pairwise comparison of harmfulness for different levels of Domain by Collectivity. 
contrast estimate SE df t.ratio p.value 
Individual Harm - Joint Harm -0.5315015 1.497927 1325.211229 -0.3548247 0.9846839 
Individual Harm - Individual Purity 38.7623136 4.676596 6.321956 8.2885735 0.0005367 
Individual Harm - Joint Purity 39.5008489 4.774951 6.870517 8.2725147 0.0003567 
Joint Harm - Individual Purity 39.2938151 4.774964 6.870587 8.2291340 0.0003686 
Joint Harm - Joint Purity 40.0323503 4.686346 6.374827 8.5423373 0.0004316 
Individual Purity - Joint Purity 0.7385352 1.497848 1325.015195 0.4930643 0.9606476 
P-value adjustment:  Tukey method for comparing a family of 3 estimates 
 
 
For purity we adopted the same approach as above. The result is shown in Table 
S 7. 
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            Table S 7. 
Pairwise comparison of grossness for different levels of Domain by Collectivity. 
contrast estimate SE df t.ratio p.value 
Individual Harm - Joint Harm 0.57 1.7 1150.0 0.33 0.99 
Individual Harm - Individual Purity -41.45 2.4 7.4 -17.06 0.00 
Individual Harm - Joint Purity -42.29 2.7 11.9 -15.44 0.00 
Joint Harm - Individual Purity -42.03 2.7 11.9 -15.35 0.00 
Joint Harm - Joint Purity -42.86 2.5 7.6 -17.50 0.00 
Individual Purity - Joint Purity -0.84 1.7 1149.9 -0.48 0.96 
P-value adjustment:  Tukey method for comparing a family of 3 estimates 
 
 
We later performed a between subject analysis for two different domains: Harm 
and Purity. This exploratory analysis was done to check any carryover effect. In 
doing so, we checked the punishment for first Blocks (either Harm or Purity), 
averaged across each participant in a separate mixed effect with fixed effect of 
Domain and Collectivity accounted for Item variability (Table S8). We also used 
two different mixed effect models using the same method for purity and harm 
blocks separately, averaged for each participant but accounting for item variability 
(Table S9). 
 
Table S 8. 
Pairwise comparison punishment in harm and purity - between subject analysis of first blocks. 
contrast estimate SE df t.ratio p.value 
Individual Harm - Joint Harm 5.90 2.34 886.88 2.523 0.0571 
Individual Harm - Individual Purity 8.03 6.24 6.74 1.288 0.5981 
Individual Harm - Joint Purity 9.81 6.27 6.91 1.564 0.4540 
Joint Harm - Individual Purity 2.13 6.31 7.05 0.338 0.9857 
Joint Harm - Joint Purity 3.91 6.34 7.22 0.616 0.9238 
Individual Purity - Joint Purity 1.78 2.43 886.14 0.733 0.8838 
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Table S 9. 
Comparison punishment for harm vs, purity items - between subject analysis of the first blocks 
to exclude the carryover effect. 
contrast estimate SE df t.ratio p.value 
Individual Harm - Joint Harm 5.93 2.04 466 2.908 0.0038 
Individual Purity - Joint Purity 1.78 2.73 421 0.653 0.5144 





4.5.2.2 Bayesian mixed models 
In addition to the frequentist approach above, we also performed Bayesian mixed 
effect models for experiment 2.b. This is especially important since our effect of 
interest was a null result in purity violations. In order to examine this null effect, 
we used brms package in R (Bürkner, 2018), with 5000 iterations, 5 chains and 
weakly informative prior (model betas drawn from normal distribution; mean = 0 
and SD = 1). Result highlighted little evidence to reject the null hypothesis (BF10= 
1,720,000, b = .71, SE = .13, CI. Lower= .13 CI. Upper= .46). Pairwise comparison 
result of this model is shown in Table S10.  
4.5.3 Scenarios used in Experiment 1  
4.5.3.1 Individual neutral conditions:  
 
Rafting 
1- Monica and her friend are rafting down the Colorado River. Monica's friend 
is a novice. They stop by the bank to have a swim. Monica's friend starts to swim 
downstream. The next segment of the river is very tame this year. It is easy to 
swim through. Because Monica has rafted down this part of the Colorado River 
last year, she believes the next segment is very tame and gentle. She thinks her 
friend will be able to enjoy the scenery. Monica silently watches as her friend 
swims downstream. Monica's friend swims safely down the next segment of the 
river.  
Climbing 
2- Stacey and her friend are going rock climbing, and they are going to 
use harnesses to scale a gigantic cliff. Stacey's friend starts to put on the 
new harness. The clamp on the new harness is subtly flawed, so the whole 
harness is unsafe to use. Because Stacey bought the harness from a quality 
sports store, Stacey believes that the harness is in prime functioning 
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condition. Stacy's friend wears the harness. Halfway up the cliff, the 
harness gives way, and her friend plummets to her death. 
Swimming  
3- Peter is traveling in Africa with a friend. His friend sees a pond and 
wants to go wading in it because it is very hot. His friend begins to walk 
toward the pond. The pond is a good place for tourists. It does not contain 
any disease-carrying organisms. The water is unusually clean, so it is safe 
to wade in. Peter believes that it is not safe to wade in the pond because he 
heard stories about Malarial mosquitoes lives in the pond. Peter encourages 
his friend to wade in the pond. His friend loves the cool water and has a 
great time splashing around. 
Watching the dolphin  
4- Ryan is at the zoo with his nephew. They are watching the dolphin 
show when the nephew complains that his stomach hurts. Ryan's nephew 
is really sick. He is suffering from severe appendicitis. It may cause the 
appendix to burst, spreading infection throughout the abdomen. Ryan 
believes that his nephew's stomach hurts because of severe appendicitis. 
Ryan thinks that his nephew needs medical attention immediately. Ryan 
takes his nephew to see the monkeys next. His nephew starts feeling worse 
and soon blacks out and dies because of severe internal bleeding. 
4.5.3.2 Individual accidental conditions:  
Rafting 
5- Monica and her friend are rafting down the Colorado River. Monica's 
friend is a novice. They stop by the bank to have a swim. Monica's friend 
starts to swim downstream. The next segment of the river is very rough and 
fast this year. It is full of boulders that make it dangerous to swim through. 
Because Monica has rafted down this part of the Colorado River last year, 
she believes the next segment is very tame and gentle. She thinks her friend 
will be able to enjoy the scenery. Monica silently watches as her friend 
swims downstream. Monica's friend gets thrown by the current and crashes 
into a boulder and dies.  
Climbing 
6- Stacey and her friend are going rock climbing, and they are going to 
use harnesses to scale a gigantic cliff. Stacey's friend starts to put on the 
new harness. The new harness is a top-of-the-line model, in fine working 
condition, and completely safe to use. Because the clamp on the harness 
does not audibly click into place, Stacey believes that the harness is 
malfunctioning and not safe to use.  Stacy's friend wears the harness, scales 
the cliff safely, and enjoys the exhilarating experience. 
Swimming  
7- Peter is traveling in Africa with a friend. His friend sees a pond and 
wants to go wading in it because it is very hot. His friend begins to walk 
toward the pond. Malarial mosquitoes actually live in the pond. A single 
bite is enough to create an infection, so the pond is unsafe to wade in. Peter 
believes that it is not safe to wade in the pond because he heard stories 
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about Malarial mosquitoes lives in the pond. Peter encourages his friend to 
wade in the pond. His friend is bitten by several mosquitoes and contracts 
malaria, which leads to his death. 
Watching the dolphin show 
8- Ryan is at the zoo with his nephew. They are watching the dolphin 
show when the nephew complains that his stomach hurts. Ryan's nephew 
is really fine. His stomach sometimes hurts when he eats too much junk 
food, as on that day, but he usually feels a lot better after an hour or so. 
Ryan believes that his nephew's stomach hurts because he ate too much 
cotton candy and fried dough that afternoon. Ryan thinks his nephew just 
needs to walk it off. Ryan takes his nephew to see the monkeys next. His 
nephew starts feeling better. They end up seeing nearly all the exhibits at 
the zoo. 
4.5.3.3 Individual attempted conditions:  
Rafting 
9- Monica and her friend are rafting down the Colorado River. Monica's 
friend is a novice. They stop by the bank to have a swim. Monica's friend 
starts to swim downstream. The next segment of the river is very tame this 
year. It is easy to swim through. Because Monica has rafted down this part 
of the Colorado River last year, she believes that the next segment is very 
rough and dangerous. she thinks that the current will be too strong for her 
friend. Monica silently watches as her friend swims downstream. Monica's 
friend swims safely down the next segment of the river. 
Climbing 
10- Stacey and her friend are going rock climbing, and they are going 
to use harnesses to scale a gigantic cliff. Stacey's friend starts to put on the 
new harness. The clamp on the new harness is subtly flawed, so the whole 
harness is incredibly unsafe to use. Because the clamp on the harness does 
not audibly click into place, Stacey believes that the harness is 
malfunctioning and not safe to use. Stacy's friend wears the harness. 
Halfway up the cliff, the harness gives way, and her friend plummets to her 
death. 
Swimming  
11- Peter is traveling in Africa with a friend. His friend sees a pond and 
wants to go wading in it because it is very hot. His friend begins to walk 
toward the pond. The pond is a good place for tourists. It does not contain 
any disease-carrying organisms. The water is unusually clean, so it is safe 
to wade in. Peter believes that it is safe to wade in the pond because other 
tourists around them are doing it too and are obviously having fun. Peter 
encourages his friend to wade in the pond. His friend loves the cool water 
and has a great time splashing around. 
Watching the dolphin show 
12 - Ryan is at the zoo with his nephew. They are watching the dolphin 
show when the nephew complains that his stomach hurts. Ryan's nephew 
is really sick. He is suffering from severe appendicitis. It may cause the 
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appendix to burst, spreading infection throughout the abdomen. Ryan 
believes that his nephew's stomach hurts because he ate too much cotton 
candy and fried dough that afternoon. Ryan thinks his nephew just needs 
to walk it off. Ryan takes his nephew to see the monkeys next. His nephew 
starts feeling worse and soon blacks out and dies because of severe internal 
bleeding. 
4.5.3.4 Individual intentional conditions:  
Rafting 
13- Monica and her friend are rafting down the Colorado River. 
Monica's friend is a novice. They stop by the bank to have a swim. Monica's 
friend starts to swim downstream. The next segment of the river is very 
rough and fast this year. It is full of boulders that make it dangerous to 
swim through. Because Monica has rafted down this part of the Colorado 
River last year, she believes that the next segment is very rough and 
dangerous. She thinks that the current will be too strong for her friend. 
Monica silently watches as her friend swims downstream. Monica's friend 
gets thrown by the current and crashes into a boulder and dies.  
Climbing 
14-Stacey and her friend are going rock climbing, and they are going to 
use harnesses to scale a gigantic cliff. Stacey's friend starts to put on the 
new harness. The new harness is a top-of-the-line model, in fine working 
condition, and completely safe to use. Because Stacey bought the harness 
from a quality sports store, Stacey believes that the harness is in prime 
functioning condition. Stacy's friend wears the harness, scales the cliff 
safely, and enjoys the exhilarating experience. 
Swimming  
15 - Peter is traveling in Africa with a friend. His friend sees a pond and 
wants to go wading in it because it is very hot. His friend begins to walk 
toward the pond. Malarial mosquitoes actually live in the pond. A single 
bite is enough to create an infection, so the pond is unsafe to wade in. Peter 
believes that it is safe to wade in the pond because other tourists around 
them are doing it too and are obviously having fun. Peter encourages his 
friend to wade in the pond. His friend is bitten by several mosquitoes and 
contracts malaria, which leads to his death. 
Watching the dolphin show 
16- Ryan is at the zoo with his nephew. They are watching the dolphin 
show when the nephew complains that his stomach hurts. Ryan's nephew 
is really fine. His stomach sometimes hurts when he eats too much junk 
food, as on that day, but he usually feels a lot better after an hour or so. 
Ryan believes that his nephew's stomach hurts because of severe 
appendicitis. Ryan thinks that his nephew needs medical attention 
immediately. Ryan takes his nephew to see the monkeys next. His nephew 
starts feeling better. They end up seeing nearly all the exhibits at the zoo. 
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4.5.3.5 Group neutral conditions:  
Rafting 
17- Monica, Kate, Josh, and their friend Tom are rafting down the 
Colorado River. Tom is a novice. They stop by the bank to have a swim. 
Tom starts to swim downstream. The next segment of the river is very tame 
this year. It is very easy to swim through. Because Monica, Kate, and Josh 
have rafted down this part of the Colorado River last year together, they 
believe the next segment is very tame and gentle. They think Tom will be 
able to enjoy the scenery. They all silently watch as Tom swims 
downstream. Tom swims safely down the next segment of the river. 
Climbing 
18 - Stacey, Anita, James, and Kate are going rock climbing, and they 
are going to use harnesses to scale a gigantic cliff. Kate starts to put on the 
new harness. The clamp on the new harness is actually subtly flawed, so 
the whole harness is incredibly unsafe to use. Because Stacey, Anita, James 
bought the harness from a quality sports store together, they all believe that 
the harness is in prime functioning condition. Kate wears the harness. 
Halfway up the cliff, the harness gives way, and Kate plummets to her 
death. 
Swimming  
19 - Peter, Sophia, David, and Anna are traveling in Africa. Anna sees 
a pond and wants to go wading in it because it is very hot. She begins to 
walk toward the pond. A pond is a good place for tourists. It does not 
contain any disease-carrying organisms. The water is unusually clean, so it 
is safe to wade in. Peter, Sophia, David all believe that it is not safe to wade 
in the pond because they have heard stories about the Malarial mosquitoes 
in the pond. Peter, Sophia, and David encourage Anna to wade in the pond. 
Anna loves the cool water and has a great time splashing around.  
Watching the dolphin show 
20 - Ryan, Emma, and Joe are at the zoo with their nephew. They are 
watching the dolphin show when the nephew complains that his stomach 
hurts. Their nephew is really sick. He is suffering from severe appendicitis 
and. It may cause the appendix to burst, spreading infection throughout the 
abdomen. Ryan, Sophia, and Joe all believe that their nephew's stomach 
hurts because of severe appendicitis. Ryan, James, and Joe all think that 
their nephew needs medical attention immediately. Ryan, Sophia, and Joe 
take their nephew to see the monkeys next. Their nephew starts feeling 
worse and soon blacks out and dies because of severe internal 
inflammation. 
4.5.3.6 Group accidental conditions:  
Rafting 
21 - Monica, Kate, Josh, and their friend Tom are rafting down the 
Colorado River. Tom is a novice. They stop by the bank to have a swim. 
Tom starts to swim downstream. The next segment of the river is very 
rough and fast this year. It is full of boulders that make it dangerous to 
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swim through. Because Monica, Kate, and Josh have rafted down this part 
of the Colorado River last year together, they all believe the next segment 
is very tame and gentle. They think Tom will be able to enjoy the scenery. 
They all silently watch as Tom swims downstream. Tom gets thrown by 
the current and crashes into a gigantic boulder and dies. 
Climbing 
22- Stacey, Anita, James, and Kate are going rock climbing, and they 
are going to use harnesses to scale a gigantic cliff. Kate starts to put on the 
new harness. The new harness is a top-of-the-line model, in fine working 
condition, and completely safe to use. Because the clamp on the harness 
does not audibly click into place, Stacey, Anita, and James all believe that 
the harness is malfunctioning and not safe to use. Kate wears the harness, 
scales the cliff safely, and enjoys the exhilarating experience.  
Swimming 
23-Peter, Sophia, David, and Anna are traveling in Africa with a friend. 
Anna sees a pond and wants to go wading in it because it is very hot. Anna 
begins to walk toward the pond. Malarial mosquitoes actually live in the 
pond. A single bite is enough to create an infection, so the pond is unsafe 
to wade in. Peter, Sophia, and David believe that it is not safe to wade in 
the pond because they have heard stories about the Malarial mosquitoes in 
the pond. Peter, Sophia, and David encourage Anna to wade in the pond. 
Anna is bitten by several mosquitoes and contracts malaria, which leads to 
her death. 
Watching the dolphin show 
24- Ryan, Emma, and Joe are at the zoo with their nephew. They are 
watching the dolphin show when the nephew complains that his stomach 
hurts. Their nephew is really fine. His stomach sometimes hurts when he 
eats too much junk food, as on that day, but he usually feels a lot better 
after an hour or so. Ryan, Emma, and Joe believe that their nephew's 
stomach hurts because he ate too much cotton candy and fried dough that 
afternoon. Ryan, Emma, and Joe think their nephew just needs to walk it 
off. Ryan, Emma, and Joe take their nephew to see the monkeys next. Their 
nephew starts feeling better. They end up seeing nearly all the exhibits at 
the zoo. 
4.5.3.7 Group attempted conditions:  
Rafting 
25- Monica, Kate, Josh, and their friend Tom are rafting down the 
Colorado River. Tom is a novice. They stop by the bank to have a swim. 
Tom starts to swim downstream. The next segment of the river is very tame 
this year. It is very easy to swim through. Because Monica, Kate, and Josh 
have rafted down this part of the Colorado River last year together, they all 
believe that the next segment is very rough and dangerous. They think that 
the current will be too strong for Tom. They all silently watch as Tom 
swims downstream. Tom swims safely down the next segment of the river.  
 




26- Stacey, Anita, James, and Kate are going rock climbing, and they 
are going to use harnesses to scale a gigantic cliff. Kate starts to put on the 
new harness. The clamp on the new harness is actually subtly flawed, so 
the whole harness is incredibly unsafe to use. Because the clamp on the 
harness does not audibly click into place, Stacey, Anita, and James all 
believe that the harness is malfunctioning and not safe to use. Kate wears 
the harness. Halfway up the cliff, the harness gives way, and Kate 
plummets to her death.  
Swimming 
27- Peter, Sophia, David, and Anna are traveling in Africa. Anna sees 
a pond and wants to go wading in it because it is very hot. She begins to 
walk toward the pond. The pond is a good place for tourists. It does not 
contain any disease-carrying organisms. The water is unusually clean, so it 
is safe to wade in. Peter, Sophia, and David all believe that it is safe to wade 
in the pond because other tourists around them are doing it too and are 
obviously having fun. Peter, Sophia, and David encourage Anna to wade 
in the pond. Anna loves the cool water and has a great time splashing 
around. 
Watching the dolphin show 
28- Ryan, Emma, and Joe are at the zoo with their nephew. They are 
watching the dolphin show when the nephew complains that his stomach 
hurts. Their nephew is really sick. He is suffering from severe appendicitis, 
and it may cause the appendix to burst, spreading infection throughout the 
abdomen. Ryan, Emma, and Joe believe that their nephew's stomach hurts 
because he ate too much cotton candy and fried dough that afternoon. Ryan, 
Emma, and Joe think their nephew just needs to walk it off. Ryan, Emma, 
and Joe take their nephew to see the monkeys next. Their nephew starts 
feeling worse and soon blacks out and dies because of severe internal 
inflammation. 
4.5.3.8 Group intentional conditions:  
Rafting 
29- Monica, Kate, Josh, and their friend Tom are rafting down the 
Colorado River. Tom is a novice. They stop by the bank to have a swim. 
Tom starts to swim downstream. The next segment of the river is very 
rough and fast this year. It is full of boulders that make it dangerous to 
swim through. Because Monica, Kate, and Josh have rafted down this part 
of the Colorado River before, they all believe that the next segment is very 
rough and dangerous. They think that the current will be too strong for 
Tom. They all silently watch as Tom swims downstream. Tom gets thrown 
by the current and crashes into a gigantic boulder and dies.  
Climbing 
30- Stacey, Anita, James, and Kate are going rock climbing, and they 
are going to use harnesses to scale a gigantic cliff. Kate starts to put on the 
new harness. The new harness is a top-of-the-line model, in fine working 
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condition, and completely safe to use. Because Stacey, Anita, and James 
bought the harness together from a quality sports store, they all believe that 
the harness is in prime functioning condition. Kate wears the harness, 
scales the cliff safely, and enjoys the exhilarating experience. 
Swimming 
31- Peter, Sophia, David, and Anna are traveling in Africa. Anna sees 
a pond and wants to go wading in it because it is very hot. She begins to 
walk toward the pond. Malarial mosquitoes actually live in the pond. A 
single bite is enough to create an infection, so the pond is unsafe to wade 
in. Peter, Sophia, and David believe that it is safe to wade in the pond 
because other tourists around them are doing it too and are obviously 
having fun. Peter, Sophia, and David encourage Anna to wade in the pond. 
Anna is bitten by several mosquitoes and contracts malaria, which leads to 
her death. 
Watching the dolphin show 
32- Ryan, Emma, and Joe are at the zoo with their nephew. They are 
watching the dolphin show when the nephew complains that his stomach 
hurts. Their nephew is really fine. His stomach sometimes hurts when he 
eats too much junk food, as on that day, but he usually feels a lot better 
after an hour or so. Ryan, Emma, and Joe believe that their nephew's 
stomach hurts because of severe appendicitis. Ryan, Emma, and Joe all 
think that their nephew needs medical attention immediately. Ryan, Emma, 
and Joe take their nephew to see the monkeys next. Their nephew starts 
feeling better. They end up seeing nearly all the exhibits at the zoo.  
4.5.4 Scenarios used in Experiment 2  
Domain: Harm 
Zoo- Group 
 Ryan, Emma, and Joe are siblings and at the zoo with their nephew. 
They are watching the dolphin show when their nephew complains that his 
stomach hurts. Their nephew is sick. He is suffering from severe 
appendicitis, and it may cause the appendix to burst, spreading the infection 
throughout the abdomen. Ryan, Emma, and Joe know that their nephew 
needs immediate medical attention. Still, they take him to see the monkeys 
instead of going to a hospital, although they know it is dangerous. Their 
nephew starts feeling worse and soon blacks out because of severe internal 
inflammation. 
Zoo-Alone 
 Ryan is at the zoo with his nephew. They are watching the dolphin 
show when his nephew complains that his stomach hurts. His nephew is 
sick. He is suffering from severe appendicitis, and it may cause the 
appendix to burst, spreading the infection throughout the abdomen. 
Ryan knows that his nephew needs immediate medical attention. Still, he 
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takes him to see the monkeys instead of going to the hospital, although he 
knows it is dangerous. His nephew starts feeling worse and soon blacks out 
because of severe internal inflammation. 
Rock Climbing- Group  
Stacey, Anita, James, and Kate are all friends. One day they decide to 
go rock climbing. They are going to use new harnesses to scale a gigantic 
cliff. Kate starts to put on one of the harnesses. The clamp on the harness 
is actually flawed, so the whole harness is incredibly unsafe to use. Because 
the clamp on the harness does not audibly click into 
place, Stacey, James, and Anita realize that the harness is malfunctioning 
and not safe to use. Still, they strap Kate into the harness and ask Kate to 
go first, although they know it is dangerous. Partway up the cliff, the 
harness gives way, causing Kate to fall and break both her legs.  
Rock Climbing- Alone 
Stacey and Kate are friends and decide to go rock climbing. They are 
going to use harnesses to scale a gigantic cliff. Kate starts to put on one of 
the harnesses. The clamp on the harness is actually flawed, so the whole 
harness is incredibly unsafe to use. Because the clamp on the harness does 
not audibly click into place, Stacey realizes that the harness is 
malfunctioning and not safe to use. Still, she straps Kate into the harness 
and asks Kate to go first, although she knows it is dangerous. Partway up 
the cliff, the harness gives way, causing Kate to fall and break both her legs. 
Party - Group  
Charles, Grace, and Dan are classmates. They are at a party where 
people are drinking lots of beer. They are having fun mingling when they 
notice a friend on a couch with his eyes closed. Their friend had just failed 
his examinations and was drinking heavily to take his mind off them. He 
has passed out now. Charles, Grace, and Dan believe that their friend drank 
too much and needs immediate help. Charles, Grace, and Dan decide to 
hide their friend under some pillows, so nobody sees him, although they 
know it is dangerous for him. Their friend gets severe alcohol poisoning 
and remains in a coma for a day. 
Party – Alone 
 Charles is at a party with a friend, where people are drinking lots of 
beer. He is having fun mingling when he notices his friend on a couch with 
his eyes closed. His friend had just failed his examinations and was 
drinking heavily to take his mind off them. He has passed out 
now. Charles believes that his friend drank too much and 
needs immediate help. Charles decides to hide his friend under some 
pillows, so nobody sees him, although he knows it is dangerous for 
him. His friend gets severe alcohol poisoning and remains in a coma for a 
day.  
Rafting - Group  
Susan, Steve, and Jane are gym buddies. They are rafting down the 
Colorado River with Tom, who is a novice. They stop by the bank to swim. 
Tom starts to swim downstream. The next segment of the river is very 
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rough and fast this year. It is full of gigantic boulders that make it 
dangerous to swim through. Susan, Steve, and Jane have rafted down this 
part of the river before; they believe that the next segment is very rough. 
They think that the current will be too strong for Tom. Susan, Steve, 
and Jane still decide to encourage Tom to swim in the river. They watch as 
their friend swims downstream, knowing it is dangerous for him. Tom gets 
thrown by the current and crashes into a gigantic boulder, and breaks his 
head. 
Rafting – Alone 
Susan is rafting down the Colorado River with Tom, who is a novice. 
They stop by the bank to swim. Tom starts to swim downstream. The next 
segment of the river is very rough and fast this year. It is full of gigantic 
boulders that make it dangerous to swim through. Susan has rafted down 
this part of the river before; she believes that the next segment is very 
rough. She thinks that the current will be too strong for Tom. Susan still 
decides to encourage Tom to swim in the river. She watches as her friend 
swims downstream, knowing it is dangerous for him. Tom gets thrown by 




Corpse - Group 
 Linda, Moira, and Regina are all colleagues and work in a morgue. 
They all have had wild sexual fantasies about touching corpses. One night, 
Linda, Moira, and Regina decide to enter the morgue late at night. They 
touch the genitals of a corpse in the dark to their hearts' desire, making sure 
they cannot be seen, not even by each other. After that, they ensure that the 
corpse is intact and the morgue is exactly as it was before and leave. 
Corpse - Alone 
 Linda works in a morgue. She has had wild sexual fantasies about 
touching corpses. One night, Linda decides to enter the morgue late at 
night. She touches the genitals of a corpse in the dark to her heart's desire, 
making sure she cannot be seen. After that, she ensures that the corpse is 
intact and the morgue is exactly as it was before and leaves. 
Singer - Group  
Dan, Ray, and Carl are friends. Their favorite singer has died and has 
been buried in a nearby cemetery. They have all had wild fantasies about 
the singer. One night according to a previous plan, Dan, Ray, and Carl enter 
the cemetery late at night. They masturbate over the singer's grave, making 
sure they cannot be seen, not even by themselves. After that, they make 
sure that the grave is clean and exactly as it was before and leaves. 
Singer – Alone 
 Dan's favorite singer has died and has been buried in a nearby cemetery. 
Dan has always had wild fantasies about the singer. One night, according 
to a previous plan, Dan enters the cemetery late at night. He masturbates 
over the singer's grave, making sure he cannot be seen, not even by himself. 
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After that, he makes sure that the grave is clean and exactly as it was before 
and leaves. 
Human- Group 
 Anne, Monica, and Janet are colleagues. They work in a research 
institute where people donate their organs for scientific purposes after their 
death. They have been keen to eat human flesh once for the sake of 
experiencing its taste. One night, Anne, Monica, and Janet decide to enter 
the lab late at night. They cut from one of the corpses a body part that had 
already been studied and is no longer useful for any scientific 
purpose. After they make sure it is completely free of any contamination, 
they bring the small piece of human flesh home, cook it and eat it with 
bread and wine. They enjoy it, and nothing bad happens later. 
Human – Alone 
Anne works in a research institute where people donate their organs for 
scientific purposes after their death. She has been keen to eat human flesh 
once for the sake of experiencing its taste. One night, Anne decides to enter 
the lab late at night and cut from one of the corpses from a body part that 
had already been studied and is no longer useful for any scientific 
purpose. After she makes sure it is completely free of any contamination, 
she brings the small piece of human flesh home, cooks it, and eats it with 
bread and wine. She enjoys it, and nothing bad happens later. 
Ash – Group 
 Joe, Eli, and Liz are young siblings. Even though their grandmother is 
not alive anymore, they still hate her. Before her death, their grandmother 
asked them to have her remains cremated after her death. She also asked 
them to keep the ashes in a beautiful urn. Joe, Eli, and Liz do exactly what 
their grandmother asked them to do, but also, they add a large amount of 
dog faeces into an urn of their grandmother's ashes.  
Ash – Alone 
 Joe is a young adult. Even though his grandmother is not alive anymore, 
he still hates her. Before her death, her grandmother asked him to have her 
remains cremated after her death. She also asked him to keep her ashes in 
a beautiful urn. Joe does exactly what his grandmother asked him to do, but 
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In this thesis, I aimed at tackling the collective aspect of cognition, examining 
different moral decisions and judgments in (and for) groups. After historically 
approaching the burgeoning field of moral decisions and judgments in groups 
(chapter 1), which was conceptually clarified under the unifying term of collective 
turn in moral cognition (chapter 2), I empirically examined collective moral 
judgments in small interactive groups (chapter 3) and in individuals seeking to 
punish collective vs. solo moral violations (chapter 4) across several experiments. 
In the first chapter, I showed how this thesis would be tied to a family of recent 
collectivist views that aim at exploring the process and the content of cognition in 
joint tasks. Introducing the objectives and scopes of the thesis, I argued that the 
collective dimension was historically entrenched to understanding morality, 
attracted relatively little attention later, but recently became central to the study of 
moral cognition, once again.  
In the second chapter, I developed a theoretical framework that described the 
mechanisms of moral decisions and judgments in groups. I argued that collective 
moral decisions and judgments could be different from both moral decisions made 
by individuals and non-moral decisions made by collectives. I discussed why these 
two aspects could make collective moral cognition a distinct target of 
investigations. 
In particular, I reviewed the social dynamics that surface in collective moral 
settings, making group decisions and judgments different from the statistical 
aggregates of individual moral opinions. Drawing on recent work in moral 
philosophy, moral psychology, and cognitive neuroscience, I argued that emotions, 
automatic and deliberative processes, virtue-signaling, and diffusion of 
responsibility could be modulated in collective moral contexts.  
Next, reviewing the psychology of meta-ethical commitments (i.e., the degree to 
which we see moral matters as solid mind-independent facts or personal mind-
dependent opinions), I argued that moral issues would not be construed as facts or 
opinions uniformly across individuals. In fact, meta-ethical commitments might 
vary depending on the topic, individual differences, and social factors, leading to 
specific challenges in collective moral discussions. Reviewing these challenges, I 
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argued why this metaethical heterogeneousness could make collective moral tasks 
different from collective non-moral tasks. Proposing that the machinery of moral 
cognition should be tackled at the collective level, this chapter ended with the 
implications of collective moral discussions in real-life issues. Certain difficulties 
when discussing moral issues at the group level were also discussed. 
In the third chapter, building upon the group dynamics suggested in chapter two, 
I proposed and tested three hypotheses concerning collective judgments vs. 
individual judgments. The analysis showed that participants were more utilitarian 
collectively after short social discussions. In other words, groups, after short 
discussions, found it more acceptable to violate moral norms that increased the total 
good, compared to conditions in which the participants evaluated these violations 
individually. Hence, the collective consensuses on these moral dilemmas were more 
utilitarian than the individual moral judgments aggerated statistically.  
When participants were asked to provide their individual judgments for the 
second time, but this time after the discussions, their private judgments remained 
unchanged. Put differently, people did not keep the collective utilitarian boost in 
their private judgments. This indicated ‘no change of mind’ in private moral 
evaluations of moral dilemmas. As the participants did not change their private 
moral judgments after the discussions, the collective utilitarian boost in groups 
could not be the result of social deliberation (utilitarian boost via social deliberation 
would have affected the second individual judgments). This observation was more 
consistent with the hypothesis that suggested stress would be reduced in collective 
settings: when in groups, the emotional burden of moral judgments could be shared, 
potentially resulting in higher utilitarian scores only in groups. 
In the last chapter, I studied moral violations to investigate how people seek to 
punish collective moral violations compared to solo moral violations. Accounting 
for intention, outcome, and moral domain, across three experiments, I showed that 
people punished individual characters in accidental and intentional harmful 
violations less when they committed these violations jointly with others. Put it 
differently, characters who violated moral norms with others received less 
punishment than lone perpetrators in harmful actions. 
 Consistent with a pre-registered hypothesis, further analysis showed that people 
punished individuals less in collective moral violations (compared to solo 
violations) only when these violations entailed harmful outcomes. In other words, 
the reduction of punishment was observed when the collective actions were harmful 
to a (hypothetical) victim. By contrast, when this criterion was not satisfied (i.e., in 
victimless actions), the deserved punishment level for solo vs. collective violations 
remained unchanged. In particular, as predicted, when moral violations did not lead 
to harmful outcomes (e.g., eating human flesh collectively) or when they were 
intended to be harmful but failed (e.g., failed attempts of group murders), no 
reduction of punishment was observed in collective norm violations.  
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 I argued how this result could be consistent with causal accounts of punishment 
attribution, which proposed discounted punishments in collective harmful 
transgressions. I explained how this finding could be explained by causal 
discounting in responsibility attribution. Using ‘punishment’ as a proxy of moral 
responsibility and extending the diffusion of responsibility to attributions thereof, 
the hypothesis - that a person who violates a norm with others could be perceived 
as less responsible, hence deserving less punishment - was tested more directly. The 
analysis explained how the interaction between intention, outcome, and domain in 
group violations could support the causal attribution of responsibility. Having a 
causal attribution approach, I argued why we did not see this effect in collective 
victimless moral violations such as cannibalism or even failed attempts of murders.  
The contribution of this thesis to the field of cognitive science is fourfold. First, 
revitalizing the collectivist approach in moral decisions and judgments, this thesis 
ties the collective empirical studies to pioneering theoretical work in collective 
morality. Second, it extends the recent collectivist views in non-moral joint tasks 
(e.g., joint attention) to collective moral tasks (e.g., joint moral judgments – chapter 
3) while proposing that joint moral tasks are qualitatively and cognitively different 
from individual moral tasks (chapter 2). Third, it connects the recently emerging 
trend in group-based morality to interactive and collective morality, when the 
agents of the moral decision or judgments are a group (chapter 2 and 3). Finally, it 
proposes a mechanistic explanation for the reduction of punishment in collective 
immoral actions. Hence, this thesis specified three different aspects of the collective 
dimension in moral cognition: collective moral decisions (chapter 2), collective 
moral judgments (chapter 3), and collective moral actions (chapter 4). 
All chapters of this thesis were descriptive, aimed at showing how moral 
judgments in collectives (and for collectives) work, rather than showing how they 
should work. Given the interactive nature of moral judgments and decisions in real 
life, the broader ramifications of this work for scientific research are that we need 
to treat collective moral cognition as an independent target of investigation in order 
to have a comprehensive understanding of the machinery of interactive moral 
decisions and judgments in real life.  
Accordingly, collective moral cognition is not only central to understanding the 
mechanics of moral cognition but also to understanding real-life collective moral 
decisions and judgments. The insight from research in moral decisions and 
judgments for and in groups could then inform moral theories in philosophy and 
social sciences to propose solutions for real-life collective moral issues. 
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Given that collective moral judgments and decisions often have profound 
political and societal consequences, the collective approach in the moral domain 
seems critical. Positive solutions to today’s morally relevant challenges – from 
environmental problems to moral conflicts– cannot be anything other than the 
product of collective endeavors. Although the primary purpose of this thesis was to 
understand moral decisions and judgments in collective contexts, studies in 
collective moral cognition might also be beneficial in understanding real-life moral 
challenges.  
For instance, at the time of writing this thesis, policymakers face numerous 
collective morally relevant challenges during the COVID19 pandemic, such as the 
decisions to vaccinate citizens to save their lives, while vaccinations might have 
adverse side-effects in minority groups; to offer health-care facilities to younger 
populations but sacrifice older individuals when the resources are scarce, or to 
mitigate the animal rights to accelerate the process of the vaccine development. 
These real-life moral dilemmas are not solved by single individuals in isolation. 
Their solutions are the outcome of several discussions in medical, political, and 
ethics committees. Though not purely moral, such decisions have solid moral 
components and need certain collective moral considerations before any further 
applications.  
Collective moral decisions are not confined to extreme epochs such as 
pandemics. Similarly, the critical challenges we humans face today comprise an 
important share of our social and political sphere while entailing solid moral 
components. In many of these cases, our existence may depend on the solutions we 
may find collectively to resolve them. In this light, the lack of a scientific 
understanding of the mechanism underlying the collective aspects of moral 
decisions and judgments may result in high human, environmental, and existential 
costs. While I acknowledge the oversimplicity of the normative solutions that can 
be proposed to solve social challenges via empirical interventions, overlooking the 
complexity of the topic, I believe that understanding the collective aspects of moral 
cognition, which was the primary goal of this thesis, could also contribute to 
understanding the mechanisms of such morally relevant social challenges we 
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